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This thesis presents and tests a model for Entry,
Conduct, and Termination of a limited war. Employing the
"Focused Comparison" methodology, an attempt is made to
relate this "Limited War Model" to a pair of historical case
studies. The cases analyzed in this endeavor are the Korean
War spanning the years 1950-1953 and the Falklands Far of
1982. In the former the analysis is concentrated on the
decisions of the United States, while the latter deals
primarily with the deliberations of the United Kingdom. The
findings of the study are encapsulated in the final chapter.
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The use of force as an instrument of foreign policy has
been the subject of debate and controversy since the dawn of
recorded history. This problem, over the years, has been
influenced to varying degrees by cultural, philosophical,
and political considerations. Today, with the advent of
nuclear weapons the appropriate employment of force has
become more imperative than ever. This thesis will present
a model for the measured use of armed force in a "limited
war". Within this context, the Entry, Conduct and
Termination phases of such a conflict are each addressed.
The study begins with a general overview of limited war,
seeking both a definition for the concept, as well as an
explanation for its prevalence in our world today. The
model for employing this instrument is then presented and
tested using the "Focused Comparison" methodology . i In this
regard, two cases, the Korean War and the Falklands War, are
examined and analyzed. This is followed by an examination
of the findings of the research and its impact on the theo-
retical paradigm herein presented.
^Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory
Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison"
in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed.. Diplomacy: New Approaches in
Historjy, Theory, and Policy JHev TorK: T5e Free Fress,
T¥7?y, pp. ZTJ-Eb.
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The examination of war has lonj been a preoccupation of
man. From the days of the "Bronze Age" to the current era
of the technological battlefield man has attempted to under-
stand the motives and/or causes of war. Pruitt and Snyder
state that three motivational and perceptual concepts are
most often associated with the causes of war. They are:
1) goals that can be advanced through war 2) the perception of
threat, and 3) hostility toward ether states. 2 while these
generalizations are admittedly thought provoking, Pruitt and
Snyder also note that they fall far shy of an ideal and
integrated theory addressing the causation of war. 3 in
short, the psychological phenomenon underlying the recur-
rence of war remains little understood.*
Because an understanding of the specific roots of war
continue to elude us we necessarily lack the appropriate
mechanisms to prevent its continued occurrence. I It is this
situation that led Morton Halperin to deduce that we must
"take seriously the problem of how war, once it erupts, can
be kept limited. "^ Hence, to begin our study, the questions
that we must address are: Why and how are wars limited?
And, how can we successfully function in an environment of
"limited war"? It is the first of these inquiries that we
will concern ourselves with in this chapter- The second
will be addressed with the presentation of the Limited War
Model in the chapter following.
2Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, ed.. Theory and
Research on the Causes of War (Znglewood Cliffs, TTJ:
Pren'EIce-HalI7~Inc77~19^'?) 7~p. T5.
3Ibid, p. 31.
*An example of seme of the ether attempts at under-
standing the causes of war are: Raymond Aron, The Century of
Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954); E. F. FT. HurBIn and
J7 Bawley, Personal Aggressiveness ana War (New York
:
Columbia university Press, J13'9T; and Kans J. Morganthau,
Politics Among, Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
l^&TJyT
^Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New
York: John Wiley 5 Sons, Inc., 19EJJ", p. 7.
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A. LIMITED WAR: 07EBVIEH AND DEFINITION
The practice of limited war is as old as man himself.
In fact, many would argue that wars have more often been
limited than total. However, this statement only has
meaning if we agree on a definition for the term limited
war, for war rarely seems limited to those whose lives it
touches and sometimes destroys. It is in search of this
definition that we now turn.
Clausewitz, writing in the 19th century, was familiar
with both "limited" and "unlimited" wars, although he never
made the distinction. Yet, even he realized that war rarely
took its most absolute form. Clausewitz noted that war is
"an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."^ *•—'
Nevertheless, it was also "an act of policy" whose "reason
always lies in some political situation" and whose "occasion
is always due to some political object. "^ To Clausewitz,
war, as an instrument of national policy, was inseparable
from the political goal toward which it was directed. Thus,
if the goal (s) toward which war is directed it can be under-
stood and weighed, then possibly they could be categorized
into limited and unlimited varieties. In this regard, the
study of history sheds some light.
The Third Punic "Sar is often cited as the classical
example of an unlimited war- It is also a case where the
formulation of objectives affected the type of war pursued.
The goal of this conflict, for the eventual winner Rome, was
the complete destruction of its rival city-state, Carthage.
Even after they were victorious militarily, the Romans
insisted on the eradication of all the remaining vestiges of
*Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans, by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1976), p. 75.
^ibid, pp. 86-7.
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Carthage. 8 So efficient were the Romans at this task that
the term "Carthaginian Peace" is now synonymous with the
pursuit of the total annihilation of the enemy. This war
exhibits clearly one of the factors on which the classifica-
tion of a war as limited or unlimited can be judged, the
extent of the aims or goals in the conflict by the respec-
tive belligerents. Thus, the formulation of "the ends"
toward which a war is directed help to distinguish its
variety.
Another historical example helps to point out the other
factor in the equation from which the categorization of war
is derived. In this regard, the wars of the 18th century
offer a good case for examination. The value of these
conflicts lies in the fact that they are often mentioned as
paramount examples of limited war. Robert Endicott Osgood
notes that warfare in this era "was conducted so as to
interfere with the lives of the civilian population--and
especially the merchants--as little as possible and so as to
conserve the soldiery as much as possible. ""^ In these
conflicts the implements of war were actually constrained so
that the level of violence was noticeably reduced. Though
the extent and scope of violence is not the primary factor
on which one would classify a conflict as limited or total
it is, nevertheless, indicative of something that is more
important, the employment of the means of war. Therefore,
the wars of the 18th century were limited principally
because there was a constraint on the resources devoted to
their pursuit. In this circumstance, the wars were limited
\due to a restraint on means-
^Salt was actually sown on top of the ruins of the
defeated city to assure it would never arise again.
^Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy
(Chicago: TEe UniversiTy of Chicago Press, 1957)", p. 64.
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We see that war may be limited as a result of a
restraint of ends or means. It would follow that it also
may he limited as a result of the combination of both. But,
why is limited war employed in our contemporary era? It is
to the answer of this guery that we now turn.
The last two hundred years have seen a growth in the
totality of war. The convergence of two phenomenon help
explain this trend. The mixture of technological advances
in war which made the scope of destruction more widespread
and concurrently less manageable, along with the advent and
growth of nationalism and the raising and employment of
"citizen armies" spelled a new age of unrestricted warfare.
This change was foreshadowed by the Napoleonic Wars where
the co-development of an efficient machinery of war and the
"citizen-soldier" of France almost succeeded in dominating
the European continent and ushered in a twenty-five year
period of unlimited war-
Historically, one could trace this change to the decla-
ration made in June 1789 by the National Assembly of France,
which spoke for the Third Estate or "bourgeoisie", that it
now represented the "national will" of the state. As a
result of this statement and similar developments that
followed, the pursuit of war would, ultimately, no longer be
connected with the goals of individual rulers or monarchs,
which were often limited, but, with the survival and will of
a nation. (One might recall that this was also the case in
Home during the Punic Wars.) Thus, the wars of the French
Republic and its extension, the Napoleonic Empire, with the
French soldier fighting for himself and his nation through a
well-oiled military machine, were unlimited in both their
means employed and ends sought.
Both the world wars of this century were also caught up
in this convergence. They, in a very real way, were battles
for the life and death of nations. Because the stakes of
13
these wars was so enormous they were virtually unlimited in
ioth means and ends. They were, in fact, total. It was
only the explosion of the atomic bombs at the end the second
of these conflicts that reoriented the thrust of war because
it realigned the calculus of useable means and obtainable
ends on the battlefield.
This change was, at first, not readily apparent. Though
B. H. Liddell- Hart had warned as early as 1946 that,
"<u>nlimited warfare as we have known it in the past thirty
years is not compatible with the atomic age" this was not
reflected in early post-war planning. lo As an example,
LFMCON, the U.S. plan for war against the Soviet Union
dated July 21,1948, called for "an air offensive against
vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity" and noted
that the "assumption is made that authority to employ atomic
weapons has been obtained, "ii This strategic blueprint
reflected total confidence in the American nuclear monopoly,
whereby the U.S. could use these weapons without fear of
reprisal in kind. This situation was abruptly changed when
the U.S.S.R., in 1949, joined the "nuclear club".
The explosion of the Soviet "bomb" and the experience of
the Korean War, a conflict that was very much limited in
both means and eventually ends, 12 generated a large
outgrowth of limited war theory in the late 1950*s.i3 Host
of this material stressed a return to the Clausewitzian
^ ^^lOB. H. Liddell-Hart, "War- Limited," Harper's, Vol.
192, No. 1150, March 1946, p. 200.
ii"JCS 1844/3: Brief of Short Range Emergency War Plan"
reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed..




i2The Korean War will be analyzed in detail in Chapters
4-6.
1 3An excellent annotated bitliography of the literature
pertaining to limited war in this period can be found in
halperin, pp. 133-184. It includes 343 entries.
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principle of welding the employment of force to its
political goal. Two works, authored by Henry Kissinger and
Robert Endicott Osgood respectively, stand out in this era.
In his classic N uclear Weapons and Foreign Policjy,
Kissinger advocated the strengthening of the connection of
politics to military action. Tc him, a limited war was a
conflict "fought for specific political objectives which, by
their very existence, tend to establish a relationship
between the force employed and the goal to be obtained. "i
*
Osgood, whose book. Limited War: The Challenge to American
Strategy, received almost as much attention as Kissinger's
delineated a similar theme. He stressed the use of "economy
of force" in the implementation of national policy. Osgood
described this as "no greater f crce. .. employ ed than is
necessary to achieve the objective toward which it is
directed. "15
As a result of these works a tremendous amount of
material was produced addressing the possibilities of
limited war. Though much of it was addressed to the nuclear
scenario, there were exceptions. Maxwell Taylor's An
Uncertain Trumpet was one of these.
Taylor's work, while primarily intended as a refutation
of the current doctrine of "massive retaliation", neverthe-
less, included comments on limited war. While acknowledging
the need for nuclear weapons to use in cases of national
survival (which he defined as an actual or incoming atomic
attack on the continental United States or a major attack on
Western Europe) he asserted that on conventional weapons
would necessarily rest the primary dependence for countering
all other "forms of military operations." Though tactical
nuclear weapons might eventually be used even in these
1 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreiqn Policy
(New York: Harper 5 Brothefs7~l'957r7~p7~75T
iSQsgood, p. 18.
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scenarios, it would only he "in comparatively rare cases
where their use would be in our national interest. "i* To
reserve the ability to continue to function successfully in
an environment where, he felt, the utility of nuclear
weapons was waning, Taylor suggested the strategy of "flex-
ible response". This would include several "quick fixes",
the first and foremost of which would be "improved planning
and training for limited war."*'' To implement this strategy
Taylor suggested the creation of a joint service staff, to
be known as the Limited War Command, which could plan for
the rapid movement and employment of conventional forces in
contingency situations- i^
Scholarly work on limited war continued through the
1960 's. In 1965 Herman Kahn published his well-known work
On Escalation. In this book he called a limited conflict an
"agreed battle" and put forward a step-by-step progression
that extended from a disagreement or cold war to a spasm or
insensate war.i^ This escalation ladder (44 steps in all)
pictured a continuum of conflict yet, also acknowledged that
there were thresholds which separated the escalation of the
use of force into recognizable sections. Among these was
the nuclear threshold which segregated the wholesale employ-
ment of conventional from nuclear weapons and also included
"Large Scale Conventional War" as a distinct possibility. 20
Though Kahn*s purpose was to demonstrate the logical
progression of escalation, his work put limited war, as we
i^Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trump.et (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1 9 59) ,~pp.T^"5^TTF7~
i7ibid, p. 139.
isjbid, p. 143.
i^Kahn credits Max Singer with the first use of the term
"agreed iattle".
20The entire Kahn Escalation Ladder (steps 1-44) can be
found in Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York; Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1953) p.T5.
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know it today, in perspective. That is, a conflict fought
entirely under the nuclear threshold yet, one which could
include the possibility of a nuclear threat. As Kahn wrote,
such a war, in conjunction with the Kennedy Administration's
adoption of Taylor's "flexible response", was going on in
the tiny Asian country of Vietnam.
It was the American experience in Vietnam that forced a
theoretical reconsideration of the use of limited force in
the furtherance of the national interest. The failure to
properly employ the instrument of limited war was wrongly
perceived, by many, as a repudiation of the instrument
itself. Yet, the emerging nuclear parity of the superpowers
still propelled the United States toward the limitation of
the use of force in its relations with the outside world.
In short, the theoreticians were in a quandary. Few dared
to advocate the course of limited war after the debacle in
Vietnam. 21
Yet, wars which were limited in scope continued to be
quite numerous. In the years 19U5-1969 Seymour Deitchman
found forty-six instances of limited war. Furthermore, in
all but three of these cases there was some form of "Third
Power" involvement, though only twenty-one included the
actual employment of outside military force- In the fifteen
years that have transpired since Deitchman »s study it can be
safely asserted that the number of both incidents and
related military interventions have increased rather
substantially. 22
2 iFor one of the more balanced views stemming from this
period see: Richard M. Pfeffer, ed.. No More Vietnams? (New
York: Harper & Row, 1968)
.
22SeYmour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense




"Hhy has limited war become so prevalent in our world
today? Two reasons stand out: 1) the emergence, prolifera-
tion, and fear of the use of nuclear weapons, and 2) the
continuing inability of nation-states to settle their
differences short of armed conflict. This is particularly
true of the great or nuclear poviers who must carefully
measure their response to any and every conflict, for most
experts agree that the greatest chance for nuclear conflict
lies in the catalyst of miscalculation. Yarmolinsky and
Foster call this the "paradox of limited response" whereby a
great power must be careful "to limit it military objectives
so as not to escalate to general nuclear war. "23
Both the aversion to the use of nuclear weapons as
instruments of war and their inability to deter the same
have been amply demonstrated since their dual use in the
summer of 1945. Although hundreds of nuclear weapons have
been detonated for test purposes in the intervening period
there is not a single verifiable instance of their use in
armed conflict since the destruction of the Japanese indus-
trial city of Nagasaki. Admittedly, some of these nuclear
tests might be classified as coercive diplomacy. 2* Yet
overall, these weapons are perceived as held only to deter
their use by other states. In the words of former Secretary
of Defense Eobert McNamara: "...nuclear weapons serve no
purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless—except only
to deter one's opponent from from using them."25 The history
of the nuclear age has not disproven the ex-Secretary '
s
23Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster, Paradoxes of
Power (Bloomington, IN; Indiana University Press, I'S'Biy
,
p. IT.
2*The atmospheric detonation of at least thirteen
weapons by the Soviet Union over a twenty-five day period in
September 1961, as a backdrop to the crisis surrounding the
construction of the Berlin Wall, is a good example of this.
2SRobert S. McNamara, "The Military F.ole of Nuclear
Weapons," Foreigji Affairs^ Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, p. 79.
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statement. In fact it can be safely said that in situations
short of national survival the role of nuclear weapons
conforms closely to the HcNamara conceptualization.
However, as has been noted , armed conflict continues as
a means to achieve political ends among the actors on the
international scene today. In this regard, the discovery
and production of nuclear weapons is similar to the use of
the longbow by the English at the Battle of Crecy in 1346.
It has redefined the scope, strategy, and tactics of war but
has not rid the world of its causes.
The "common currency" used to settle those disputes that
arise is still power and "the basic measure of a nation's
power <remains> its ability to wage war in defense of its
interests". 26 The implication is not that all disputes
should be settled through the vehicle of military power.
However, the ability to employ military force is an integral
part of what Klaus Knorr called the "power package". 27
Included in this are both military and non-military means
for the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. The
employment of force is important in this context as both a
complement and, in some case, a final method by which the
perceived interest of a state can be either advanced or
defended.
The practice of war below the "firebreak" between
conventional and nuclear weapons is a fact of life within
our contemporary international structure. 28 ;^s exercised
today by nuclear armed powers, this requires a severe
2 ^Osgood, p. 19.
2 7Klaus Knorr, On the Uses cf Military Power in the
Nuclear Age (Princeton, ~¥J; "Prmcef^on ITniversiEv Fress,
28The "firebreak" concept, analogous to the slowdown in
decision-making prior to the crossing of the nuclear
threshold, was first used by Alain C. Enthoven in 1963. For
a model of this idea see Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the
Nuclear Option (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton ITniversity Press,
19
restriction of the available iajlements of war through wnich
political objectives may be achieved. This necessarily
makes those objectives less ambitious than they might other-
wise be. Thus, the main reason for the existence of contem-
porary limited war is the self-enforced restraint on means.
Bernard Brodie put it succinctly: "<...in today's age of
nuclear weapons and related sophisticated delivery systems>
the restraint to keep wars limited is primarily a restraint
on means, not ends. "29
However, there is also a pressure to keep wars limited
by constraining the ends to be sought through their engage-
ment. This is in relation to the increased need to fight
for precedents in a world which can no longer afford
recourse to general war. This objective, while not
mandating the total defeat of the enemy, does require the
perception of some type of military success.
In today's world the battle is as much for the percep-
tion of a credible ability to act as in the actual results
of our actions. Each policy decision must be weighed not
only for its current effect but for the precedent it may set
for the future. In this psychological struggle we seek to
establish positive precedents and to avoid those that are
negative. Morton Halperin states: "When major powers
participate in a local war it is because of the expected
political effects of doing so and not because of the direct
payoff from battlefield success. "3° Kissinger notes that the
credibility of our deterrent is linked in a very real way to
our reputation in the use of our military as instruments of
foreign policy or in his words: "...the experience of the
last use of force. "3 i
2 9Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age
(Princeton, N.J.: PrmceFoQ university Press, 1759), p. 312.
30Halperin, p. 4.
3 1 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New
20
Thus, the interlocking constraints on Loth means and
ends mitigate toward the limitation of war. This situation,
which cannot be changed, calls for a coherent and rational
plan for the use of the instrument of limited war. It is to
the development of such a plan that we now proceed.
B. TOWABD A HODEL
We have briefly reviewed sone of the early thought on
"limited war" and its application to the nuclear age. We
have noted that the restrictions of both military means and
political ends is almost axiomatic within the current era of
international relations. It then behooves us, as a nation,
to become adept at the use of "limited force" as an instru-
ment of national policy.
The model presented in the next chapter is an attempt to
logically and systematically consider the decisions made
before entry and during the conduct and termination of such
a conflict. Because these decisions have an obvious and
considerable impact on the expectations surrounding the
outcome of armed intervention, the method through which they
will be addressed should be considered prior to the advent
of crisis situations. It is their addressal which estab-
lishes the parameters within which the success or failure of
each such enterprise will be judged and hence the precedents
that will be transmitted into the international environment.
The experience of the last three years have further
reinforced the importance of the limited use of force in
today *s world. The American experience in Grenada, as well
as, the Anglo- Argentinian conflict over the Falklands or
Malvinas, the continued Soviet involvement in Afghanistan,
and the French interest in Chad have underscored the
York: Harper S Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 48.
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necessity of a continuing capability to intervene below the
nuclear threshold where national interests dictate.
The recent failure of the Multi-National Force (MNF) in
Lebanon (composed of CS., U.K., French, and Italian
elements) stands in stark contrast to the marginally
successful campaigns mentioned above. Here a mismatch of
means (symbolic but toothless force deployment) and ends
(the disarming of rival militias and establishment of a
stable Lebanese government) led to disaster. A mistake that
many would argue was also the cause for our failure in
Vietnam- It is toward the avoidance of sach situations that
the model to be presented in the next chapter was




In the previous chapter our attention has been on both
understanding exactly what "limited war" is and in estab-
lishing a theoretic framework upon which a model for its
employment can be constructed. This has naturally necessi-
tated a review of some of the previous thought concerning
war as an instrument of national policy in the contemporary
international environment. It is within this context that a
model for Entry, Conduct, and Termination of Limited War
will he presented.
As will be seen, this model, finds its primary applica-
tion below the nuclear threshold. It recognizes that while
conflict will always exist in the international arena, there
are few instances when the recourse to nuclear weapons for
its settlement is appropriate. However, it also acknowl-
edges that even the use of conventional force may be, in
some cases, unsuited to either the risks associated with its
employment or the goals toward which it is directed. In
short, this model offers a process through which decision-
makers may assess the applicability of the use of military
force to a specific goal and once committed, its progress
toward the same.
It is the author's contention that, since the serious
consideration of limited war, as a national policy instru-
ment, began in the post-World War II era, a decision-making
structure, such as is herein presented, has been lacking
from the theoretical study of the self-restricted use of
force in the furtherance of the "national interest".
Although this study makes no attempt to reconcile the
23
ambiguity surrounding the conceft of the "national
interest", it does assume that its interpretation after
serious deliberation will result in a relatively clear
determination of policy by those in authority. In other
words, this model can not correct a deficient reading of the
"national interest", but, it does provide a rational format
for the decisions surrounding the employment of "limited"
force in its furtherance.
"While admittedly far from flawless, this effort
endeavors to redress what Gregory D. Foster called "<a lack>
of a unified 'philosophy of intervention* attuned not only
to specific threats and circumstances, but also to the
overall, perceptual dimensions cf power and posture in an
increasingly hostile world, in which the element of demon-
strated resolve has been even mere significant a deterrent
than the military capability. " ^2 it therefore, represents an
effort to increase the capability of states to adeguately
prosecute the types of limited conflicts that history has
shown are much more likely to occur and thereby to deter the
same. It is felt that this attempt at the development of a
coherent and structured decision-making process in the
employment of the instrument of limited war will help to
fill a strategic void that has heretofore been existent. If
proven to be of utility, such an effort not only adds to our
ability to pursue our "national interest", but, to the
strength of our overall deterrent-
Our discussion will now turn to an understanding of the
intrarelationships of the steps within the model itself and
its interrelationship with the actual decision-making
process. The model assumes a situation (Pre-War Conflict),
possibly one of crisis, when a determination concerning the
applicability of various national policy instruments is
32Gregory D- Foster, "On Selective Intervention,"
Strateciic Beview, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Fall 1983), p. 4 8.
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being made. It is in the face cf the necessity for such a
decision that the model begins. The model, in its entirety,
is presented in Figure 2. 1
B. EHTRI
The entry aspect of the Limited War Model is its most
crucial phase. It is from the conclusions reached in this
period that the guidelines for both the conduct and termina-
tion of limited war are derived. It also provides a base
toward which the cybernetic loops within in the model can
return for processing. The Entry phase therefore provides
the foundation upon which the relativity of the judgements
taken toward fulfillment of national policy are compared.
It is the yardstick to which decisions regarding later
assessment of battlefield progress and the accomplishment of
objectives must be measured.
Step J- Clearly establish objectives: a) Political
considerations-extent of interest, b) Military
considerations-types of forces available.
The first step in the decision toward entry into a
limited war must be the clear establishment of objectives.
This is imperative at the outset, for the delineation of the
purposes toward which force may be applied is essential
prior to any consideration of its use. This is nothing more
than an adaptation of "Management by Objectives" (MBO) to
international decision-making, where the ultimate goal (s) of
a manager or organization are established before action is
taken.
Management by Objectives, like much administrative
theory, has often been subjected to broad interpretation
which, in turn, has led to abuse and misuse in actual prac-






c 0) a) o 1
o CO cu -p • 1
tM CO +J C +J X) C
<M o >• CO cfl CU O O -H o
o ^ a, en— m-k "H -P -M .M ^ O
Cfl +J -H •^~ — x:
-p cfl Cm ^ 'cn>—
•H
^ C >-i -p -P
c (U -p o o __- Cfl >•
o p c a afl o c C tt) U -P
•H cfl 0) cfl a) •M .H O U +^ o
-p c c OJ T3 e o x: CO x:
rt •H o ? • A ^ C CO oc E a, o
^i +J•M tj , l^ ^-H S-i ^ :6 Q) CO o cfl
<i)r
OJ c u
U -P c OJ a o cfl
0) o CO ^ >rH •H s
e-1 U -H 0) o / o P






O (U o \ 1A O o
VI o ^ \ 1^ tn p
^
\tn '-^ "
= K ^ >-l 1
^
M CO O cfl -H cfl -P •H o C c^- )










+^ J^ •H t. H un c x: \
-p CO Cfl ,H +J -M 1 Cm 1 C —
1
1 CO \
m •• Ch 3 a • C S-i cfl O J3 .H cn O -H \
(U w o o CO o e cn •H Q) \ t< cfl CO X) cn > (U ^ cn
> C -P J^ -p o 0) Ol. T3 <U >>-P 3 0) <D rH CU r-i d, (U 1
•H Oi ta o o > 0) 3 (U Q. p CO a Ij cfl rH J3 E >i
v <u -o c +J +J o H > - cn CO •H 0) cn o bOC XI t- o o
o e s^ H cfl C cfl +J •H cn >>-H r-\ 0) rH o o cfl Op 0) cfl +J O 0) O +j cn iH +J cfl 0) cfl O > 0) ;j —1 -p rH O
o ••-5 <D tlD-P "H £ 0) CU o 0) cfl -H u cn o 1) +J -H > a+j ci, cfl Cfl3 xi l-^ 03 0) •a CD -p 1-3 0) (h O rH -P OJ .H S-. +^ (1) C cu C
-a O ^ tj cn C > cfl £> r-( -P .H -M O > •p o -o o -p (U o tn •H C
C ca •H O e O-^ OJCObi) XJ>j;j!^ —-> QJ O CU ^—"C > o— 0) O <u -
o ^ rH 0) -a • c: H cn o o iH o <D x: -H —3 >, (U C cfl >-i •H CU A
a 3 .H D c ;-i a
" p Cm : • rH S iH Vh cn +^ rH ^ rH • S^ o t^ X3
O ni T3 cfl cfl O tOrH o : O \ cfl Cm o cn CO (-1 u cn O
>> > 5 ^ c 3 <i)CC t3-H<u+Jcn (DC 3 u 3 <u cn
rt a> 0) 0) -rH +J cJox: ojo-pcc tj O 73 O o o x: o 0) (U
sz > CL, 0) > f-l 73 C •H -H O >> CU 0) -M .M O Cfl O 0) -H -p -P u > > >•
o u-^ >>J= (1) cfl C <u 1—l-P CD+J CliQ,,—1 O-i-l a x: > cfl ,
r
CO -H o Cfl -H T3 1
+J 3 O -P +^ a c cfl e M C Eh -M C! LO 0) >-3 -P E 0) tn CU o 1 KH 3 Cm =: -p CU
m o • -P (U • • • o x:-H t< H • •










1•H c m 0) rH 1 1 u ^'^'''n.^^
+J o c •-3X1 C -M II cfl A"*«s»^1,^
O -H O £>••-{ 0) -P O O -H (>. P cfl 1 1 ^
0) -p .H o CO -p +j -H +j a,+j I •HE jri t/3
••-^
cfl +J w Co rH a, d) M rH tj c cn t -_
^ t-i cfl Cm O oj a, o ^•^ o a c H O -H .H \ 1 >^ J
4-> O 0) t^ O U C a 0) E .H E C^H t, \ 1 wO •O 0) O Sh > t, o ^ U^ \ 1 r
.H x: .H
-a P Q) a O 0) -H 3 o cfl CU 0) CO c \ 1
fH w tn -H C JZ ex x: o o : +j x: ci^^.H \ 1
VI •H C M 0) +J o -p -p cn >5 1 p +j \ a>
c i .HOC e C 0) cfl ^ -p C C \ i-i cno t< ^ o o JC 4-> ^• ^0) 0) s^ H cn Q) 3 (U O \ X2 (Uu +> nJ o to cn cu cn 3 U •• > -^ Ij C -H cn > O C-M \ t—
^
•H
E: +^ pH -^ •H QJ o— (u^ o (^ cn cfl o -H s^-t cu> cfl b -p \ rH
u El] m Cfl >> F^^ -H M ti >-• >i 3 OJ X: rH c„ \ >H x: o G--H <: \ cn r-t
c« 0) o tn Q< Hfl o O -H ^ i^^ c \ -p o.+-> : o <
T^ H rt e 3 Cm U rH 3 -H 0) cn -M \ 3 O (U bD I (X
1 >>-p -p O CO 0) cn rH o 5 a,w- \ o cn o- C \ ^•^
—
(U M .H .H o Cm T3 -H cfl >j +J C >i C u E •H \ .M^
^ S-l r-l iH o W o •H X: rH +^ c o cfl 3 O
^ \
3
Cl< CC O -H cfl 0) cn rH O cfl 3 <U -H \ o 0) o a \ tn 1
a> a s > o C-OCflQOOC-P \ Q E >>: P \ " Hrf—1 • • O -H cn O C -H • \ 1 CU fO Cfl X3 Q -P 3 O Cfl +J Cfl o J3 o K
A • • T^ z •



















effectual orientation toward both task accomplishment and
problem solving. The key to the exercise of MBO is under-
stand that it forms a conceptual framework through which one
can view the task of management vice a systematic process
for its accomplishment. The author's preference is for the
definition of MBO advocated by Karl Albrecht:
"Management by Objectives is ...an observable pattern of
behavior on the part of a manager, characterized by
studying the anticipated future, determining what payoff
conditions to bring about for that anticipated future,
and guiding the efforts of the people of the organiza-
tion so that they accomplish those objectives. "^
3
The merit of such an outlook is that it focuses the
decision-maker on the "big picture" making he/she and there-
fore his/her state an active rather than reactive force when
confronted with possible conflict. This is obviously the
point from which anyone would want to approach the process
of decision-making, as well as, crisis management.
A caution is also relevant here- Political authorities
should avoid the "pie-in-the-sky" theory of goal construc-
tion. Objectives should be firnly grounded within the
confines of the achieveable. There should be a clear under-
standing that no panaceas exist in the realm of interna-
tional relations, yet, a sharp focus on what realistically
can be done begins the establishment of a structure within
which decisions can be made and their results subsequently
judged-
The initial consideration in this regard must always be
the relationship of the impending conflict to the current
and long-term political atmosphere. Included in such a
deliberation are geostrategic, ideological, cultural, social
and, if considered applicable, moral issues that are
^^Karl Albrecht, Successful Manaqement By Objectives
(Englewood Cliffs, N JT~Prentice -Hall, ~Tnc7 ,~T9 78") ~p72U7~
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relevant to the actual situatioD or the precedent that it
will invariably set. It is at this point that an interpre-
tation of the "national interest" by the decision- makers
comes into play; a reading that is, without a doubt, crit-
ical to any further action. These tasked with such a
responsibility must be sensitive to both the international
and domestic arena in which their actions will eventually be
played out. They must safeguard both the viability of their
instruments of national policy and the role or position of
their state in future world affairs. This is a charge that
would appear at first glance to be "eye watering" but that,
in truth, is far from hopeless. A crucial point that should
always be kept in mind is the Clausewitzian precept subordi-
nating the pursuit of war or conflict to politics. While
there will always be issues worth fighting for, war should
never be viewed as self-fulfilling.
The other consideration taken in the establishment of
objectives is an examination of the specific indigenous
force structure available to employ toward their possible
accomplishment on the field of combat. There is a distinct
possibility that the type of action dictated by a study of a
particular situation may be outside the current capabilities
of the actual military units available for employment.
Although such a contingency would signal a distinct inade-
quacy in prior force planning, it would, nevertheless, be
quite pertinent to any future decision surrounding the use
of force in the furtherance of national policy. This
assessment, made early on, begins the matching of means and
ends that becomes of primary concern in any attempt to
successfully prosecute a limited war. If forces are, in
fact, not available, then the use of another policy instru-
ment or the suspension of action until they can be acquired
through alliance or internal development seems prescribed.
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Once both political and military considerations have
been consolidated the finalization of objectives can be
accomplished. This aggregation should result in the setting
of goals that are both meaningful in light of the "national
interest" and attainable in regard to available resources.
Once this process has been completed the attention of the
decision-maker can be directed to Step 2.
Step 2- Do the accomplishment of your objectives require the
use of force?
This question would appear to find its roots in the
Western cultural tendency to view the use of force to accom-
plish one's goals only as a last resort. While this would
seem to skew the model toward utilization by only "Western
oriented" states, such is not the case. The Leninist inter-
pretation of Marxist doctrine, although viewing conflict as
inevitable, also sees the employment of force as a final
measure. Though probably less hesitant than their Western
counterparts to use force (a detateable point that is beyond
the scope of this study) their picture of history through
the prism of dialectical materialism allows them to forgo
overt military action and literally allow nature to take its
course. Hence, this query is relevant, to a degree, to any
state that is considering entry into a limited war.
Phrasing this step a little differently in an attempt to
shed more light on its significance, we might say: If our
objectives can be accomplished short of the actual use of
force then that is the road we will take. However, if force
is necessary to assure their realization then we are ready
to proceed with our consideration regarding its possible
use. In the former case, it could be that the exercise of
some other policy instrument (diplomatic signalling,
increased military presence, etc.) would, at least
initially, be more appropriate to the situation at hand.
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However, in the latter instance, either the earlier attempt
to reconcile the conflict below the Armed Hostility
threshold has failed/is failing, or the use of tools other
than the active utilization of military forces was consid-
ered incompatible with the current circumstances. Once this
judgement is made we may then either: 1) forswear the use of
force by returning to the realm of Pre-ifar Conflict or,
2) proceed with an analysis of the level of "risk" that we
are willing to bear in regard to the possibility of armed
intervention.
Ste£ 3^ Consider your opponent and his current or potential
allies: a) Do you have the political will (resolve) to out
perform your opponent (s) in a "competition in risk-taking"?
b) Do you have the military means to out perform your oppo-
nent (s) in a "competition in risk-taking"?
After completing the considerations that effect the
establishment of realistic objectives and arriving at the
determination that these goals may require the use of force,
the decision-maker (s) must direct their efforts to a "net
assessment" of their capabilities for the successful employ-
ment of force relative to that of their opponent (s) . Such
an examination must go beyond the scope of a mere "bean
count" of men and material and first compare the "resolve"
of the two or more states or coalitions that are in
conflict. An analysis of the psychological factor of
resolve or will is not easy to conduct of oneself, much less
of one's opponent. Yet, a look at just what you and your
opponent are willing to hazard to achieve the accomplishment
of your respective goals is a beginning toward the accom-
plishment of this task. It necessarily requires not only
the establishment of your own objectives (a process we have
already covered) but, a perception of the goals of your
opponent. Such an analysis consolidates the cultural.
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historical, ideological, and political attributes of one's
opposition at both the national and individual decision-
maker levels.
This task has traditionally been performed by intelli-
gence services, individual analysts working directly for the
political authorities, or by the political authorities them-
selves. However, the final result of this assessment,
regardless of the preparer, should result in a meaningful
estimate of the comparative stakes between the two opposing
parties in the current situation. If nothing else, the
ultimate parameters within which force will continue to be
employed (.i.e how far will you go?) must be established.
In the model the term "competition in risk-taking" is
used to describe the gamble inherent in the escalatory
process that forms an undercurrent beneath any decision to
actively use armed force for the furtherance of national
policy. 3« Herman Kahn used this concept to define the
essence of "a typical escalation situation" where the
comparison of resolve, "and a matching of . . . reso urces, <lead
to> some form of limited conflict between two sides. "^s
While Kahn was attempting to provide the basis for his
construction of a comprehensive "escalation ladder", our
interest is to a specific range of escalation, namely, the
limited use of armed force below the nuclear threshold. It
is an assessment of our will to out perform our opponent in
this realm of the escalation continuum or the eventual deci-
sion tc crossover into an unlimited or total war that is of
interest in this model.
3*The conception of escalation as a "competition in
risk-taking" was first put in print by Herman Kahn. He
gives Thomas Schelling credit for the phrase. See: Herman




To take our analysis one step further, the comparative
estimate of the factor of national will must be extended
beyond that of o ur current opponent to the actual or poten-
tial allies that it may recruit. This situation is usually
very relevant to the considerations surrounding entry into a
limited var, for often the actual conflict will be pros-
ecuted against a proxy or dependent state of a larger power.
It is within these circumstances that the extension of the
analysis of relative resolve beyond that of one's direct
military opposition must be undertaken. Such a step is
dictated by prudence if nothing else, yet, its addressal can
frequently provide guidance that is crucial to later policy
development.
When the decision-maker (s) can assure themselves that
they possess the psychological intangibles necessary to back
the employment of military force for the accomplishment of
national policy, an actual comparison of of military poten-
tial between the two competitors can be made. It is fitting
that this assessment should follow that of comparative
resolve because any policy mandating the use of military
force, however physically powerful, not backed by a matching
political will is doomed to stillbirth. Again, this esti-
mate of capability must include your opponent's actual or
potential allies.
The heart of this analysis is a comparison of both the
quantitative and qualitative factors that, when aggregated,
form an appraisal of relative military capability. Although
numbers become understandably mere important in this area
other variables such as readiness, training, and morale
should be given substantial weight. Intervening factors
including location of forces to the possible theatre of
operations, prior force commitments, mobilization potential,
and the whole myriad of logistical support questions must
also be considered. Again, this analysis could be conducted
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Ly any number of organizations or individuals. However, the
final product must provide a tinely and meaningful estimate
of comparative military potential. Since such assessments
can rarely be generated without bias during crisis situ-
ations they are best conducted en a periodic basis in the
guise of peacetime contingency planning and given frequent
review. If this is competently accomplished estimates can
be quickly updated as circumstances warrant.
Once completed, the examination of the relative capa-
bility of a state to out perforE its opponent in a "competi-
tion in risk-taking" on both the mental and physical level
can be synthesized. The product of this process should give
the decision-maker (s) an adequate indicator of their state's
individual ability to engage in military conflict, under the
current circumstances. If this analysis tilts in their
favor then the active employment of military forces may
begin. But, if this appraisal reveals a shortcoming in the
ability to accept the risks associated with overt interven-
tion then an attempt must be made to enhance the relative
escalatory capability of the state. This can only be done,
in the short-term, through the recruitment of allies.
Step 4- Recruit allies.
The engagement of allies is a sensible step that would
be taken by almost any state before entering into military
conflict. In fact, it is a move that might well be taken by
those nations who already believe they possess the ability
to out perform their potential opposition, as well as, those
who do not. However^ it is readily more apparent that this
would be a much more important undertaking for those in the
latter situation than for those in the former.
In the model, the terms ally, allies, and alliance are
used with a much broader connotation than the classical
meaning of these concepts. While the traditional definition
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of an "alliance" would indicate the execution of formal
pacts, treaties, or agreements that provide for the mutual
security of the parties involved, the idea as used in our
conte:xt, is considerably more open. The model's utilization
of this term and its derivatives includes not only classical
alliances, but also both political and military support in
instances where security considerations between two states
may momentarily, though not permanently, coincide. Such
support may begin at the level cf mere diplomatic backing
and extend to full scale joint ailitary cooperation. In
this way, the perception of alliances falls in step with the
employment of limited military force. That is, the
signaling associated with constrainted, though positive,
international support is more meaningful in an environment
of a war engaged in for limited ends employing limited means
than in a situation of total or unrestrained conflict.
Whatever the situation, any addition to one*s alliance
structure adds to the overall political and military poten-
tial to successfully engage in a limited war.
The search for political and military support on a
worldwide scale is crucial to most decisions to enter
limited wars. Few states feel that they can "go it alcne"
in such a situation for the costs, both real and opportu-
nity, of this type of conflict may be exorbitant- Although
allies can help to spread the expense of such an action,
their recruitment is often a double-edged sword. This is
especially true when their support is given contingent to a
modification or further restriction of the objectives of the
conflict that is more in line with their particular inter-
ests. Such trade-offs must be carefully weighed at this
early stage so as to determine the utility of any expected
support relative to its price. Analysis of these considera-
tions is imperative from the outset for the successful
implementation of the limited war instrument. This is true
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because, while alignment represents the only significant
short-term vehicle for the augmentation of one's capabili-
ties, its unrestricted utilization may undercut the very
objective toward which the use cf force was initially
considered.
Once the road of alliance has been considered and
subsequently accepted or rejected the ultimate decision
point on whether or net to enter a limited war has been
reached. A comprehensive aggregation of one's psychological
and material resources along with those of your allies may
be stacked against those of the opposing coalition. From
this analysis, an assessment coEcerning movement toward or
away from the Armed Hostility threshold may be made. Once
crossed, one's effort must necessarily be directed to the
Conduct phase of limited war.
C. COHDDCT
The Conduct phase of the Littited War Model is concerned
with the fruitful implementation of the decision to utilize
force in the furtherance of national policy. Our interest
in this area will be with the actual operationalization of
the predetermined objectives of the intervention into the
reality cf the battlefield. A nethod of conducting a
limited war is also included in the model. Termed "selec-
tive intervention", this technique stresses the exploitation
of technological advantages and an emphasis on mobility,
speed, and the use of specially trained/elite forces. We
begin our discussion with the initial step after penetrating
the Armed Hostility threshold, the matching of ends and
means.
/
Step 5z Match your objectives to your available means:
a) Give due regard to the type and setting of the war,
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The mating of objectives and means is predominantly a
military task. It entails the dispatch and employment of
the proper force structure and the implementation or devel-
opment of suitable tactics for the mission at hand. This
job should be undertaken with full cognizance of acy limita-
tions or constraint that were envisioned by the political
authorities when the decision was made to enter the war.
Tie saw in Step 3 that an assessment of comparative mili-
tary capabilities was necessary before conflict entry. One
would hope that such an analysis included the inputs of the
military establishment before finalized. If so, this initi-
ates the cooperation between the civilian and uniformed
authorities so vital to the successful conduct of limited
war. From this beginning, plans for the actual employment
of force should begin.
In this regard, there must be a concerted effort to
consider both the type and setting of the war and its effect
on the utilization of the available force structure. If the
American experience in Vietnam proved anything, it was that
a barrage of men, money, and material is not the answer to
every strategic problem. Specific force employment in
limited war takes a mixture of a knowledge of: your enemy,
his "modus operandi", and your capability to counter the
same; your preferred "modus operandi", its applicability to
the current conflict, and your ability to adapt it as neces-
sary to the developing tactical and strategic situation; and
finally, your ability to force your enemy to engage you in a
realm where you hold a potential escalatory advantage. Of
course, all this must be tempered by geographic and seasonal
considerations (deserts, jungles, mountains, monsoons, snow/
ice, etc.) that could effect both your own and your enemy's
battlefield capabilities.
One might note that these considerations are not only
applicable to limited war but, to total war as well. What
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then is the difference between the waging of these tvo types
of conflict? This guery takes us back to the contemporary
definition of limited war itself. That is, a war utilizing
limited means and hence directed toward the achievement of
only limited ends. Its answer is found in an examination of
some of the actual restrictions often associated with the
instrument of limited war.
These constraints may have a substantive impact on the
resources available to the commander in the field for
employment in actual combat or it may saddle him with "Rules
of Engagement" (EOE) that severely restrict the scope or
arena in which forces may be employed. However, regardless
of the limits that may be placed on the utilization of mili-
tary power, the field commander is still faced with the
reality of death and destruction on the battlefield. He
still must contend with the requirement of mission accom-
plishment with the resources of, what will probably be, a
less than fully mobilized national warmaking potential. All
of this could well be taking place in an aroused interna-
tional atmosphere where the coherence of political and mili-
tary alliances that are crucial to the eventual success of
his state in the limited war could well be at stake. The
combined mastery of the violence of the battlefield and the
subtleties of international relations and image projection
is the task that many a military commander has found so
daunting in the current era. Yet, the reality of the needed
capability to, as necessary, employ limited military force
remains a unshakable characteristic of the contemporary
international environment. Therefore, military commanders
must be ready and able to operate cooly and decisively in a
context of politically mandated restraint.
To overcome this hurdle takes the cooperation of both
the civilian and military leadership. The easiest method by
which the adequate matching of means and ends may be
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encouraged is the development of a broad spectrum of force
employment options for utilization in limited war. Such a
menu would range from the use of small counterinsurgency
units to the employment of air strikes, conventionally armed
cruise missiles, and/or large ccmmitments of ground forces
as dictated by the tactical situation and the "interest"
involved. Such a selection offers the decision- maker (s) a
much needed flexibility in the conduct of limited war in
both the escalation and victory denial scenarios.
Another important concern early on in the Conduct phase,
is the conceptualization of indicators which will signal
both movement toward and eventually the accomplishment of
one*s goals in limited war. The development of these signs
should not be taken lightly and their ade>juacy and validity
should be guickly established. In fact, their generation
should begin as soon as the type of force structure that is
to be used in the conflict has teen determined and the
initial direction of the conflict has been set. Although
the indicator may be as simple as a military advance to a
predetermined geographic line or point, or as complex as the
current state of quantitative analysis will allow, it should
be well understood by both the political authorities that
approved the initial entry into the conflict and the mili-
tary leaders whose success will be judged by its usage. A
periodic reexamination of these indicator (s) and their rela-
tionship to the ultimate objectives of the intervention
would seem wise^ if not, mandatory.
Albert Clarkson deals peripherally with this subject in
his discussion of some of the problems of measuring "real
effectiveness" in strategic analysis. While he is well
aware that the strategic analyst (or in our case decision-
maker) must concern himself primarily with the future, the
pursuit of a meaningful "post mortem" which will distinguish
the "real effectiveness" of prior policy decisions from
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their "estimated or apparent effectiveness" is critical to
actual or continued S'^ccess, This process includes hurdling
numerous epistemological barriers to develop a framework for
the analytical examination of actual vice perceived results.
Clarkson suggests the adaptation of some current and soon to
be available information technology advances to speed and
enhance this task. 36 However, regardless of the technique
employed, the assessment of indicator validity and, later
on, progress toward objectives through some sort of "post
mortem" analysis is indespensible to the conduct and even-
tual termination of a limited war.
While changes due to this "post mortem" process remain a
possibility, they should never be entered into blithely.
Such an alteration dictates a thorough analysis of the
reasons for the inadequacy or invalidity of the former indi-
cator, an effort that could necessitate revisiting the
actual decision on intervention- Attention must also be
given to cross-referencing the results of later periods to
the earlier time, when different indicators were in use, for
the evaluation of the trends within the conflict. In light
of these issues it would seem that the simplier indicators,
with clear cut ties to the ultimate goals of the interven-
tion, the less the likelihood that it would later be
discarded as invalid or unusable. This is a consideration
that the developers of such indicators should be well aware
of.
Step 6- Utilize "selective intervention". Stress:
a) Technological superiority; b) Speed/ mobility; c) Specially
trained/elite forces, and d) Joint service operations.
3 6Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis
(Boulder- CO: Westview Press, I'^HTr- ^ee speciTically
Chapter 3- "Strategic Analysis Measures," pp. 21-80-
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The model now takes us to the actual field of combat
where policy goals must be accomplished through the
successful employment of military resources. To realize
this task the use of "selective intervention" is suggested.
This idea^ adapted with some modification from the work of
Gregory Foster, stressess the "selective application of
power at all times and places of one's own choosing. "^7
Poster explains that such an overall strategy would empha-
size the use, when possible, "of limited, precision strikes
against valued enemy assets." These "<l>imited- scale
engagements are most likely to exploit natural... techno-
logical advantages, provided the forces employed are numeri-
cally adequate for the mission at hand. "^e
The exploitation of technological superiority, when
existent, is critical to SMCcess oq the limited war battle-
field. It assures that the prosecution of the war will
enter a medium on the escalatory continuum that cannot be
matched in the short-term by the opposition. It probably
will reduce friendly casualties and battlefield collateral
damage, both of which are considerations that may be of
paramount interest in the ability to maintain domestic and
international support for the intervention. It may also be
more cost efficient for the accomplishment of certain mili-
tary missions. In short, technological superiority is a
means through which decisions tc out perform one's opponent
in a game of increasing risk can be implemented.
In addition, superiority in speed and mobility, if
available, should also be utilized on the battlefield. This
entails the use of modern means of strategic and tactical
maneuver. Examples of this are developments in vertical and




both infantry and mechanized units, and advances in the
employment of both fixed wing and rotary aircraft in both
the logistical and direct fire support missions (to name
only a few) . The purpose of stressing rapid maneuver is
twofold. First, if utilized correctly it emphasizes those
areas where a state holds an advantage in either technology
or force readiness, training, or availability.
Concurrently, it should direct the combat action away from
arenas where the relative military capabilities of the oppo-
sition exceeds one's own. Secondly, an emphasis on these
factors enhances the chance of achieving strategic or
tactical surprise on the battlefield, both of which are
important and coveted force multipliers. Obviously, the
advantages offered by these factors can become extremely
important in a limited war.
The utilization of specially trained/elite forces should
also be emphasized in the conduct of a limited war- The
training and use of such units should stress a professional
and controlled approach to the concept of "selective inter-
vention". Their use as the sole element of a military
intervention would naturally be recommended. However,
should the situation warrant, they could be employed in
concert or as cadres for more traditional elements. The
advantages offered by such an eiployment are dual. First,
the use of these forces would again tend to hold down the
number of friendly casualties and any losses taken would be
viewed in a different light from those associated with
conscripted troops. Secondly, the need for increased or
wholesale mobilization to adequately implement the limited
war instrument may, at least initially, be unnecessary if
such forces are available. These units also provide a
portion of the military flexibility required in connection
with Step 5 and therefore, should be developed and, as
needed, employed.
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A "joint" concept of operations should also be stressed
in the conduct of limited war. This is important because
the consolidation of military air, sea and ground power
provides some of the most significant opportunities for
implementing "selective intervention" and emphasizing speed
and mobility in actual operations. It would seem that
inter-service cooperation provides the best vehicle for the
combination of these factors.
Rhile inter-service rivalries will always exist, a
consolidation of efforts toward national vice service accom-
plishment must prevail. Without a doubt, the lead in this
area must be with the civilian leadership. An atmosphere of
cooperation between both military and civilian authorities
and within the military establishment itself must be estab-
lished from the outset. Appointments of civilian officials
to positions of authority in the area of national security
who bring to the job few preconceptions about the relative
utility of the various services is a start toward such an
environment.
The iaplementation of the joint concept should begin
with the planning phase and naturally extend through combat
employment. Inter-service staff billets should be given
increased attention as a almost mandatory step for any who
would aspire to flag or general rank. Also budgetary and
procurement decisions should provide incentives for the
development of smoothly run joint operations. In this
regard, rewards should accrue to those services that submit
to the team concept in the form of a bigger piece of the
national security pie.
Step-7 Compare the reality of the conflict to established
objectives using previously developed indicators: a) Is
current progress with conventional forces acceptable? b)
Have original objectives been accomplished?
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This step represents what should be a continual process
of self-critique and introspection regarding the progress of
the intervention toward the policy goals that were set at
the onset of the conflict- This analysis includes a review
of not only one's own objectives but of the assumptions made
about the aims of the opposing state or coalition before
entry. The advances and setbacks of your own forces should
also be judged at this time. Emphasis, in this analysis
must be put on digesting and integrating the "lessons
learned" into the conduct of the ongoing campaign and on
their applicability in the future. Some of the Clarkson
ideas that were introduced earlier in relation to indicator
development and ongoing validity assurance are pertinent to
this situation also, particularly with regard to the conduct
and use of "post-mortems".
After completion of this progress assessment the
decision-maker (s) , as is most always the case, must make a
choice. If advancement toward the preordained objectives is
adequate then he/she may continue to orient the actions of
his/her state within the context of conventional war.
Escalation under the nuclear threshold, to speed the
conflict to a quicker, yet, still successful termination,
remains a distinct possibility in this situation (a subject
we will address in more depth shortly). However, if prog-
ress has been insufficient then the decision-maker is faced
with several divergent alternatives. It is to the discus-
sion of these and their implications that we now turn.
The first course open to the dissatisfied practitioner
of limited war is to redefine or modify the objectives of
the conflict. The modification of goals in the event of
unfavorable progress is usually a face saving measure to
allow subsequent withdrawal from hostilities justified by
the reduction of anticipated benefit of conflict continua-
tion. Eventual termination, in such an instance, is usually
accomplished through negotiation and/or military retreat.
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Another path that also requires back-tracking through
the decision-making process is a search for allies after the
entry into conflict. Like the redefinition of objectives,
this action is usually an attempt to redress a current or
anticipated strategic inequality. Great care must be taken
in the recruitment of allies at this point for the cost of
their entry could well be substantial. However, although
subject to increased reservation and contingency sensitivity
their possible entry could be the thread upon which
continued prosecution of the United war hangs.
Another alternative available to the decision-maker
frustrated with the progress of a limited war is the road of
escalation. This can follow either the nuclear or conven-
tional path. Since nuclear escalation brings the belliger-
ents very close to total war it will be discussed within the
Termination phase of the model. Our attention presently
will then be devoted to conventional escalation.
The consideration of conventional escalation in a situ-
ation of strategic or tactical dissatisfaction brings into
question the implementation of the technique of "selective
intervention" to date in the conflict. If progress is
insufficient obviously its employment needs adaptation or
reinvigoration. A consideration of forces available for and
"risk" inherent in escalation, just as undertaken in the
original Entry phase, must be addressed. This is a joint
task of both the political and military leadership. As
always, the ultimate objective (s) of the conflict and the
total "risk" considered appropriate for their accomplishment
must be of primary importance. Any inertia created by the
ongoing conduct of the war itself should be disregarded.
Yet, questions concerning precedent establishment, deterrent
impact, and national prestige are fair game and must be
weighted in accordance with the specific circumstances.
Consideration of conventional escalation as a means for
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speeding war termination should also include an examination
of the signal it sends in light of the original objectives
of the conflict. While a useful lever in any negotiating
process this type of escalation should never be employed
until it is absolutly necessary. This is only good
psychology, for the anticipation of bad tasting medicine is
usually much worse than its actual effect.
This ends the discussion of the Conduct phase of the
Limited War Model. In our examination we have seen how the
goals and restrictions agreed upon in the Entry phase can be
translated into effectual combat action within the spirit of
a less than total national commitment to war. It is to the
methods for ending this conflict that we will now devote our
efforts.
D. TERHINATION
Limited wars are inherently harder to end than general
wars. Since they are rarely, if ever, waged in pursuit of
an unconditional surrender of the opposing coalition that
one faces, the point at which termination should be sought
is much less apparent than the goal of a "Carthaginian
peace" often associated with total war. In fact, in many
instances limited wars, due to the very reason (s) for their
pursuit, may have no clear-cut winner or loser in the purely
military sense. However, because these conflicts are so
intertwined with political and/or military considerations
that forced their limitation, they may terminated at points
far short of those attempted in total war.
The conclusion of a limited war becomes apparent in two
ways- The first, is the achievement of the objectives of
the conflict as determined in the Entry phase or as subseq-
uently modified as the intervention progresses. Without
question, once these goals have been attained there remains
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no prevailing reason for the war to be continued.
Conversely, if the limited employment of force has failed to
adequately pursue or defend the "national interest", as
interpreted, then the possibility of escalation to general
war may be dictated. Both of these alternatives will be
addressed as we look at the Termination phase of the Limited
War Model.
Ste p 8- Slow or terminate offensive operations.
This step is the rational fcllow-on to the accomplish-
ment of previously developed goals. It alerts one's oppo-
nent that a possible end to armed hostility could be at
hand. Such a slowdown should also be accompanied by the
appropriate diplomatic signalling that could lead toward a
negotiated settlement of the conflict.
A couple of cautions are also relevant in regard to this
step. First, the ability to quickly resume active or offen-
sive operations should never be compromised by moves toward
a negotiated settlement. This is because the leverage
created by military pressure may, during the course of arbi-
tration, prove critical to the conclusion of a beneficial
agreement. Therefore, military readiness may be kept sharp
until the complete and formal conclusion of the conflict is
reached.
Secondly, field commanders should always be given the
leeway to ensure the safety of their units even though
possibly forced to surrender the tactical initiative.
Orders pertaining to troop deployments and rules of engage-
ment during a period of truce, ceasefire, and/or negotiation
must give adequate ccnsideratioL to the tactical situation.
Terrain considerations, logistical support, and unit
emplacement should be considered in concert to maintain
force morale and keep casualties low. Continued use of the
techniques of "selective intervention" on a limited scale
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may also provide an avenue through which a semblance of
battlefield initiative might be maintained. The tactical
commander must use this "break" in large-scale operations to
reprovision his forces for the continuation of offensive
operations should such a course be dictated by subsequent
inaction in conflict termination.
Step 9- Does opponent possess nuclear weapons?
This query, which forms the basis of any escalation
beyond the range of conventional weaponry stemming from a
negative response to Step 7a, ^9 marks one of the two end
rungs of the Limited War Model. Its answer could well
determine if the crossing of the nuclear threshold is a step
toward total war or an effort tc persuade one's enemy that
the range of escalatory "risk" now exceeds his capability to
respond in kind. The model assumes that such an inquiry
would not be considered unless it was felt that the conse-
quence inherent in the outcome, of what had initially been
conceived as a limited war, dictated its necessity.
Though the nuclear threshold can theoretically be
crossed at any time, its permanent breach is actually conso-
nant with only two circumstances. The first and by far the
more preferable, is when the use of nuclear weapons gives
the user an unmatchable escalatcry advantage over the
opposing forces. This is escalation in risk-taking extended
to an arena where their is, in fact, no commensurate danger
and implies that their may have been a hardening of the
position of the nuclear armed power toward the final aims of
the conflict. However, while these weapons are the ultimate
trump card in such a situation, their use appeals to few
decision-makers because of the precedent that it would set
for the conduct of future international relations. It is
3 95tep 7a asked the question; Is progress with conven-
tional forces acceptable?
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the perceived disutility of these weapons as actual war-
making instruments, already mentioned in the first chapter,
that has resulted in the contemporary emphasis on the utili-
zation of the limited war instrument- Hence, the one-sided
use of nuclear armament, while always a possibility, will
continue to be considered only as a last resort and then
only in situations of extreme "national interest".
The second scenario in which a state might permanently
cross the nuclear threshold would be in the circumstance of
a decision to disregard the original determination to limit
the scope or scale of the war and to escalate the conflict
into the realm of total unrestricted war. Though such a
conflict has its own range of "competition in risk-taking"
accompanied by political and diplomatic signals which, in
theory, would be similar to that of limited conventional
war, the probable extent and scope of destruction and the
past inviolability of the nuclear threshold dictate it as an
entity that must be treated separately. Therefore, within
the model one method of terminating a limited war is to make
it a total war.
There are also two limited war termination scenarios
when the nuclear threshold would not be crossed permanently
or, in most instances, at all. The first of these is again
the case of the one-sided monopoly of nuclear weapons. In
this situation nuclear coercion could be employed to
finalize or dictate conflict termination. Such an employ-
ment might only take the form of a nuclear threat or could
involve the use of a "demonstration shot(s)" similar to the
American destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in August 1945. This usage conforms well with
Thomas Schelling's conception of "compellence" as a means by
which actions can be used to persuade one's opponent (s) to
conform to the course of conduct that one would have them
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take.*o In our case, war termination is dictated by the
capability and will of one side to carry the conflict across
the nuclear threshold. It differs from the previous situ-
ation where the nuclear monopoly was employed because, in
this latter circumstance, the attacker would be still
seeking to restrict the use of force to the minimum neces-
sary for the accomplishment of objectives.
The second situation where the nuclear threshold would
not te permanently crossed is when one's opponent or his
allies possess nuclear weapons and neither side feels that
the ongoing conflict bears the weight of "national interest"
necessary to drive its conduct toward total war. In this
scenario the expected value of any escalation across the the
nuclear threshold would be mininal and hence the resons for
the original limitation of the war itself would still be in
place. Both sides would attempt to employ other instru-
ments, both military and diplomatic to position themselves
for the "best bargain available" in eventual termination.
Of course, as discussed earlier, this circumstance leaves
open the avenues of goal reappraisal, ally recruitment
and/or conventional escalation.
Ste£ JO^ Negotiate or dictate conflict termination.
This is the final step in the Limited War Model. All
the efforts expended in the earlier Entry and Conduct phases
find their ultimate focus in this final effort at successful
conflict resolution. Any success stemming from the limited
war battlefield is meaningless until converted into a mutu-
ally accepted agreement which formalizes its results. The
negotiating effort required in this regard may last as long
as the war itself but, it can never be separated from the
AOThomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,




initial goals for which the war was fought or from the
ongoing conduct of military operations.
Conflict termination can be either negotiated or
dictated based on the actual or mutually perceived
strategic/tactical situation. It may be stalled so as to
gain a more advantageous political or military conclusion.
Conversely, it can be speeded, as we have already discussed,
through nuclear or conventional escalation. Such decisions
are always within the purview of those who are tasked with
the interpretation of the "naticnal interest" and its rela-
tionship to the ongoing conflict. Each should be undertaken
with full cognizance of its effect on both the objectives
sought in the current use of the limited war instrument and
the impact it will have on the use of that tool in the
future.
E. SOMMATIOH
In this chapter a model for the employment of limited
war has been presented. Its three specific phases— Entry,
Conduct, and Termination— have been closely described and
discussed. The model attempts to provide a coherent
decision-making flow for those responsible for considera-
tions regarding the limited use of force. In the following
chapters we will test the model for its applicability and
utility against the barometer of history.
The model's central theme is its demand that objectives
and goals be realistically set before wholesale entry into a
conflict and that they remain the guiding force in subseq-
uent decisions relating to its conduct and termination.
Without a clear reading and understanding of goals the
decision-maker who would enter a limited war becomes like
the blind man examining an elephant, destined to make
mistakes. It is toward the avoidance of such a contingency
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that the model is offered and it is within a similar vein




Before we begin our testing and evaluation of the
Limited War Model the methodological structure upon which
our study will be built needs to be established. Since the
ultimate purpose of this study is to draw "lessons from
history" through the analysis of case studies, the specific
technique which will be employed is that of the "Focused
Comparison" developed by Alexander L- George. *i This meth-
odology offers several advantages in such an undertaking
which will be covered shortly, but, first a word about the
applicability and use of historical evidence.
B. USING HISTORY
The term history, as is herein used, refers to the
record or account of events and actions of the past.
Although subject to bias and multiple interpretation, based
on the background and/or perspective of the historiographer,
the rationale for its continued study rests in its ability
to add to the individual human experience. In the words of
Robert Jones Shafer: "<Its study gives> the single human
being an understanding that men and women many times in the
history of the race have confronted similar problems. "*2
This thought mirrors the oft reiterated conventional wisdom
^Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory
Development: The Method or Structured, Focused Comparison,"
in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed.. Diplomacy: New Approaches in
History, Theory, and Policy TTIew York: TEe Free ?ress,
1^7^77 PP"~'^3-tS.
SRobert Jones Shafer, ed. , A Guide to Historical
Method, 3rd ed- (Homewood, IL: THe Dorsey Press, T'5B'D) p. 2.
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that history repeats itself and that those who fail to
benefit from its lessens are ultimately doomed to failure
Dealing with history has never been easy. Almost
twenty-five years ago Robert L. Heilbroner wrote:
"<Th6> recurring surprises and shocks of contemporary
history throw a pall of chronic apprehensiveness over
our times... We feel ourselves beleaguered by happenings
which seem not only malign and intransigent, but unpred-
ictable. We are at a loss to know how to anticipate the
events the future may bring or how to account for those
events once they have happened. .. At bottom our troubled
state of mind reflects an inability to see the future in
an historic context. If the current events strike us as
all surprise and shock it is because we cannot see these
events ir a meaningful framework. If the future seems
to us a kind of limbo, a repository of endless
surprises, it is because we no longer see it as the
expected culmination of the past, as the growing edge of
the present. More than anything else, our disorienta-
tion before the future reveals a loss of our historic
identity, an incapacity to grasp our historic situation.
' liUnlike our forefathers who ved very much in history
and for histor " . , _ . ^. .
historic void.
y, we ourselves appear to be adrift in' an
Some would assert that Hielbroner's statement is just as
applicable today as it was when he wrote it in the early
1960 's. Can we then hope to tame the animal of history and
extract its lessons for future use or are we forever doomed
to be confused and bewildered behind the historical power
curve? It is this author's belief that history can be used
as an invaluable tool in discernment of trends, and some-
times axioms, for use in the conduct and implementation of
policy. However, such a utilization cannot be undertaken
without some qualification and care.
That the study of history offers some interesting
insights is readily apparent. Again, in the words of
Shafer:
^Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future As History (New York;
Harper £ Brothers, 1960), pp71'5-T57
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"<One> does not find in history that problems are iden-
tical in details, but that they are similar in their
demands upon individuals and groups. .. This broadening
experience promotes sophistication and judgement in the
contemplation of public decisions, and tends both to the
reduction of parochialism or insularity, and to steadi-
ness in consideration of grand decisions by elimination
of the supposition that all current problems are
uniquely terrible in the history of man."**
Yet, the examination of history alone, without a systematic
orientation, is possibly headed for either biased or inap-
propriate conclusions. This is why the "Focused Comparison"
methodological technique advanced by Alexander L. George is
so important, for it combines the value of the study of
history with a structure that enhances the "scientific"
nature of the undertaking, thereby raising the probability
of significant and enduring contributions to comprehensive
theory.
The model presented in the previous chapter is a
concerted attempt to distill the common experience of
history into a workable structure, usable by future
decision-makers. In conjunction with the "Focused
Comparison" methodology this theoretical paradigm can then
be tested for its validity through the lens of history via
the examination of the historical case study. It is to the
nuts and bolts of this operation and the actual structuring
of our study that we now direct our attention.
C. THE "FOCUSED COMPARISON"
In presenting his development of the "Focused
Comparison", Alexander L. George noted that it is never an
easy task to learn from history. He stated that two major
problems are always encountered in this regard. The first
is that "people often disagree as to the correct lesson to
lie drawn from a particular historical experience", a fact
**Shafer, pp. 2-3-
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especially true in historical situations clouded by either
controversy or frustration for the international actors
involved. This is a d atmosphere that, almost of necessity,
creates a revisionist school that either reinterprets or
rewrites the historical record. Secondly, "even if people
agree on the correct lessons to be drawn from a particular
case, they often misapply those lessons to a new situation
that differs from the past one in important respects". *5
George's answer to these problems is the examination of
the "lessons of history" in a "systematic and differentiated
E^Z f£ol § ^£2^^^£. range of experience that deliberately
draws upon a variety of historical cases. In other words,
the task is to convert <these lessons> into a comprehensive
theory that encompasses the complexity of the phenomenon or
activity in question. "*& Such a task is analogous to the
maker of maple syrup who, after drawing the sap from a tree,
boils it down to its sugary base creating a product which is
then useful to a wide population of consumers. A similar
process remains the challenge inherent in the study of
history and the goal toward which the "Focused Comparison"
technique is tailored.
George lays out five tasks that enhance the ability of
his methodology to exploit the "lessons of history". They
are as follows:
1. Specify the research problem.
2. Elucidate the elements to be examined in the study.
3. Select the appropriate cases.
4. Consider ways in which the study can best contribute




5. Formulate general viuesticcs to be asked of each case
so as to reduce the effect of intervening variables
and further control the structure and and conipar-
aiiility of the cases.*"'
We will now address these tasks and their fulfillment within
this study.
As has already been noted, the thrust of this particular
study is the examination of the phenomenon of limited war
through the analysis of a theoretical model. This model
therefore, in itself, forms a series of hypotheses
Goncerning the employment of limited war as a tool of
national policy. Hence, it represents both the research
problem itself and, on close examination, specifies those
elements that are to be the subject of particular study.
With these first two tasks completed, our attention is now
devoted to the selection of appropriate cases for study.
Two historical cases were selected for in-depth analysis
in furtherance of this research effort. The decision to
rely on only two cases is the result of a compromise between
the constraints of time and research validity. The analysis
of more cases would have necessitated a shallower approach
to the individual historical studies proportional to the
total number involved. Conversely, the examination of just
a single case was considered completely inadequate for a
true test of the theory presented. Therefore, the selection
of a dual case study approach toward completion of the
"Focused Comparison" structure was employed.
A five step criteria was used in the selection of the
cases considered appropriate for special study. The employ-
ment of these criteria was considered crucial to the even-
tual perceived utility of the mcdel as a basis upon which
future decisions could be founded. In this way, the
7ibid, pp. 54-57-
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development of the criteria was pertinent to not only the
validation of the research, but to the general perception of
the framework in which the model would be considered to be
operative- The resulting synthesis of these considerations
produced the following criteria:
1. Successful prosecution of a limited war. That is, at
least some, if not all, of the objectives of the
intervention were satisfactorily completed under the
constraint of "limited military means".
2. The conflict must have occur ed after 194 5. This
post-WW II orientation contributes appreciably to the
value and timeliness of the study.
3- Iiivglvement of a nuclear power. This assures the
analysis of an actor which has significantly limited




Some use of sophisticated or "high- tec h" weaponry.
Provides a test of the exploitation of technological
superiority for either escalatory purposes or the
reduction of casualties/collateral damage.
5 Adequate docu mentation of the decision- making pr oces s
^t the unclassified level. Assures the widest disse-
mination of the results of this study without seri-
ously hampering the availability the research
sources.
Using this criteria the two cases selected were; 1) The
Korean War 1950-1953, and 2) The Falklands War 1982. Our
examination of these events will center on the decision-
making processes of those states to which these conflicts
represented a true "limited war", that is, a limitation of
both the means and therefore the ends toward which force
would be employed. As a result, in the former case (Korea)
we will te concerned primarily with the United States, while
in the latter (Falklands) our attention will be principally
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on the United Kingdom. However, the maneuvers, motivations,
and actions of other states will also be assessed as the
situation warrants.
While fulfilling the needs of our study as detailed
above these cases also offer some other interesting advan-
tages. First, because they are separated chronologically by
thirty years the continuing application of the model over a
period of time can be tested. In this way, it can be shown
useful as both a means for looking backward to examine the
historical record, as well as, a tool for future use in
policy development and implementation. Also, since these
cases compare different sets of primary actors (although the
United States and the United Kingdom are somewhat involved
in each) it reduces the chance that the singular traits of a
particular state could intervene and influence the results
of the study. It is for the conplementary effect of these
reasons and those stated earlier in the original criteria
that the selection of these cases is considered the most
appropriate for the task at hand.
The implications of the development of the case selec-
tion criteria on the applicability of this study to the
development of general theory has already been discussed.
However, one other point in this area bears mention. This
study is obviously conceived as an aid to the decision-
making process of the national security leadership of a
state in the context of a competitive international environ-
ment. It is therefore primarily concerned with an analysis
of the political, geostrategic, and tactical decisions of
both the civilian and military authorities tasked with
responsibility in this arena- Rhile not entirely disposing
of domestic political considerations, an attempt has been
made to examine the issues involved in the specific cases on
a broader and more international plain. Therefore, the
following analysis would tend toward an emphasis on
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Allison's rational actor (Model 1) rather than his organiza-
tional or bureaucratic actor paradigms (Models 2 & 3),^^ This
is only logical, for the model's workings key on assessments
made in regard to the net political and military capabili-
ties between two or more states. We therefore must focus
our attention on this international "netting" process
although domestic political, organizational, and bureau-
cratic considerations can never be entirely swept aside.
The final task remaining in the structuring of our
"Focused Comparison" study is the development of a series of
questions that will operationalize the variables within the
Limited War Model and hence provide a vehicle for the
comparison of the chosen cases. This requirement was found
to be best fulfilled through the application of a series of
questions to each of the three specific phases of the model
itself. Presented below in a phase-by-phase format are the
"Queries that were developed. Naturally, because the model
is interrelated the questions will also show a certain
inter-dependence and, in fact, we shall see that the answer
to a particular inquiry might have application in more than
one phase. This is an idea that will be investigated more
fully as we progress, but first, the questions themselves.
The Entry Phase:
1. What were the principle considerations in the deci-
sion to employ armed intervention?
a) Political
b) Military
2- Were these considerations translated into clearly
established objectives at the outset of the conflict?
*«Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971)
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3. Is there evidence that the actor assessed its
political/military will and capability to out perform
its opponent(s) in a "competition in risk taking"
before entering into the conflict?
4. Were allies sought before entry? Why and at what
price?
These questions stress the political and military
contemplations that should, and in most cases do, precede a
decision to enter into an ongoing or anticipated conflict.
Since our model requires a coherent and rational assessment
of such capabilities in relationship to that our opponent
and its probable allies before nilitary intervention the
thrust of these inquiries is fairly straightforward. In
essence we will be looking and judging the scope and depth
of the considerations undertaken by the national security
advisors of the states in our cases before their decision to
enter into a limited war.
The Conduct Phase:
1. Were the objectives established during the entry
phase translated into the political/military action
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war?
2. Did one side possess technological superiority at the
beginning of the conflict? If so, how did it exploit
this advantage?
3. Was a form or adaptation of "selective intervention"
employed on the actual battlefield? Were joint
service operations utilized?
4. Here any of the original objectives changed during
the course of the war? Why?
5. Were allies sought after entry into the conflict?
Why and under what pretext or arrangement?
This set of inquiries seeks to expose the linkage (or
lack thereof) between the original deliberations prior to
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conflict entry and the actual conduct of the intervention.
Given a certain set cf considerations that resulted in a
decision to pursue the fulfillment of policy via the battle-
field our concern in this phase will be to find out if these
were properly translated into guidelines or orders for the
use of the tactical commanders. We we will also be inter-
ested in the role of technology as both a means of unmat-
chable escalation (technological superiority) and a vehicle
for damage and casualty reduction- The employment of the
"selective intervention" concept that is closely related to
the utilization of technology, as well as emphasizing the
use of speed, mobility and specially trained/ "elite"
forces, will also be tested. In this regard we will also
examine the use of joint service operations and their appli-
cation to the phenomenon of limited war. Finally, any
search for additional allies after entry into the conflict
will be questioned for both motivation and ultimate price.
Our overall purpose is to construct a useful framework
through which the implementation of the original objectives
of the conflict may be viewed as they are operat ionalized on
the field of battle-
It can be seen that questions concerning the indicators
used as a measurement of the prcgress that is being made
toward the stated objectives and their employment in this
area are not addressed in this section. Admittedly, the
whole process of the measurement of and progress towards
objective accomplishment and decisions regarding conven-
tional escalation are closely related and are made during
the Conduct Phase of a limited war. However, since these
determinations form the basis for the termination of a
limited war, it was felt that their examination would be
best understood if undertaken in that context.
61
The Termination Phase:
1. Were measures or tactical goals developed to indicate
the accomplishment of objectives? What were they?
2. Was a periodic assessment made of the progress toward
objectives?
3. When the initial objectives were reached was war
termination sought?
4. Under what condition in relation to the original
stated objectives was the conflict ended?
5. Was the employment of nuclear weapons ever consid-
ered? If so, under what circumstances?
6. How was the conflict terminated?
The consideration of the Termination phase, as was noted
earlier, includes the analysis of the progress toward the
objectives that were theoretically constructed initially in
the Entry Phase of the model and now form the imaginary
"finish line" toward which the conduct of the limited war is
run. The questions reflect the continuing preponderance of
these original or modified goals as a guide for the employ-
ment of the limited war instrument. Our interest in this
area is also taken a step further by inquiring as to how the
conflict was actually ended and if the use of nuclear
weapons as either a means of coercion, escalation, or demon-
stration was employed as a means for terminating the
conflict. Our hope is to structure the analysis of this
phase so as to assess the extent of success attributable to
the utilization of limited war as a policy tool and the
means by which such a conflict can be ended.
The questions dealing with each phase of the model will
not be repeated again in a verbatim form during an examina-
tion of the cases. Eather, for the sake of readability, the
cases are each broken into three chapters corresponding to
the three phases of the Limited War Model. Within each of
these chapters further subtitling roughly reflects the
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questions asked of the cases. In the concluding chapter the
specific inquiries will again be listed and a summation of
the findings developed in guest of their answers mads.
This ends our investigation of the particulars of the
"Focused Comparison" technique and its application to this
study. As we have seen, this methodology offers a chance to
view the "lessons of history" through a structured and
potentially more meaningful format than available in the
past. Because it has the inherent capability to distinguish
between cases, but nevertheless remains grounded in the
historic method, it represents a middle-ground Detween the
historiographers and the adherents to the statistical/
correlative approach. Therefore, due to its recognized
ability for diagnostic potential "conclusions can be
drawn. ..that can assist directly in the diagnosis of a fresh
case, historical or contemporary."*''
B. E7IDEHCE
The final subject of this chapter on methodology will be
concerned with the gathering and interpretation of evidence.
Since this study is based on the examination of historical
cases the validity of evidence is of no small concern to its
conduct. For this reason we will take a yuick look at the
types of evidence that will be used in this study and their
relative weighting.
Naturally, where possible, primary sources will be
utilized in the examination of cur case studies. Since our
concern is principally with government decision-making the
ntsColumbia Universiry "Press, iy/4) p. 97. This work represe
the most acclaimed of those that have to date employed the
"Focused Comparison" methodology. It is, in fact, a classic
due to both its scholarship and its methodological struc-
ture. This study relies on it heavily as an example of the
research technique employed and as a goal toward which all
scholastic study should be directed.
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use of government documents pertinent to tne actual process
of formulating policy will be stressed. This is particu-
larly true in the Korean War case, where in the last 8-10
years numerous records have been declassified that have
direct relation to subject of our study. ^o However, because
the quantity of government documentation available relating
to the Falklands conflict is understandably limited due to
the relatively recent conduct of that war our analysis,
while not totally devoid of government sources, is neverthe-
less more reliant on contemporary newspaper and magazine
accounts along with the numerous post-mortems that were
published in scholarly journals after the war than is our
examination of the Korean conflict. si
The next most important source of information is that of
the personal memoirs written by those individuals who were
associated with the decision-making process in both of these
conflicts. Again, there is a wealth of this information in
regard to the Korean War and a substantial lack of such
insider accounts in the Falklands case. While almost all of
the principals have published their recollections in one
form or another for both the Truman and Eisenhower adminis-
trations, the availability of similar documentation from the
Thatcher government is virtually non-existent. The only two
accounts that could be considered in this regard would be a
soThe series published by the State Department and enti-
tled Foreign Relations of the United States was released in
1976 Tor ^ne Korean ¥ar years alin incIuHes many previously
classified documents. It represents one of the principle
sources now available for the study of the Korean conflict.
siTwo British Government documents were extremely
helpful in preparing the Falklands case study. They are: A
Committee of Privy Counselors, The Lord Franks Chairman,
Falkland Islands fteview Presented to Parliament by Command
of Her Hajesry Tl^ondon: HMSO, January 1983) and John Nott,
Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign
Presented to Parliament by the Command of Her fTajes^y
(London: HMSO, December 1982) . Though these presentations
offer a sanitized view of the decisions surrounding the
Falklands War they are, at present, the only official
sources available whicn address the conflict.
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magazine article written by Sir Nicholas Henderson, British
Ambassador to the United States during the Falkiands War, 52
and the autobiography of Alexander Haig, the U.S. Secretary
of State, who played an important role in attempts to
mediate the crisis. ^3 This fact further emphasizes our reli-
ance on the contemporary journalistic accounts surrounding
the Falkiands War.
The final source of information used in the analysis is
that of the outside biographies and accounts written on both
of the cases which we will scrutinize. The responsibility
for both the external and interral criticism of these
sources is necessarily that of the researcher. This fact is
not only true for these materials , but, for all of the
sources employed in this study. Where (Questions are perti-
nent, particularly as to the authenticity or factual
validity of a source, they will be raised. However, it is
felt that the amount of documentation available for a thor-
ough examination of both the selected cases will not be
affected by such considerations. With these thoughts in
mind we can now turn our attention to the analysis of our
case studies.
52Sir Nicholas Henderson, "Behavior of an Ally,"
Economist, November 12,19 83, pp. 40-55.
53Alexander Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984)
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IV. THE KOREAN iAR: ENTRY
The Korean War, a conflict conducted between the years
1950-1953, will be the first case examined in relation to
the, previously presented. Limited War Model. Robert
Endicott Osgood, writing in 1957, called this conflict "the
single most significant event in the development of American
post-war strategy. "5 A while its impact in the years since
Osgood wrote may have seemingly diminished, the American
experience in Korea will always be considered a watershed,
for it marked the first large-scale use of the limited war
instrument by a globally significant power in the post-7!orld
War II era. In fact, over thirty years later, Joseph
Goulden would still be able to make a strong case for the
importance of this war. He states:
"<This war> was. ..the turning point for America's
post-World War II military and diplomatic strategy.
Korea marked the first time the Qnited States went to
arms to halt Communist military expansion- . .<It> marked
the start of the construction of a military juggernaut
the support of which consumed half the annual federal
budget, even in peacetime years, and found American men
and women at posts in the fartherest reaches of the
world. "55
The war in Korea is also important because of the broad
concern it generated on the international front. Not only
was this conflict the source of much diplomatic maneuver
within the newly created United Nations but, after that body
called for military action under the aegis of collective
security, personnel from twenty different states saw service
5*Robert Endicott Osgood, limited War: The Challenge to
American Strategy (Chicago: The~TTniversify or CiTicago Press,
1^575"7~p .I'El'.
55joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Ontold Story of the War
(New York: Times Books, 1982)", p.xv.
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in the subsequent intervention. 5& The Korean War was, there-
fore, not just a "civil war" but an event with international
proportions.
For these reasons, this war provides an extremely inter-
esting case for examination. This is specifically true in
regard to our search into the validity and utility of the
limited War Model because this conflict was for all of the
parties involved, with the notable exception of the Koreas
themselves, a "limited war". Nc where was this limitation
more profound or controversial than in the U.S. Therefore,
the deliberations of the Jnited States provide extremely
fertile ground for our particular study. We now turn our
attention to an analysis of the decisions regarding American
entry, conduct, and termination of this war.
Our examination of the entry of the United States into
the Korean conflict will be considered in the following
chapter. Four sections will be used in organizing and
structuring our analysis of this decision. The first will
analyze the political and military considerations that
impacted on the determination of the J.S. to enter the
Korean conflict. The second will look at the establishment
of objectives by the American decision-makers in the context
of these considerations. The third section will deal with
any relative "risk" assessment that was performed before the
decision to enter the conflict and any limitations that were
placed on the use of force as a result. The last topic
which will be addressed in our examination of the Entry
phase is the recruitment of allies by the U.S. in anticipa-
tion of actual armed hostility.
s^Thas number represents the 15 nations that sent mili-
tary forces to Korea plus 5 which dispatched only medical
units. For a list of participants with their relative
contributions see: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Ippendr3r'A7~p7T5'7.
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A. PEE-ENTEY POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
The initial concern of this case study is with the deci-
sion of the United States to respond to the invasion of its
client state, the Republic of Korea (ROK) , by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea(DPRK), their cultural twin yet,
ideological opposite to the north. The thrust of this
assault by the North Korean People's Arniy(NKPA) into the
south coDJinenced along four axes before dawn on June 25, 1950
(Korean time) . The attack, which achieved tactical
surprise, soon rolled over the gallant but, disorganized and
outgunned, ROK forces and withic three days had captured the
traditional capital city of Seoul. This invasion not only
succeeded in the rapidly occupying territory, but virtually
destroyed the army of the southern republic- As evidence of
this one need only note that the ROK Army, on the evening of
June 28th, could account for only 22,000 of the 98,000 men
it had carried on its roles three days earlier. 5 7 it was in
this strategic situation that the President of the United
States, Harry S. Truman, and his advisors considered their
possible military involvement on the Korean Peninsula.
The decision of the United States to intervene in the
Korean conflict of 1950 can not be completely understood
without an acquaintance with the historical background that
led to the invasion of the south by the DPEK. Like all wars
there were both short and long-term reasons for the outbreak
of hostilities. There were alsc entirely separate motives
that prompted an international response to a situation that
was seemingly disproportionate to the security considera-
tions involved.
s'^T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of »ar (New York;
Macmillan, 1963), p. 75.
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In the following section we will examine the circum-
stances leading to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.
Our analysis will begin with the division of the peninsula
following the end of WW II. We will then shift our atten-
tion to the perception, specifically within the U.S., of the
Korean situation as only another example of the Soviet
tendency toward global expansion. In this regard, Korea
will te examined from both a psychologically and materially
strategic perspective. We will then look at the factors
that were later cited as the reason for American involve-
ment, the resistance of aggression and the defense of
collective security. Finally, we will end our analysis of
pre-ccnflict considerations with a overview of the meeting
between President Truman and his advisors at Blair House,
the day after the invasion.
Chosun or Korea, as it is krown today, has had the
misfortune to be situated at the point of geographic conver-
gence of "great powers". China to the west, Russia to the
north, and Japan to the east have traditionally dominated
this "Hermit Kingdom". At the close of World War II another
"great power" found itself involved in this eternal border
state, for the United States had now become one of the domi-
nate powers in Asian politics.
In Korea, the U.S. was only assuming the position of the
recently defea^ted Imperial Japanese Empire. In 1905,
following the defeat of Czarist Sussia in the Russo-Japanese
War the land of Chosun had fallen under the complete control
of Dai Nippon. Over the next forty years the Japanese had
not only exploited their Korean subjects but had attempted
to extirpate their ancient culture. It was only the Allied
victory in the Pacific, resultirg in the dismantling of the
East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, that broke the shackles
binding the Koreans and offered the possibility of eventual
independence.
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The war in the Pacific ended much quicker than the
Allies expected. Although the reasons for this are entirely
dependent on which history book one reads, certainly the
American destruction of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
with atomic bombs, on August 6th and 9th respectively, was
one motivation for the sudden ccllapse of Japan. Another
possibility would coincide with the Soviet's later claim
that the Japanese suit for peace was the result of their
entry into the Pacific war, with the invasion of Manchuria
on August 8th. However, regardless of the rationale, the
unexpectedly quick surrender of Japan forced the United
States to promptly take action for the joint occupation of
the Korean Peninsula unless it ><anted the entire region to
slip, by default, into Soviet hands.
The alliance of convenience which had allowed the capi-
talist West to join hands with the communist East lost, with
the defeat of Japan, the only adhesive that had ever held it
together— a common enemy. Concerns now centered on the
rebuilding of the post-war world and the political/economic
model that would be employed for this task. It was with
this in mind that the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC) (created during the war to do just the job
its name implied) met, in the Pentagon, on the night of
August 10-11, with the issue of Korea high on its agenda. se
As this group gathered to consider future U.S. actions
regarding Korea there were several previously made policy
pronouncements that guided their deliberations.
Stephen Pelz traces the beginnings of the U.S.'s post-
war Korean policy to the drafting of the Atlantic Charter by
Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941. In this document
these leaders promised self-government for all peoples in
those nations "forcibly deprived" of their sovereign
ssGoulden, p. 19-
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rights. 59 However, the subject cf the post-war dispensation
of Korea was first broached at the Cairo Conference between
Eoosevelt, Churchill, and Chaing Kai-Shek in December 1943.
At this time it was agreed that a joint trusteeship should
ie set up to govern the Koreans after the war, a decision
that was subsequently, though unofficially, endorsed by
Stalin at both the Tehran and Yalta Conferences. ^
o
The ultimate goal of such a trusteeship was always
perceived, at least in the U.S., as a method through which
the country could be rebuilt after forty years of Japanese
occupation and eventually be granted independence. But,
because most of the American military leaders had considered
the invasion of the Japanese homeland inevitable, they had
not seriously considered the near-term possibility of imple-
menting the Korean trusteeship arrangement through military
occupation. This would be an area where the anticipated
Soviet offensive in northeast Asia must, of necessity, be
allowed to take its course, while the U.S. forces went about
the business of conquering Japan.
It was with this background that the SWNCC convened on
that fateful summer evening. In the course of their discus-
sions several factors became readily apparent. First, the
surrender of the Japanese occupation force and government in
Korea had to be accepted by some Allied contingent. Second,
because the U.S. had long been reconciled to the necessity
of a invasion of Japan the nearest American ground troops to
Korea were in Okinawa, over 600 miles distant from the
peninsula; Third, since the Soviets had invaded Manchuria
s^stephen Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy,
1943-1950: Some Hypotheses" in Eruce Cumings. ed. , Child of
Conflict jfSeattle, WA: The University of Washington Press,
_
60For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the impli-
cations of the various Allied conferences on the post-war
status of Korea see: Eruce Cumings, The Origins of the
Korean Far (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
T95T77 ppTia4-117. ^
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two days earlier, it could be assumed that their forces were
in much greater number and proximity to Korea; And finally,
it was the desire of the Department of State that, for
understandable political reasons, the surrender of the
Japanese forces in Korea to be accepted by the elements of
the D.S. Army as far north as possible. Eventually, two
Army colonels. Dean Rusk (destined for much greater fame)
and Charles H- Bonesteel, were dispatched to an adjoining
room to come up with a solution that represented a compro-
mise between the contradictory military realities and polit-
ical desires. It was from their deliberation that the
division of Korea along the 38th parallel emerged. ^i
Although the two colonels realized that the ability of U.S.
forces to reach this line before the Russians, should they
disagree, was non-existent both considered the inclusion of
the capital city of Seoul within the American area of
responsibility crucial. When later approached, to every-
one's surprise, the Soviets accepted division along the
parallel without eguivocation. &2
On September 8th Maj. Gen. J. R. Hodge, USA, a Corps
Commander, landed at Inchon with a regiment of his troops.
On the next day he accepted the surrender of the
Government-General at Seoul. Meanwhile, the Russians had
entered Korea on August 12th and by this time were already
abreast the 38th parallel. ^3 Gen. Hodge would remain as
titular head of the U.S. occupation force for four more
^^Interestingly enough, this partition used the same
line of demarcation that had been employed in the
Russo-Japanese agreement which had divided Korea into
"spheres of influence" in 1896, a fact that may have




years. This period saw the idea of a trusteeship, leading
to the eventual unification and independence of Korea, first
wane and then altogether disappear.
The story of the lack of cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Onion in Korea parallels that of
similar experiences in other areas following World War II.
^hile the specifics of this breakdown and the validity of
each party's position is beyond the scope of this study, the
effect that it had on future actions of the U.S. is not.
Simply put, the United States felt that the Soviets were
undercutting the agreements made between the victorious
allies for the reconstruction of the post-war world.
In Korea, Soviet intransigence took the form of the
stonewalling of the Joint Commission (JC) that had been set
up as the vehicle through which the trusteeship and eventual
independence of that country would be administered. &* The JC
guickly proved powerless for two reasons. First, the
Soviets would not allow any semblance of outside influence
within their zone of administration in Korea. And second,
they consistently objected to the right of all political
parties in Korea to have a voice in the provisional govern-
ment that was to be formed during the period of the trustee-
ship. Later, this same issue of the right to free and
unrestricted self-determination would form the stated basis
for a substantial portion of the actions of the U.S. in
Korea.
Thoroughly frustrated by the lack of progress, the U.S.
decided to take the Korean problem to the United Nations
General Assembly. There, in November 1947, a nine nation UN
Temporary Commission on Korea was established to observe the
election of Korean representatives to a National Assembly
^*The Joint Commission (JC) was formed as the result of
an agreement reached between the U.S., Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union at a Foreign Ministers conference held in
Moscow in December 1945.
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that could then, in turn, form a national government . ^s
Early in 19U8 this Commission proceeded to Korea.
Predictably, it was denied access to the area north of the
38th parallel, thus forcing it to consult with the Interim
Committee of the General Assembly as to its future course of
action. Subsequently, the Committee decided that, regard-
less of the Soviet position, the Commission should carry out
its mandate in as much of Korea as possible. Therefore,
elections were scheduled in the American zone for May 1948.
It was from this balloting that the Republic of Korea
was formed in August of the same year with the well-known
Korean nationalist, Snygman Rhee, selected as its first
President. In September the Soviets responded to the
creation of the ROK by announcing the formation of the
Democratic Peoples Republic in the north. This state,
considered by the international community to be little more
than a Russian satellite, was headed by Kim Il-Sung.
In April 1948, just before these elections began the
process of its permanent division, the U.S. position with
respect to Korea was outlined in a then Top Secret document
prepared by the National Security Council, NSC 8. Here the
objectives of the United States regarding the future of
Korea were defined as follows:
1. "To establish a united, self-governing, and
sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent
of foreign control and eligible for membership in
the UN.
2. "To ensure that the national government so estab-
lished shall be fully representative of the
freely expressed will of the Korean people.
3- "To assist the Korean people in establishing a
sound economy and educational system as essential
bases of an independent and democratic state.
65it should be noted that this resolution was passed by
the General Assembly without Soviet concurrence.
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"To these may be added the derivative objective of
terminating the military commitment of the U.S. in Korea
as soon as practicable consistent viith the forgoing
objectives. "6^
NSC-8 shows that the 0, S. was interested in an independent
Korea but, was also anxious to dispose of the task of occu-
pying its portion of the peninsula as soon as possible.
This was because the men and material necessary for a
continued occupation were, due to post-war demobilization
and ballooning American security commitments, increasingly
becoming in short supply.
A quick look at the war plans that were being written
during this period is a good indicator as to where the mili-
tary occupation of this peninsula fit in the overall stra-
tegic picture for the Dnited States. In September 1947 the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told President Truman that "the
Dnited States has little strategic interest in maintaining
its troops and bases in Korea. "^^ Later, in May 1949, the
strategic war plan codenamed OFFTACKLE (the first post-war
plan to utilize statements of national interest prepared by
the Department of State and the National Security Council in
its formulation) put the previous disregard of the JCS for
the Korean peninsula in perspective. OFFTACKLE' s overall
strategic concept called for "the destruction of the Soviet
will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic
offensive in Western Eurasia and a strateg_ic defensive (my
emphasis) in the Far East."^^ The plan subsequently defined
s^D.S- Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
Dnited States ^iiereafter FRDS) 194E7 7oI. 7T~TWashingtonT
6'^Harry S. Truman. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope,(Garden City, NY: Doubleday~S~Cc77~Inc77 T"55Br, ~pT325.
s^Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment:
Documents on American Policy, and Strateqx, 194S"-T?5I7 ["New
Yorlc: CoIumMa Dliiversiry Fress, T97BY, p.SZB". Significant
portions of OFFTACKLE are reprinted in their original formm this source, pp. 324-334.
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the defense of the Far East as the assurance of the
continuing availability as staging bases of both Okinawa and
Japan. ^^ In fact, no where in the document is mention even
made of the defense of Korea. ^o
This plan, though obviously not considering the possi-
bility of a limited war, nevertheless points out some
crucial factors operating in the conceptualization of U.S.
strategy. First, the U.S., just as in the previous war, was
going to employ a Europe first strategy. Second, the scope
of American security commitments had out run its resources
and decisions on the strategic value of certain areas were
being made and included in planning. In this cost-benefit
analysis world Korea was viewed as a virtual non-entity.
Thus in June 1949 the U.S. withdrew its occupation forces
from Korea leaving only a 500 man advisory contingent to
assist what was now advertised as one of the best armies in
the Far East. Unfortunately, future events were to prove
this analysis severely clouded by wishful thinking.
A little over a year later when the DPRK attacked the
south these strategic considerations had not been appreci-
ably altered. Hence, the U.S. elected to respond in a
"limited" fashion to this challenge vice the escalation to
*^Ibid, p. 330.
70^1so of interest is OFFTACKLE's relationship to the
later controversial statement made by Secretary of State
Acheson concerning the American forward defense perimeter in
Asia in a speech before the National Press Club on January
12, 1950. The Secretary defined the U.S. line as beginning
at the Aleutians, running through Japan, then Okinawa, and
terminating at the Phillipines. One can note that this
statement bears a remarkable resemblance to the OFFTACKLE
plan. Acheson was, subsequent to the invasion of South
Korea, to be criticized for encouraging a Communist attack
on the ROK by leaving it out of the stated perimeter. Yet,
the record shows that his statenent was, in fact, policy.
However, the ambiguity decreasing nature of the speech,
particularly in light of later events, makes Mr. Acheson'
s
candor, at best, ill-conceived though far from indefensible.
It should also be noted that Gen. MacArthur made a similar
statement to a New York Times reporter in 1949. Acheson
gives a good defense of himself in Present at the Creation
{New Yorx: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.,~195?f7 pp.~356-T5^T ~
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total war that OFFTACKLE prescribed. Korea was never a war
foe national survival or even of geostrategic value. It
was, however, a battle for precedent.
Precedent had become important to the United States as
the world moved toward an era when the perceptions of the
balance of power became as important as the actual balance
itself. This period basically began in 1949 with two
astounding events the loss of China to the communists and
the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb. These
happenings overlaid on a policy that, through the Truman
Doctrine, was already committed to the support of "free
peoples" everywhere restructured the American view of the
world.
In Washington it was felt that these incidents signalled
a permanent alteration in the international environment.
The fall of China was significant because, as the most popu-
lous nation on the globe, it represented a potentially
formidable adversary. It also narked only the latest in a
growing number of states that had "fallen" to the communists
since the end of the war. The reality of a Soviet atomic
bomb was even more critical for it ended the American
nuclear monopoly and changed the strategic framework in
which the global competition of, what were now, "super-
powers" could be played-
In early 1950 President Truman commissioned a study that
would produce, for reference within his administration, a
"single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and
feasible responses" in light of the new strategic situ-
ation. ^i The result, when completed by the "ad hoc" combina-
tion of State Department and National Security Council
personnel assigned to the task, was NSC 68. This document,
though still not officially approved at the outbreak of the
^iJohn Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New




Korean hostilities, is important for it gives an insight
into the mind-set that dictated U.S. intervention in that
conflict.
John Lewis Gaddis has noted that the Korean War and NSC
68 went hand-in-hand because the attack by the communists on
the peninsula "appeared to validate several of <the docu-
ment's> most important conclusions. "'^2 i]^q first of these
was the nature of the Soviet Onion and its relation to the
rest of the world. On this subject NSC 68 stated:
"the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithet-
ical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute
authority on the rest of the world. Conflict has there-
fore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the
Soviet Onion, by violent or ncn-violent methods in
accordance with the dictates of expediency ." ''^
Furthermore;
"any further expansion of the area under domination of
the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coali-
tion adequate to confront the Kremlin could be
assembled. ""^ *
Thus the Soviet Onion was viewed by the leadership of the
Onited States as being ideologically evangelical and mili-
tantly expansionist. As a result, all further gains by
communism were to be perceived as contrary to U.S. inter-
ests, ultimately approaching the point where the entire
"free world" could well be in danger.
In this context the invasion of the ROK was seen as a
Soviet conceived grab for what must have appeared to be an
opportune spot for easy conquest. President Truman later
wrote that he, early on, expressed the opinion that "what
72ibid, p. 109.
73FRDS 1950, Vol. I, p. 237
7Albid, p. 237-238.
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was happening in Korea seemed tc be a repetition on a larger
scale of what had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing
for weaknesses in our armor; we had to meet their thrust
without getting embroiled in a world-war. " ^s without ques-
tion the consideration of checking the growth of the Eastern
bloc was one of the primary considerations in the U.S.
decision to enter the Korean conflict.
As mentioned earlier, precedent setting had become
important in the American conceptualization of dealing with
the post-war world. NSC 68 put it this way: "The assault on
free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of
the present polarization of power a defeat of free institu-
tions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. ""'6 Therefore, the
D-S. could not afford to let the defense of freedom lag at
any point. In short, the world was now to be viewed as a
zero-sum game. In this contest a loss for the U.S. anywhere
was, automatically, a victory for the Soviet Union and vice
versa. Hence, when challenged, the "free world", led by the
United States, must be willing to engage and setback the
forces of the Soviets or their proxies in order to set prec-
edents against expansion. Such an action would, in theory,
concurrently reduce the possibility of further attack and
boost the morale of those aspiring to individual freedom.
It was this psychological charge that would have a substan-
tial impact on the American decision to resist the expansion
of communism into south Korea.
President Truman returned to Washington on June 25,
1950, the day after the commencement of the hostilities in
Korea, from his home in Independence, Missouri.^"' He had
^STruman, p. 337.
76FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p.240-
"^'The time in Washington was a calendar day behind thatm Korea. Therefore, though the attack in Korea took place
on June 25th it was still the 2 Uth in the United States.
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called an emergency meeting of his advisors to be held at
Blair House that evening. This gathering would include
significant State and Defense Department personnel, but, was
not representative of any formal policy making body such as
the National Security Council. It was, in fact, an "ad hoc"
gathering of the men that the President wanted as counselors
and who were available for consultation in the capital.
On his return flight to Washington Truman was already
considering the implications of the action in Korea. An
avid student of history and the lessons its holds for the
current decision-maker he would later write:
"Almost all current events in the affairs of government
have their parallels and precedents in the past... Long
before I ever considered going into public life I had
arrived at the conclusion that no decisions affecting
geople should be made impulsively, but on a basis of
istorical background and careful consideration of the
facts as they exist at the tine."78
It was the lessons of history that were vary much on the
Chief Executive's mind as he prepared to meet his advisors
that evening. He subseguently recorded that his thoughts
centered on the world's past experience with unchallenged
aggression- In his words:
"In my generation, this was net the first occasion when
the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some
earlier instances: Manchuria. Ethiopia, Austria. I
remembered how each time that the democracies failed to
act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going
ahead. Communism was acting in Korea iust as Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and
twenty years earlier. "^"'
78Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, (Garden
City^ NY: Doubleday & Co~~Tnc. ,~1S55Y7 pTTZTT
7 9Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope , p. 33 3.
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The implications of the resistar.ce of aggression to the
President were dual. First, forceful military invasion, was
not an appropriate instrument through which contemporary
states could affect changes in the international structure.
Second, the risk of unchallenged aggression was ultimately
the outbreak of total war, an alternative that was particu-
larly distasteful in a world with nuclear weapons. By the
time Truman's plane touched down in Washingti>n he had
decided that he was "not going to let the attack succeed. "^o
It was in this frame of mind that the President boarded his
limousine for the drive to Blair House and the meeting with
his advisors.
Until the return of the President the crisis had been
handled in Washington by the Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, although he was in frequent contact with the Chief
Executive. In fact, before his return Truman had authorized
Acheson to have the Korean situation brought before the
United Nations Security Council- This was accomplished on
the morning of the 25th, at which time a resolution was
passed calling for "the immediate cessation of hostilities"
and the return of North Korean forces "for thwith . . . to the
thirty-eighth parallel." It further called for a report on
the situation in Korea from the United Nations Commission
currently in place on the peninsula and ended with a rec,uest
that "all Members render every assistance in the execution
of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to
the North Korean authorities. "^ i This resolution began the
soGlenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: The
free Press, 1968), p, 12^
8»U.N. Document S/1501, included in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII,
p. 155-156. The vote on this resolution was 9 in favor to
opposed, with one member (Yugoslavia) abstaining and another
(U.S.S.R.) absent. The Soviets were protesting the failure
to seat the delegation of the People's Republic of China en
the Security Council. It was this fortunate circumstance
that allowed the Council to take the speedy action that it
did on the Korean situation.
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campaign of the United States tc make the conflict in Korea
a test of the vitality of collective security, which, at the
time was still considered an imjortant aspect of American
national defense. '
Truman was well aware that the United Nations was on
trial in the Korean crisis. In his memoirs he later said,
"It was ...clear to me that the foundations and the princi-
ples of the United Nations were at stake unless the this
unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped. "82 Secretary
Acheson, in Congressional Hearings, later remarked;
"The attack of Korea was. . . a challenge to the whole
system of collective security, not only in the Far East,
but everywhere in the world. . .If we stood <by> while
Korea was swallowed up it would have meant abandoning
our principles, and it would have meant defeat of the
collective security system on which our own safety ulti-
mately depended. "8-S
We thus see that considerations about the United Nations and
the viability of the global collective security system, put
in place as a result of the experience of two World Wars,
were very much on the minds of the senior U.S. decision-
makers as they considered the appropriate response to the
Korean situation.
The meeting at Blair House on that Sunday evening began
a week of deliberations that ended in the commitment of U.S.
combat ground forces to the fighting in Korea. s* in this
ssTruman, Memoirs: Year s of Trial and Hope, p. 333.
S3U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Mil itar y
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^Those present at Blair House on June 25th were: Pres.
Truman; Sec. of State Acheson; S^c. of Defense Johnson; Sec.
of the Navy Matthews; Sec. of the Army Pace: Sec. of the
Air Force Finletter* Under Sec. of State WebD: Asst. Sec.
State (Far Eastern Affairs) Rusk; Asst. Sec. of State (United
Nations Affairs) Hickerson^ Ambassador-at- Large Jessup:
Chairman of the Joint Chiers of Staff. Gen. Bradley; Chief
of Staff of the Army, Gen- Collins;^ Chief of Naval
Operations, Adm. Sherman; and Chier of Staff of the Air
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first conference of that momentous week the participants
reviewed the basic issues that we have already touched upon,
That the invasion of Korea was a Soviet inspired was a fore-
drawn conclusion. Earlier in the day the Office of
Intelligence Research at the Department of State had
released the following assessment:
"The North Korean government is completely under Kremlin
control and there as no possitility that the North
Koreans acted without prior instruction from Moscow.
The move against South Korea must therefore be consid-
ered a Soviet move. "85
Furthermore, this intelligence estimate warned of the
results of failing to successfully halt the Communist
aggression on not only the Far East but, in Europe as well.
The thrust of this analysis was that neutralist pressures in
both Japan and occupied Germany would substantially increase
if the U.S. was unable to save the ROK.ss This was battle
for precedent advocated with a vengeance, and the beginnings
of a concept that would, later, be termed the "domino prin-
ciple". The message of the invasion of Korea seemed obvious
to the U.S. political and military leadership, world commu-
nism, directed from Moscow was aggressively on the move.
In notes taken of this Blair House discussion by
Ambassador Phillip Jessup we also know that mention was made
of both the consideration of resisting aggression and the
implementation of collective security. ^7 jt was reiterated
on several occasions in the meeting that any U.S. response
would be made through and under the shield of the United
Force^ Gen. Vandenberg. Source: FRUS 1950, Vol. VII,
p. 157.
85FEUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 149.
sfilbid, p. 151, 154.
87jessup's "Memorandum of Conversation" of the first
Blair House meeting can be found in: Ibid, p. 157-161.
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Nations for purposes of both precedent and support. We will
examine the U.S. use of the U.N. in more depth shortly.
Finally, our analysis of pre-conflict political/military
considerations can end with a Icok at the review given the
positioning of both friendly and potential enemy armed
forces at this first meeting. Acheson had opened the
discussion, at the President's request, with a review of the
situation in Korea including some recommendations for
preliminary U.S. action. Truman then immediately turned to
the uniformed military advisors (Bradley, Collins, Sherman,
and Vandenberg) and had each run down the strength of
American and Soviet forces in the Far East.^e it was only
after this review of the military situation and some further
deliberation by both himself and his advisors that Truman
issued his orders for the eveniDg. It is to the substance
of these instruction and those of the following days that we
now direct ourselves as we examine the formulation of
objectives.
B. ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES
As stated earlier, in the presentation of the model, the
establishment of objectives that clearly relate to the
political and military considerations involved in a partic-
ular situation is vital to the ultimate success of a limited
war. In the proceeding section the factors that were of
importance to the United States in relation to the Korean
crisis of June 1950 have been considered in some detail. We
will now take each of these and discuss its translation into
a goal by the American authorities.
The basic objective of the U.S. decision-makers as they
considered the relative weights of various actions during
the initial period of the crisis was the assurance of the
seibid, 158-159.
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continued existence of th e Repuhlic of Korea, based on the
principle of self-determination , and the return to i ts
sovereignty of, at a minimum , the territory und er its
control at the commencement of hostilities. This objective
fit in well with the demonstrated U.S. concern for the right
of individual choice for the people of Korea and the estab-
lishment of a positive precedent against international
aggression. There is little question that if the invaders
had returned across the 38th parallel in the first week of
the war there would have been little further action by the
U.S. outside of beefing up the defenses of the South
Koreans. The wording of the original U-N. resolution,
passed on June 24th, calling for the "cessation of hostili-
ties" and a withdrawal to the original border is ample
evidence of this.^' The survival of the ROK remained a goal
of the U.S. throughout the conflict although, as the war
continued, it was to undergo sone reinterpretation.
The possibility of extending the war north of the 38th
parallel, as was later done, is consistent with this objec-
tive for two reasons. First, this line represented no mili-
tary reality as its selection was made, as we have seen, on
a purely political basis. Hence, the defense of the ROK
might well include tactical action across this imaginary
line of demarcation. Secondly, the U.S. and most of the
world recognized the government of the ROK, elected under
the auspices of the United Nations, as the only legitimate
state on the Korean Peninsula. Later, on September 9th the
National Security Council would approve a report addressing
the suggested "Courses of Action With Respect to Korea" (NSC
81/1) that lucidly states the U.S. position:
890. N. Document S/1501 included in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII,
p. 155.
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"The political objective of the 'Jnited Nations is to
bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea
in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of
November 14-1947, December ^2, 1948. and October 21,
1949... The United States has strongly supported this
political objective. "90
Since the events of June 1950 had proven that it was threat-
ened by its "illegal" neighbor to the north, a case could be
made for forcibly unifying the two Koreas. The later ques-
tion of the wisdom of crossing the parallel was not so much
concerned with its political defensibility , as with the
possibility that it might widen the war. It is to this
concern over limiting this conflict that we now turn.
Another objective of the U.S. in dealing with this
conflict was to limit the war tc the Korean Peninsula. We
have already noted that, from a military standpoint, the
consensus of the American military establishment was that
the possession of Korea held little strategic value in the
event of an all out war with the Soviet Union. However,
because of the need to, not only deny a victory to aggres-
sion but, also check an attempt at Russian/Communist expan-
sion, it was felt that a successful defense of the ROK, if
possible, below the threshold of total war was in the best
interests of the United States.
Both Truman and Acheson recognized this unique
constraint early in the decisior-making process. For
example, Truman later wrote: "Every decision I made in
connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in
mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruc-
tion it would bring to the civilized world. "^i Acheson,
meanwhile, was concerned with preventing a spread of the war
to China by involving either the Nationalist government on
Formosa or its Communist counterpart on the mainland. It
90FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 713.
9iTruman, Memoirs: Year s of Trial and Hope, p. 34 5,
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vas he who recommended that the Navy's Seventh Fleet be
moved north from the Phillipines "to prevent any attack from
China on Formosa or vice versa. "^2 This recommendation was
subsequently approved and translated into action.
Thus the course toward a limited war was set from the
very beginning in the American approach toward the Korean
situation. Again NSC 81/1 gives an insight into the U.S.
position:
"If ...present United Nations action in Korea can accom-
plish <the> political objective without substantially
increasing the risk of general war with the Soviet Union
or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advo-
cate the pressing of the United Nations action to this
conclusion. It would not be in our national interest,
however, ...to take action in Korea that would involve a
substantial risk of general war."93
A final objective of the U.S. was to li mit the expansion
of the Soviet Union and thereby its communist ideology. We
have seen that this was not only a concern in Korea but,
globally. In fact, much of the discussion in the early
stages of the Korean conflict centered on whether or not the
Communist push in that area was not a precursor to activity
elsewhere. Chiefly mentioned in such a scenario were Iran
and Yugoslavia. The U.S. was also now formally committed
to the defense of Western Europe through the North Atlantic
Treaty. The questions in the minds of the U.S. authorities
were: Would the Soviet Union use the Korean crisis as a
diversion for a push elsewhere? And, if so, when and where
would the new challenge arrive?
President Truman was again well aware of this possi-
bility. At Blair House on the evening of the 25th he
instructed the State and Defense Departments to make a
"<c>areful calculation. .. of the next possible place in which
92Acheson, p. 406.
93FRUS 1950^ Vol. VII, p. 713.
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Soviet action might take place- "9* We have already noted
that at this time he also called for an analysis of Soviet
military strength in the Far East. Thus, Truman was
preparing himself to meet the Russian global challenge, so
forcefully defined in NSC-68 which we examined earlier.
Korea would be a point where the U.S. would meet the thrust
of communism. To paraphrase the opinion of Gen. Omar
Bradley, we had to draw the line somewhere and Korea offered
as good an occasion as any.'s
In summation, we have noted three primary objectives of
the U.S. in the Korean conflict. They are:
1. To assure the survival of the Republic of Korea,
based on the principle of self-determination, and the
return to its sovereignty of, at a minimum, the
territories it held prior to the initiation of
hostilities.
2. To limit the war to the Korean Peninsula thereby
avoiding recourse to total or general war.
3. To check the expansion of the Soviet Union and world
communism in Korea.
fle have related these objectives to their origination in the
historical background and international context in which the
Korean crisis arose. Now, with the knowledge of the direc-
tion of U.S. policy in hand, we can analyze the "risk"
assessment taken by its decision-makers before conflict
entry.
C. PEE-COHFLICT BISK ASSESSMENT
The process of risk assessment for the United States
decision-makers began with the first meeting at Blair House




this section, we will consider the analysis of risk that was
associated with the determination by the American leadership
to comiDit troops to combat in the air, sea, and ultimately
on the ground in Korea. Later in our study of the conduct
of the war we will consider U.S. post-entry escalatory
actions in the pursuit of victory on the peninsula.
The assessment of risk in situations of possible armed
conflict logically begins with an inquiry into the applica-
bility of the use of force to the specific circumstances.
If this question is answered affirmatively, decisions can
then be made regarding the types, quantity, and tactical
employment of particular military elements. Also of impor-
tance at this stage is a general feeling for the limit of
both your own and your opponent (s) will to enter into, what
has been termed, a "competition in risk-taking". Once these
issues have been resolved, one may proceed toward armed
hostility-
In examining the American approach toward the Korean
conflict we will look at these considerations in their
logical order, beginning with he decision to employ U.S.
forces in Korea. We will then review some discussion within
the American leadership in the early weeks of the war that
dealt with a relative risk assessment of the perceived
international actors involved.
As the first week of the Korean crisis wore on it became
apparent that the ROK forces would be unable to hold on
without outside help. This put the onus on the U.S.
decision-makers and, in particular. President Truman to
determine if Korea would be left to its own fate or if the
U.S. would intervene. We have already seen in our earlier
analysis that, due to the nature of the attack and the
attacker, the survival of the south Korean republic was a
major concern of the U.S. Therefore, armed intervention
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short of total war, if necessary, was almost a foredrawn
conclusion. ^^
With the ROK in headlong retreat U.S. involvement was
quicx. Dean Acheson stated the U.S. position forthrightly;
"To back away from this challenge, in view of our
capacity for meeting it, would Be highly destructive of
the power and prestige of the United States. By pres-
tige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great
deterrent importance. Therefore, we could not accept
the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet
under the very guns of our defense perimeter with no
more than words and gestures in the Security Council.
It looked to us as tnough we must steel ourselves for
the use of force. "'"^
Thus the question, for the U.S. soon became not whether to
use force but, what type and where.
In what was later to become a standard formula for the
measured use of military power, air and naval elements were
used prior to ground forces in Korea. At the initial Blair
House meeting the President had authorized that American air
power cover the evacuation of 0.3. civilians from the Seoul
area. At the same time he ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief Far East(CINCFE) and currently heading
the Allied occupation force in Japan, to send a team to
survey the situation in Korea. ^^ j^e findings of this on
hand observation, accomplished by a member of MacArthur 's
Tokyo staff, Maj. Gen. John Church, edged the U.S. closer to
all-out intervention for it paved the way for a similar
inspection by CINCFE himself before the week was out.
^^Almost certainly the Eastern bloc did not share this
analysis, for it is doubtful that the attack would have
taken place if the quick intervention of the United States
and the United Nations had been predicted. For an inter-
esting view of this problem from the Communist side see:
Nikita S. Khrushchev- Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 197UJ7 pp.3Hl-37U.
^^Acheson, U05.
98FEIJS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 160.
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When the President met with his advisors again at Blair
House on the evening of the 26th the situation in Korea was
reported through both political and military channels as
rapidly deteriorating. ^^ The composition of the group at the
second Blair House meeting was almost identical to the first
according to a memorandum of its proceedings prepared,
again, by Ambassador Jessup.ioo After hearing that American
aircraft had already engaged and shot down a North Korean
plane while covering the withdrawal of American citizens and
dependents from Seoul, the President again let Secretary
Acheson begin the discussion. Acheson suggested that in
light of the worsening situation for the fiOK (Seoul was
already being evacuated) "that an all-out order be issued to
the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on their
operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible
support to the Korean forces." On inquiry from Army
Secretary Pace, it was agreed the the mission of these
elements would be, for the moment, restricted to areas south
of the 38th parallel, loi
It is significant that air and naval power should be
used first in this situation. The merits of their employ-
ment in Korea at this juncture were several. First, they
represented areas where neither the DPRK or their theoret-
ical allies, the PRC or the DSSE, could match the U.S. in
escalatory capability from a purely c^ualitative respect.
Second, they were forces that would not be nearly as visible
or as potentially costly in friendly casualties on the
battlefield as ground forces. And finally, they were also
^^For example see: "Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to
Secretary of State" June 26, 1950. Ibid, p. 176.
loojessup notes that Sec. of the Navy Matthews arrivedjust after the meeting was adjourned and that Deputy
Under-Sec. H. Freeman Matthews had replaced Under Secretary
Webb in the State contingent. Ibid, p. 178.
1 01 "Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at
Large (Jessup) " Ibid, p. 179.
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more easily controlled from the standpoint of limiting
hostilities to certain areas while still sending an unmista-
kable signal to the Communists about D.S. intentions. Thus
we see that the U.S. was slowly "upping the ante" in Korea.
Paramount in these initial force commitments are the objec-
tives of assuring the continued survival of the Korean
republic while still limiting the war to the area south of
the 38th parallel.
On June 28th the National Security Council held its
weekly meeting at the White House- Naturally, the situation
in Korea was discussed. The specific problem addressed at
this gathering was that of successfully opposing the inva-
sion of the ROK without embroiling the U.S. in a general war
with the Soviet Union. Secretary Acheson presented a draft
of a policy paper on this subject at this time. Because it
represents a significant example of "risk assessment" it is
reproduced here in full:
"The decision now made to comirit United States air and
naval forces to provide cover and support for the South
Korean troops does not in itself constitute a decision
to engage in a major war wifnTEe Soviet Union if Soviet
forces intervene m Korea. The decision regarding
Korea, however, was taken with the full realization of a
risk of war with the Soviet Union. If substantial
Soviet forces actively oppose our present operations in
Korea. United States forces should defend themselves,
should take no action on the spot to aggravate the situ-
ation, and should report the situation to Washington. lo
2
This specific document, though never accepted as a singular
statement of U.S. policy, subsequently found its way into
NSC 81/1 signed by the President on September 11, 19 50 which
prescribed the action (s) to be taken by American forces
should the Soviets enter the war in Korea. lo^ The crucial




decision-makers were well aware that their moves in Korea
constituted a significant increase of the risk of war with
the Soviet Onion and that this knowledge was incorporated in
their future plans and analysis.
By the end of the week the situation had become critical
for the EOK. On June 29th MacArthur decided to get a first-
hand view of the of the circumstances on the peninsula for
himself. After arriving at Suwcn airfield about 25 miles
south of Seoul he made his way to the Han Eiver which
provided a natural geographic barrier south of the capital
city. What he witnessed was a scene of utter chaos and
confusion. It was at this time that he decided to recommend
the commitment of U.S. ground forces to the battle in Korea.
HacArthur*s message to Washington communicating this sugges-
tion read in part:
"It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its
impetus will threaten the over-running of all Korea.
The South Korean Army is incapable of counteraction and
there is grave danger of further breakthrough. ... The
only assurance for holding the present line and the
ability to regain the lost ground is through the intro-
duction of [Jnited States ground combat forces into the
Korean battle area."io*
In Washington action was also being taken. As MacArthur
travelled back to Tokyo from his battlefield tour, deter-
mined to recommend the introduction of American ground
forces to the combat in Korea, the National Security
Council, at the behest of Secretary of Defense Johnson, held
its second meeting in as many days. Unfortunately, the
Council did not have MacArthur* s personal assessment, for
he, inexplicably, was to wait more than sixteen hours before
sending it to his superiors- Meanwhile, Defense Secretary
Johnson, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs, had
lo^Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York
McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 334.
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determined that the currently approved measures for the
employment of D. S. forces in Korea would probably prove
ineffectual. This was due to both the limitation of their
action to areas south of the 38th parallel and the inability
of American aircraft to operate from bases in Korea. He
asked that the President authorize an extension of U.S.
naval and air activity north of the parallel "and to commit
a limited number of combat infantryman to protect a port-
airfield beachhead in the southeastern coastal city of
Pusan,"i05 This recommendation was approved, but not without
some consternation. Although the commitment of U.S. ground
forces was, at this time, purely for defensive purposes the
decision would have been much easier had the Far Eastern
Commander's report been available to the President and his
advisors.
At this meeting Acheson alsc reported on an earlier
request (June 27th) made of the Soviet Union to use its
influence with the DPEK to end the hostilities in Korea.
While the reply from the Soviet spokesman in Moscow, Andrei
Gromyko, was expectedly negative, the wording of the state-
ment caused optimism among the analysts at State for it
indicated that the Soviets, at least for the moment, would
not intervene in Korea. The key to the analysis rested in
the following phrase, "the Soviet Government adheres to the
principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign
powers in the internal affairs cf Korea. "lo^ Thus the U.S.
decision-makers left the meeting feeling that the chance of
war with the Soviets over Korea was somewhat lessened.
Early on Friday morning (June 30th) MacArthur's recom-
mendations began arriving in Washington. The first official
to act in light of this new information was Army Chief
lospaige, p. 245.
106FEUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 229,
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Collies who passed the specifics on to Secretary Pace.
MacArthur wanted to commit one regimental combat team (ECT)
to the battle in Korea and to build up two of his occupation
divisions for subsequent use on the peninsula. Pace tele-
phoned the President ( at approximately 5:00 AM Washington
time) to report on the Korean situation and to ask for
permission to commit one U.S. ECT as the lead element in an
eventual deployment of two complete divisions to Korea. The
President immediately approved the commitment of the RCT and
told the Secretary that a decision on the two divisions
would be made after a meeting of his advisory group later
that ffiorning-io"' Thus, it was the MacArthur assessment that
led to the commitment of U.S. ground forces to combat in
Korea. However, their is an interesting sidelight to this
action that demonstrates the cornection between risk assess-
ment and political objectives. This is the offer by Chaing
Kai-Shek of Chinese Nationalist troops for use in Korea made
during the first week of the crisis.
The offer of 33,000 troops, by Chaing, for commitment to
the Korean Peninsula was brought by Secretary Achescn to the
White House on Thursday June 29th. The idea at first
appealed to the President for it had a couple of advantages.
First, it would be a much needed augmentation to the thinly
stretched American forces and second, it would broaden the
base of support for the Korean intervention in the interna-
tional community. But, Acheson argued against accepting the
offer. He noted that it was inconsistent to use the naval
forces of the United States, now positioning themselves
between the Nationalist held island and the mainland, to
preclude the spread of the Korean conflict to Formosa while
accepting the movement of its natural defenders to Korea,
where their presence could well provoke the intervention of
lOTTruman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 342-344.
95
the Communists anyway. Further ttore, the transport of the
Chinese Nationalists would have to be accomplished by U.S.
elements that could well be used to greater advantage else-
where. When the subject was put before the advisory group
meeting of Friday morning the guaiity of the Chinese troops
from a material and equipment standpoint was also questioned
by the Joint Chiefs. Therefore, it was decided that the
offer would be politely declined. lo^ This outcome points out
the overriding concern that was placed on the limitation of
the Korean conflict, for the U.S. was willing to reject the
offer of what amounted to the tvjo divisions that it would
initially commit to the peninsula.
At the same meeting that produced the final decision on
the rejection of the Chinese Nationalist forces the
President and his advisors also considered the MacArthur
request for the commitment of two divisions to the battle on
the peninsula. Based on the State assessment that Soviet
intervention was unlikely and Communist Chinese involvement
was, though of higher probability, far from imminent, the
group eventually granted the Far East Commander the leeway
to utilize his entire occupation force in Japan as necessary
to stop the enemy advance in Korea. lo' The only stipulation
put on the commitment of U.S. forces by the decision-makers
in Washington was that their use was subject to continued
assurance of the safety of Japan, a matter whose judgement
was left solely to MacArthur . ^ ^ o Shortly after receiving
these instructions Gen. MacArthur ordered the 24th Infantry
Division under the command of Maj. Gen. William Dean to the
1 osThis account is a synthesis of two sources: Truman,
Memoirs: Years of Trial ana Hope, pp. 342-343 and Acheson,
ppr^lz-ailT
1 09MacArthur had four infantry divisions under his
command: 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry(an infantry unit
despite its name)
.
iiOAn actual transcript of the orders sent to MacArthur
can be found in FRUS 1950, Vol.'VII, p-263.
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peninsula. Within a week elements of Dean's command were
engaged in wholesale combat in Korea.
The following day the Far East commander was authorized
to utilize the naval units under his command to
"blockade. . .the entire Korean coast." These orders specifi-
cally stated that "<C>are should be taken to keep well clear
of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR."iii Again the
objective of limiting the conflict seems paramount. Yet, it
still did not stop the U.S. decision-makers from employing
force on the peninsula. Instead, it forced these men to
tailor their military response to the joint goal of outper-
forming their opponents in the realm of tactical escalation
while avoiding recourse to general war. Thus began the
American commitment to hostilities in Korea, a decision, as
we have seen, that was based on a knowledge of the political
and military context, an establishment of objectives, and a
candid assessment of the risks involved not only in entering
the war but, in the specific tactical employment of forces.
We will now address the final step in the entry process, the
recruitment of allies.
D- RECRUITING ALLIES
When viewed with historical perspective the recruitment
of allies by the United States for the intervention in Korea
seems insignificant. In truth, the material contributions
of the international contingent that fought beside the U.S.
and Korean forces seems minimal. However, while President
Truman and his advisors realized that they could probably
handle the situation in Korea without outside support, the
addition of allies would add tremendously to their ability
to successfully prosecute the war.
iiilbid, p. 271.
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There are several reasons fcr this. First, one of the
objectives of the 0. S. decision-makers was the resistance of
aggression. This, in a very real way, was the purpose of
the United Nations. Truman was determined that this organi-
zation would not suffer the same impotency that had shackled
its predecessor, the league of Nations. The legacy of
Munich, considered indicative of the dangers of appeasement,
was a vital issue to the Americans, and their decision to
take the Korean matter immediately to the U-N. shows this
concern. 112
The second reason for lining up allies was the percep-
tion that the Communist thrust into Korea was only a
precursor of Soviet moves elsewhere- As we have seen this
was certainly a concern of the U.S. decision-makers.
Therefore, not only was a diplomatic offensive launched
within the U-N. but the embassies around the world were kept
well informed of the government position and actions in
Korea.* 13
State also set up a briefing for Latin American and
European nations concerning Korea on Tuesday, June 27th.
These states were tied to the U.S. through the Rio and North
Atlantic Treaties respectively, and it was obviously consid-
ered important to keep them informed of military commitments
that could ultimately impact on their own security. 11* This
action also was intended to build international support for
the stand that the U.S. was taking in the United Nations and
1 izpresident Truman later sent a letter to Secretary
Acheson commending his "initiative in immediately calling
the Security Council". He continued, "<h>ad you not acted
promptly. . .we would have had to go into Korea alone." The
letter is reprinted in full in; Acheson, p. 415.
ii^The record of the first week of the deliberations on
Korea in FEUS 1950, Vol. VII is literally filled with dozens
of communications between the State Department and its




send a clear signal to the Soviets that the Western bloc
stood ready to confront any challenge.
A final reason for recruiting allies in response to the
Korean crisis was the the desire to positively display the
action of the United States to toth the international and
domestic audience. It was important for the U.S. decision-
makers to portray themselves as the "good guys" in their
actions regarding the invasion cf Korea. This initially was
much more important on the international front than at home,
for the crisis condition could te counted on to sidetrack,
at least momentarily, any domestic dissent. Hence, if what
appeared to be a tough military intervention could be "sold"
to the international community it would make its later
defense at home somewhat easier
-
Glenn Paige, in his analysis of the Korean situation and
its handling by the American decision-makers, noted that in
crisis situations there is a greater tendency to initially
solicit international than domestic support. This is
because "the absence of regularized patterns of authority in
international politics" necessitates the need for persuasion
which is usually "promptly undertaken. "i is This phenomenon
is clearly demonstrated in the Korean crisis, where interna-
tional support received the lion's share of attention in the
early going.
With these rationales in mind we can now turn to an
analysis of the search for allies in the Entry phase of the
Korean War. Our examination will be principally concerned
with the utilization of the United Nations as both a forum
for international discussion surrounding the Korean conflict
and a vehicle through which an alliance to oppose the
Communist invasion of the south could be formed. We earlier
covered the initial resolution cf the Security Council
iispaige, p. 313.
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regarding the hostilities in Korea on June 25th, our
analysis will now pick-up with the later developments
leading toward the creation of a United Nations Command on
the peninsula.
The D.N. Security Council convened again on Tuesday,
June 27th, to consider the developing situation in Korea and
judge the adherence to its earlier resolution. The
President of the Security Council also had in hand the
reports from the U.N. Commission stationed in Korea. These
forthrightly placed the blame for the invasion on the North
Korean forces, a piece of evidence that was to be crucial in
building and maintaining international support. ii* ^he
United States representative, Warren R. Austin, then
submitted a resolution to the Council that was designed to
solidify international support tehind the EOK while concur-
rently providing legitimation for the use of outside force
to save the same. The pertinent parts of this document are
reproduced below;
"Having noted. ..that urgent military measures are
reguiredTo restore internat icnal peace and security;
"Reccmmends that the Members cf the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area."ii''
This resolution was adopted by the Council late on the
evening of the 27th and it was under its authority that
later U.S. military action was taken. ii^
iisThe text of one of these communications, U.N.
Document S/1507, can be found in FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, p. 207.
117U.N Document S/1501 FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 211.
ii^The vote on the resolution in the Security Council
was 7 in favor, 1 opposed (Yugoslavia) , two abstaining (Egypt
and India), and 1 absent (U. S . S. B. ) .
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The adoption of this resolution was to have far reaching
affects, for it not only opened the door to U.N. military
action in Korea but, on the U.S. domestic front, gave the
President a rationale for committing the United States to a
long-term military action on the peninsula. This course was
now legitimized without receiving a formal "declaration of
war" from Congress. In fact, a Congressional authorizing
resolution was considered by Truman but rejected, princi-
pally on the advice of Dean Acheson, because of the impact
it might have on the actions of future Chief Executives. i i^
We thus see, in operation, the import of the generation of
international support to later rationalization of the
conflict on the domestic front.
With the U.N. now committed to militarily supporting the
EOK, U.S. decision- makers were confronted with the problem
of constructing a proper structure through which this inter-
national assistance could be funneled. This matter took on
more urgency as international offers of assistance poured
in. By June 29th, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the Netherlands had already stated their
intention to help the South Korean republic. Also,
mentioned earlier, was the offer of Nationalist Chinese
forces for combat on the peninsula. Yet, because many of
these states had vital political and commercial interests in
the Far East, particularly with Communist China, a suitable
organization for the employment of military power in Korea
had to be established. 120
ii^Por Acheson* s recollection on this matter see Present
It the Creation, pp. 414-415. The official State memorandum
supporting tTTe President's action, prepared on July 3, 1950,
can be found in Hearings, Appendix 0, pp. 3 198-3204.
izoTwo cases demonstrating this point were the Dutch who
had recognized the PEC and, while anxious to show the
vitality of "collective security", wanted to avoid any
chance of hostilities with the Chinese and the British who
were understandably concerned about the security of their
colony in Hong Kong.
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To satisfy these concerns the U.S. proceeded to enter
into a series of negotiations regarding the set-up of a U.N.
Command. Since a large majority of the men and material
that would be committed to the defense of Korea would come
from the U.S. it was soon accepted that an American would be
named as the unified commander. The thrust of the arbitra-
tion centered on assuring the Security Council that the
military action would be restricted to the Korean Peninsula
(i.e., not overflowing into Manchuria or Formosa) and on the
use of the United Nations flag by the U.N. Command. The
resolution, as adopted, solved the first matter by using
wording similar to that which had been employed on the June
27th, calling for the member states to "assist the Republic
of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus
restore international peace and security in the area" (my
emphasis). The second issue was solved by authorizing " the
unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations
flag in the course of operations... concurrently with the
flags of the various nations participating." But, these
were only minor issues, for the central theme of the
Council's resolution was the appointment of the U.S. as its
agent for the implementation of the U.N. intervention. To
guote the document;
"<The Security Council> recomaends that all Members
providing military forces an3 assistance ... make
such. - .available to a unified commander under the United
States: requests that the United States designate the
commander of such forces <and that> the United
States. .. provide. . .the Security Council with reports as
appropriate on the course of action taken under the
unified command. "i 21
i2iThe full text of the July 7th resolution, U.N.
Document S/1588 is reproduced Ie FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 329
This resolution was introduced ty ^Ee representatives of
France and the U.K. and was adopted by a vote of 7 to 0,
with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia) and 1
absent (U.S. S.R.) .
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The next day President Truman appointed Gen. Douglas
MacArthur as the Onited Nations Commander in Korea- 122 Thus
the U.S. gained allies for its involvement in Korea without,
seemingly, altering substantially its own objectives in the
conflict. Although, the later crossing of the 38th parallel
was to strain the D. N. commitment, the formation of this
alliance was, in the long-run, to prove most beneficial for
all of the parties involved. If for no other reason it was
crucial as a precedent for actively pursuing the goal of
"collective security".
E. SOMfiATIOH
This ends our analysis of the entry of the United States
into the Korean War. The treatoent of this phase has, of
necessity, been detailed because the decisions made in this
early period impact on the Conduct and Termination phases to
be discussed later. In our examination we have painted the
political/military background ir which this conflict arose
and the translation of these considerations into goals by
the U.S. decision- makers. We have also looked at the
assessment of "risk" undertaken by these men in their deter-
mination to engage in armed hostilities in Korea. And
finally we have seen the U.S. recruit international support
of both a material and political nature for an intervention
in Korea without altering its own objectives. Now our
attention will be focused on the translation of the deci-
sions made in the Entry phase into action in the conduct and
termination of the war.
i22ibid, p. 333 (fn 1) .
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7. THE KOREAN SAfi: CONDOCT
Our attention is now turned to the actual pursuit of the
political and military goals, developed in the Entry phase,
on the battlefield. The specific conduct of this war, which
lasted over three years, would he impossible to cover in the
short treatment which will be accorded it in this study.
However, to examine its relationship to the Limited War
Model, certain examples of the attempted operationalization
of the objectives of the intervention will be noted.
The strategic and tactical operations of this conflict
have been well documented in the thirty-odd years since its
end. 123 In the following chapter some the particulars of
certain plans and operations will be dissected for their
illustrative value. A quick overview of its structure
follows.
i23The three best "unofficial" treatments of the war,
authored by David Rees, T. R. Fehrenbach, and Joseph C.
Goulden respectively, have been previously cited. Two
Eersonal memoirs also deal specifically with Korea; Matthew
. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and
Co., Inc.. ^^ET) and'"!}, lawton Collins, War in Peacetime
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969) Fur^Eermore, all of
the U.S. armed service branches nave published official
and/or quasi-official histories of their operations in the
Korean war. An extensive, though not necessarily exhaus-
tive, list follows: ARMY: Orlando Ward, Korea: 1950
(Washington: aSGPO, ^V57Y ; John Miller, Jr . ,~?raj.~nwen L.
Carroll, USA, and Margaret E. Tackley- Korea: 1951-1953
(Washington: OSGPO, 1956) ; Roy 1. Appleman, SouTTT'fo ITie
Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington: USG?UJ~1^61T ;~^altei:
n. Hermes, Truce TenI an^ Fighting Front (Washington: USGPO,
1966); James F. ScEnabelJ Policy and Direction: The First
Year (Washington: USGPO, 19727T NI7T:~Ca'f7~HaTcoTm~WT~Cagle,
"DSFT and Cdr. Frank A. Manson, UST7, The Sea War in Korea
'Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1957f; James A.
„ield, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea
^Washington: USGP0,~19^Er; M'^III^'i' ~U~^~ Harlne C£era^onsin Korea 1950-1 953 (hereafter Harine Operations)": Volume T^
Xynn Hcntross an3 Cpt. Nicholas A. Canzona, USH& The Pusan
Perimeter (Washington: USGPO, 1954); Volume II- I^em, TRe
TncHon-Seoui Q£eration (Washington: USGPO, 1955) ; Volume
TTI- I"aem, The CKosin Reservoir Campaign Based on the
research of K. Jaclc Bauer~T^ssHing€"on: USGPO, 1957); Volume
IV- Lynn Montross, Maj. Norman Hicks, USMC and Maj. Hubard
D. Kuokka, USMC, The East-Central Front (Washington: USGPO,
loa
I
Ill analyzing the conduct of the Korean War, in an
attempt to glean its lessons for the use of the instrument
of limited war, four different aspects of the conflict will
be examined. In the first we will look at the attempt to
operationalize the political and military goals, as predet-
ermined in the Entry phase, on the field of combat. In this
regard, a review of the U.S. motilization effort, whose
purpose was to provide the men and material necessary for
the successfully prosecute the intervention, will be under-
taken- Following this, in the second section, will be an
examination of the use of "selective intervention" in the
Korean conflict. The example selected for our study in this
area is the amphibious landing of U.N. forces behind enemy
lines at Inchon. Its analysis will include a look at the
exploitation of technological superiority by U.S. forces in
Korea. The third section will consider the translation of
objectives or goals in an unbiased and effective manner to
the battlefield. Korea provides an almost classic case of
this phenomenon in the MacArthur recall and 38th parallel
situations. Finally, we will end our look at the Conduct
phase of this war with a review of the effect that the
actual fighting of this war had on both those allies taken
into the conflict and on further recruitment after the
initiation of hostilities.
Airpower: TEe decisive Force in Korea (New York: D. Von
TIors'E^a^, 1957); T^oEefl FranJc Tutrell, Brig. Gen. Lawson S.
Moseley, OSAF, and Albert F- Sinpson, The United States Air|!o£Ge in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: DruII, ~5Xoan,~ann
Pearce, ^'9'S1) ~
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A. SHAPIHG aiLITABY ACTION
The war in Korea was primarily a conventional ground
action. The invaders, from the beginning dictated this
type of conflict through the use of organized infantry and
armor divisions in their push iuto the south. Although,
there was a significant amount of guerrilla and insurgency
activity associated with the actions of both sides, the
truly decisive combat was between the regular ground forces
of each coalition. Hence, the successful prosecution of the
intervention by the U.N, forces depended on mustering the
men and material necessary to first halt the Communist inva-
sion and then to push it back. It was this task which
confronted the peacetime mobilization structure of the West
and, in particular, the United States during the early
months of the conflict in Korea.
At the beginning of the Korean War the U.S. Army
consisted of 10 divisions, the European Constabulary (equiv-
alent to a full division) , and S separata regimental combat
teams. 124 pour of these divisions— the 7th, 24th, and 25th
Infantry and the 1st Cavalry— were in the Far East. All of
the units, with the exception of one regiment in the 25th
Division, were manned and equipped at only two-thirds
strength- 12 5 However, understrength or not, these units
would obviously be the first that would have to be committed
to the action in Korea.
In fact, there was a feeling within the American camp
that the DPEK offensive would be halted after only a
symbolic deployment of U.S. forces. The argument
supporting this was that the Army of the Democratic People's
x2*tlemo from the Troop Control Branch, Department of the
Army, May 1951. Cited in Appleman, p. 49.
125'Tij^g 2Uth Regiment carried the normal complement of
three battalions and its support artillery, the 159th Field
Artillery Battalion, contained the traditional complement of
three batteries. iSid.
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Republic, the In Min Gun, would be coerced to a standstill
by the presence of its famed American counterpart. The
proponents of this school were to be shortly disabused of
this notion. MacArthur himself hoped that through an "arro-
gant display of strength <he> cculd fool the enemy into a
belief that <there were> greater resources at" his disposal
than he actually had.^^e it was with this in mind that he
began the piecemeal commitment cf the 24th Division to the
peninsula after receiving approval for the use of U.S.
forces in combat from Washington-
The initial engagement between American and North Korean
forces occured on July 5th, about three miles north of the
small village of Osan, along the road that connected Seoul
with the city of Taejon in west central Korea. Recounted in
the U.S. war histories as the mission of "Task Force
Smith" (after Lt.Col. Charles Bradford "Brad" Smith who
commanded the U.S. forces engaged) this experience was to
provide several data points for American planners. The
first was that the North Korean forces were not in awe of
American troops for they chopped right through Smith's
infantry contingent and supporting artillery without being
seriously delayed. The second was that U.S. forces were
unprepared materially to stop the In Min Gun advance. The
light infantry elements found in most of the U.S. units did
not have the anti-tank capability to seriously challenge the
armored spearhead of the Communist advance. 127 Third, and
most importantly, the American soldier was not psychologi-
cally ready to fight in Korea. This is a theme to which T.
R. Fehrenbach returns repeatedly in his account of the
early failure of the U.S. forces to halt the In Min Gun. 128
i26MacArthur, p. 336.
127^ good account of the battle fought by Smith and his
men can be found in Goulden, pp. 116- 123.
1281'he complete title of Fehrenbach 's book. This Kind of
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The soft life of occupation dut;y in Japan where, due to the
constraint of space, there was little opportunity for
training caught up to the American GI with a vengeance in
the first days of the Korean War.
The failure of "Task Force Smith" was shortly folloi»ed
by the defeat of the entire 24th Division at the Kum River
on the 16th of July and the loss of Taejon four days later.
With MacArthur's "arrogant display of strength" now a sham-
bles the ROK and American forces began their retreat to the
Pusan beachhead. It would be within the confines of this
"Pusan Perimeter" that the strength of the newly formed O.N.
Command would grow and eventually turn the tide of battle-
This was accomplished through the mobilization of men and
material and the exploitation of certain advantages avail-
able to the "Western" coalition. It is to an analysis of
this mobilization that we now turn-
President Truman addressed the question of the possi-
bility of partial mobilization early in discussions with his
advisors on the Korean crisis. At the second Blair House
meeting, held on June 26th, Truman asked Gen. Bradley if it
might not be necessary to callup the National Guard were
the D-S. to become involved on the ground in Korea. 129 in
July, with the commitment of American forces now a fact and
their preformance on the field less than satisfactory, this
concern now required action. The problem was not that the
authorized strength of the U.S. Army, 630,000 on the eve of
the Korean War, was insufficient to meet the challenge of
the DPRK. It was that it could not simultaneously fight in
Korea and fulfill its commitments elsewhere. It was this
situation that the President and his advisors set about to
rectify in the early days of the intervention.
E^£- h. Study in On preparedn ess , gives some indication of the
angle he pursues m Jxls his'Eory of the war.
129PEUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 183.
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By July 19th the authorized strength of the Army had
been increased on three separate occasions and now totaled
834,000.130 But, as James Schnatel was to later write, "a
paper army wins no battles and deters no aggressor. "i 3
1
Therefore, the manpower to fill the ranks had to be
acquired. This was done in two ways, through conscription
and the recall of reserves to active duty.
In July the Army called for 50,000 draftees to be
inducted into the service in September. i ^2 of course, it was
recognized that these men were far from helping the imme-
diate situation in Korea. However, it was hoped that they
would fill the positions of the rapidly depleted General
Reserve held as a contingency fcrce within the continental
United States.
On June 30th Congress authorized the President to order
units of the Reserves and the National Guard into active
federal service. The rapid mobilization of the Army Reserve
in the face of the crisis in Korea was, at best, a bad joke.
Out of well over 600,000 men on the ledgers of both the
inactive and active reserve there was little information
available through which to intelligently select those best
suited for regular service. Because periodic medical exami-
nations had been discontinued in February 1947, the process
of locating those still physically fit for duty was slow and
arduous. On July 22nd, 1,063 Army Medical Service officers
were recalled to help with the task of sorting the situation
out. Nevertheless, the effect of the recall of the Army





The only place where the Amy could find relatively
complete and ready units to fill the ranks of its swollen
authorized manning was in the National Guard of the United
States. Gen. Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and the other
members of the JCS opposed the nationalization of the
National Guard until it became an absolute necessity. This
was principally due to the highly charged political nature
of selecting the individual units to be recalled and the
economic dislocation that it would cause. However, in late
July the Chiefs finally recommended that the President
authorize the recall of certain Guard units to active duty.
Therefore, on September 1st, four divisions and two RCT's
were called to active duty, to be brought to full wartime
strength through conscription and ready for operational
employment by April 1951.^33
Thus, the Army began to build toward the ability to
cover the global security commitments of the United States.
Yet, as we have seen, the tactical situation in Korea
demanded more than just a long-term plan for mobilization.
Forces to bolster the defense of Pusan and ultimately to go
on the offensive versus the In Min Gun had to be found.
They were to come from three sources, the occupation force
in Japan, the General Reserve in the continental U.S., and
the United States Marine Corps.
By the end of July MacArthur had commited three of the
four divisions of his Japanese occupation force to the
Korean Peninsula. i ^4 ihe 2nd Infantry Division had also been
dispatched from the General Reserve to Far East. These
units, augmented by the ROK Army would eventually form the
defense perimeter around the crucial beachhead surrounding
133A good discusion of the nobilization of the Army for
the Korean War is found in Schnabel, pp. 117-125. It is from
this source that the majority of the facts presented in the
previous discussion were taken.
i3*The 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry.
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Pusan, the last remaining foothold for the U.N. forces on
the peninsula. The defense of Fusan was entrusted to Gen.
Walton H. Walker, commander of the Eighth Qnited States Army
Korea (EUSAK) , a man that many have written never shared the
full confidence of his immediate superior, MacArthur, This
fact was to impact on the performance of Walker's forces
throughout his tenure in the war. i^s
The final element of the ground forces committed in the
early months of the Korean War were those of the Marine
Corps. Priding themselves on their slogan "First to Fight"
they were obviously anxious to get into action as soon as
possible. Gen. Clifton B. Cates, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, volunteered its services on June 28th for duty
in Korea. 136 when it became apparent that the Army would be
unable to mobilize quickly and that the fortunes of the U.N.
force in Korea depended on a rafid build-up of men and
material around Pusan, the offer of the Corps was
accepted. 137 The deployment of the Marines, in comparison to
that of the Army Reserve and National Guard, to the Far East
is remarkable. The Marine Eeseive was recalled to active
duty on July 19th. By August 2nd a Provisional Marine
Brigade, including a ECT and attached indigenous air
support, had arrived at Pusan. On September 15th the 1st
Marine Division would spearhead the assault of the beach at
i35waixer was killed in an jeep accident while still in
command of the Eighth Army in December. For an example of
the perception of distrust between MacArthur and Walker see;
Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life { New
York; Simon & Schuster, 1983) pp. 55'3'-55'zr.
i36fjontross and Canzona, Marine Operations 7ol. I, p. 48
,
i37jt is fairly well known that the Marines were out of
favor bureaucr atically in Washington during this period.
Their forte, amphibious assault, had been relegated to the
status of the horse cavalry in the minds of most of the top
national security officials. Also, President Truman had a
strong personal distaste for the Corps which he would later
describe as a naval police force with "a propaganda machine
that is almost equal to Stalin's." See: "Truman Letter to
Eep. MacDonough , ** New York Times, September 6, 1950, p. 13.
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Inchon and would remain in combat in Korea for the duration
of the hostilities.
Although the deployment of ground forces was the most
crucial factor in the early stages of the Korean War, the
tuild-up of the Navy and Air Force for use in the interven-
tion had to be accomplished also. As already mentioned,
these forces were the first to be utilized by the U.S. on
and around the peninsula. Their ability to provide an
almost unchallengeable sanctuary for the employment of
American military power was to prove extremely beneficial on
more than one occasion in the war. However, unlike the
Army, their mobilization could cot be accomplished by a mere
influx of men, for they needed the weapons systems in which
their personnel, once trained, could perform their missions.
Hence, these services went to war with what they had and
with little hope of short-term augmentation.
The Air Force, which because of the significant role
that airpower had played in the conduct of the second World
War, had not suffered nearly the cuts that demobilization
had forced on the other branches and was in good shape when
hostilities broke out in Korea. No where was this more true
than in the Far East, where there was stationed the "largest
aggregation of DSAF air strength outside the continental
United States. "i 38 However, the 350 combat aircraft that
were assigned to Lt- Gen, George E. Stratemeyer, Commander
of the Far East Air Force (FEAF), were spread throughout the
Pacific. Furthermore, those stationed in Japan, although
able to reach Korea, were, due to fuel considerations,
limited in the amount of time they could spend over the
battlefield. As we saw earlier, this was one of the consid-
erations in the initial deployment of American troops to
Korea on June 29th, when the mission of these forces was to
1 38;^ppleman, p. 50.
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secure and guard airfields and port facilities around Pusan.
Yet, as the war continued, FEAF was able to consolidate its
capability to strike Korea and was to play a major role in
the fighting, specifically in carrying the war to the north.
As its official historiographer, James A. Fields, puts
it, the naval war in "Korea had its strange and unpredic-
table characteristics. One of these was the fact that, so
far as the control of the seas was concerned, the war
started with the exploitation phase. "i39 This was because
the immediate adversary. North Korea, had little or no naval
capability outside of a small ccastal patrol force used for
both defense and insurgency purposes. Thus, the Navy was
able, when ordered, to impose a blockade on the coast of
Korea with basically the units on hand in the Far East,
although the transfer of an additional Carrier Task Group to
provide air cover for the blockading force was requested. 1*0
The Navy also had another advantage over the other
services. This was the early augmentation of its forces by
those of the U.N. members who had opted to help in the
intervention. Chief among these was the contribution of the
British, whose attack carrier HKS Triam^h and accompanying
escorts provided a needed boost after their arrival on June
30th. 1*1 Other nations contributing naval forces in the
first few weeks of the war were Australia, Canada, and the
Netherlands. All U.N. Naval Foices eventually came under
the operational command of Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander of
Naval Forces Far East (CINCNavFE)
.
As a result of these factors the U.N. Naval Forces
guickly captured and maintained the control of the sea
around Korea. Although the DPRK was able to stall some of
i39Field, p. 74.
i^opEuS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 261.
i*iField, p. 56.
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the moveinent of naval forces and embarked troops by the use
of mine warfare (most notably at Wonsan in November 1950) it
remained very much on the defensive in the naval arena
throughout the war. Naval superiority was exploited on many
occasions by the U. N. forces, Inchon being the foremost
example. Also, the day-to-day support of the land war was
assisted by naval forces through both coastal bombardment
and air strike. The latter mission augmented greatly Air
Force efforts to maintain air superiority over the penin-
sula. In many cases, the ability of the carriers and their
indigenous air wing to close on and hit targets that were
out of the range of ground based air, on short notice,
proved invaluable to the U. N. war effort.
Thus we see that the goals that had been established in
the Entry phase of the conflict were translated into an
effective vehicle for action on the field. The buildup of
the U.S. conventional ground, air, and naval forces in Korea
was a recognition that the battle there would be one of
classical military attrition, at least until the "Western"
forces were strong enough to assume the offensive. The
immediate advantages of the superiority of American air and
naval units were also quickly brought into play. In short,
the U.S. was assuring a check to aggression and the survival
of at least a portion of the ECK until the balance of forces
on the peninsula could be tilted through the influx of men
from either domestic mobilizaticn or its allies in the
United Nations.
Later, in December after the entry of the forces of
Communist China into the Korean conflict President Truman
would continue this commitment by declaring a National
Emergency. This action was designed to ready the country
both materially and psychologically for the prospect of a
long and gruelling yet, still limited war. Hence, the means
for effective military action in the spirit of established
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objectives was, as possible, provided. Our attention must
notf be directed to the use of this potential on the
iattlefield.
B. DSIHG SELECTIVE INTERYENTIOM
We will now look at the use of "selective intervention"
in the Korean conflict. Our primary concern in this context
will be with the exploitation of technological superiority,
speed/mobility, specially trained forces, and joint service
operations in the successful prosecution of a limited war.
The example chosen for diagnosis in this regard is the
amphibious invasion of the Korean port city of Inchon by
U.N. forces on September 15, 1950-
Historian David Rees called Inchon "a modern Cannae,
ever to be studied. "1*2 Certainly, all who examine this
action have dubbed it a strategic masterpiece. Due to its
success, U.N. forces, under the command of Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, were able, almost overnight, to transition from
the defensive to the offensive on the peninsula. Though the
study of this action, planned and executed as OPERATION
CHROMITE, is extremely interesting, space does not permit a
full recount of its conduct here. i*^ Rather, our concern is
with its implementation as an example of a very successful
use of specific force elements in a limited war. It is in
this vein that we will proceed.
The conception of the Inchon landing was that of
MacArthur himself. He was looking for a method through
which the pressure could be simultaneously taken off the
Pusan Perimeter and a death blow dealt to the In Min Gun.
i42Rees, p. 96.
i*3Several books have been written about the Inchon
landing. The most oft guoted and probably the most readable
is- Col. Robert Debs Heml- Jr., USflC(Ret.), Victory at High
Tide (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippircott Company, T'9dBJ".
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The General would later recall that the idea first occurred
to him on his inspection of the battlefront on June 29,
1950: 1*^
"I watched for an hour the pitiful evidence of the
disaster that I ha d inherited. In that brief
interval..,! formulated my plans....! would throw my
occupation soldiers into this breach. Completely
outnumbered, ! would rely upon strategic maneuver to
overcome the great odds against me.-..<I>n these reflec-
tions the genesis of the Inchon operation began to take
shape—a counter-stroke that could in itself wrest
victory from defeat. "i*5
The General's plan was relatively simple, it was its
execution that would be the challenge. In a cable to
Washington in the July it was described in this way:
"Operation planned mid-Septemher is amphibious landing
of a two division corps in the rear of enemy lines for
purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in
conjunction with attack from the south by the Eighth
Army. I am firmly convinced that early and strong
effort behind his front will sever his main line of
communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and
crushing blow."i**
What this communication does not say is that: 1) the amphib-
ious landing would take place almost 150 miles behind enemy
lines, and 2) that the forces needed for its execution were
not then available in the Far East. But, despite its draw-
backs, the Inchon idea was a sound one, for it pitted the
forces of the D.N., principally those of the United States,
against those of North Korea in an area where their relative
capabilities were far out of balance— the projection of
military power from the sea.
i**One will recall that it was also from this experience
that MacArthur recommended the commitment of U.S. ground




The superiority of the naval forces of the U.N. in
comparison to those of the Communist forces has already been
discussed. However, no where was this more prevalent than
in the power projection mission- While the DPRK and its
allies, the USSR and the PRC, might possess a minimal "sea
denial" capability they had no ability to use the oceans as
platforms from which the battle on the land could be
affected. Furthermore, they lacked the capability to deny
this arena to the U.N. forces.
The advantage in this area, for the West, was complete.
It began with several elements cf technological superiority.
First, the U.S. and its allies were equipped with sea based
tactical air that could both ensure the protection of the
fleet while concurrently holding hostile naval forces at
significant risk. Many of these assets could also be used
in close air support for ground forces operating on the
peninsula. This latter capability would be especially
cogent to the amphibious landing at Inchon where carrier
based air would provide an unmatchable boost to the invading
forces. I*'' Second, the utilization of cruisers and
destroyers by the invading force at Inchon in the reduction
of the coastal defenses on the island of Wolmi Do, domi-
nating the approach to the harbor, and to cover and support
the initial landing was another example of using weapons
systems that the enemy did not have and could not counter.
On the two days prior to the actual landing Inchon was
treated to a pounding by the nine ship Gunfire Support Group
I'^'^The close air support for the Inchon landing was
provided by F-4U Corsairs flown by both Navy and Marine
pilots. Although the proficiency of these pilots and their
aircraft was a very real advantage, the use of some "new"
weapons would also have a positive effect on the operation.
Of particular interest in this regard was the initial use of
napalm for defoliation purposes along the Inchon beachfront
before the landing of the Marines. This was a tactically
sound employment of a weapon that had first been introduced
in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. See: Michael
Langley, Inchon Landing (New York: Times Books, 1979), p. 62.
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assigned to cover the operation. The work of these elements
proved very beneficial, foe though they were heavily opposed
by shore batteries on their initial sortie, the bombardment
in conjunction with multiple air strikes silenced the enemy
resistance. This allowed the landing on Wolmi Do, at dawn
on September 15th, to be made without opposition from
coastal artillery. 1*
8
OPEEATION CHROMITZ also exhibited the advantage inherent
in the use of speed and mobility on the battlefield. The
Marine history of the landing estimates that, on the day of
the invasion, there were only about 2200 defenders in the
city of Inchon. 1*^ This force was obviously insufficient to
hold the port against the combined Marine and Army force of
X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, USA,
numbering close to 70,000 and slated to conduct the
assault. 15
Certainly, if this operation was anything, it was a
surprise to the Communists. Th€ reasons for this are
varied. One is the hydrographic difficulties that Inchon
presented as a target, a matter we will discuss in more
depth shortly. However, the ability of the U.S. to move
large amounts of men and material across the oceans and
ultimately to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault
against hostile territory, far away from friendly lines, was
not fully appreciated by the North Koreans. Perhaps the
lack of acquaintance inside the Communist camp with amphib-
ious operations is partially responsible for this. Yet,
there can be little doubt that the exploitation of the
lASField, pp-191-197.
i*'For a complete rundown of the North Korean strength
see; Montross ana Canzona, Marine Operations Vol. II, Tne
lgS^9P~5eoul Cam2aign Appendix "E, pp.325-32H.
150X Corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division and the
7th Infantry Division along with supporting air, artillery,
staff and administrative elements.
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advantage accruing to the U.N- forces in the form of
superior mobility was crucial to their success at Inchon.
The use of specially trained and "elite" forces was also
very much in evidence in the Inchon landing. The amphibious
planning staff that pieced together the operation following
MacArthur's conceptualization is one example of using a
distinctly experienced group to press home a known advantage
in material capability. Also, the troops which made the
initial assault at Inchon, the Marines, were a preeminently
seasoned force which could very well be described as
"elite".
It is well known that the selection of Inchon as the
target for an amphibious assault was not a popular one among
the Navy and Marine Corps planners who were tasked with its
tactical implementation. Their objections were many.
First, the target area had the second highest tidal range in
the world, averaging well over 25 feet.^^i Because of this,
the invasion could only take place on a limited number of
days, when the tide would exceed the draft of the largest
landing craft, approximately 29 feet. Thus the actual date
of the assault was restricted tc three days— September 15th,
27th, or October 11th— when the high tide would give the
U.N. forces dual three hour periods of unrestricted beach
operations between sunrise and sunset. ^52 of course, if this
same information was understood by the enemy the results
could be disastrous.
The Navy was also concerned about the sea approach to
the beachhead itself. Long and tortuous, the two channels
which led from the Yellow Sea tc the harbor at Inchon were
easily susceptible to mining and, due to their narrowness,
virtually necessitated a daylight approach for the bulky
isiThe Bay of Fundy between New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, with a range exceeding 40 feet, is the first.
i52Langley, p. 46.
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transport ships essential to the landing. This fact would
also preclude the traditional retirement of the amphibious
force at night in accordance with established naval
doctrine. 153
Terrain was another drawback to the selection of Inchon.
A landing there would not be against the gently sloping and
wide teaches of the Pacific were the amphibious skill of the
Navy and Marine Corps had been honed. Instead, this assault
would be against a fully built up industrial port complex
complete with sea walls that were, in some places, at least
ten feet tall. Furthermore, because the island of Wolmi Do
dominated the harbor and contained significant fortifica-
tions it would have to be taken before the actual capture of
the city could commence. Hence, the initial period of
favorable tides had to be devoted to landings on this
crucial piece of real estate which would then be followed,
after an almost twelve hour lag, by the attack against
Inchon itself. In other words, the positive effect of local
surprise would be lost long before the actual assault began
on the actual city.
Lcdr. Arlie G. Capps, a gunnery officer on the amphib-
ious planning staff, later remarked: "We drew up a list of
every conceivable and natural handicap and Inchon had 'em
all. "ISA It is therefore a credit to the skill and profes-
sionalism of the specially trained amphibious forces that
this pivotal landing was successful. Not only was the
planning and execution by the naval elements superb but, the
actual assault by the 1st Marine Division was almost of
textbook fashion.
i53Field, p. 177.
isAcagle and Manson, p. 8 1.
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MacArthur*s biographer, William Manchester, states the
case for the Marines' performance at Inchon clearly:
"In the history of arms certain crack troops stand
apart, elite units which demonstrated gallantry in the
face of overwhelming odds. There were the Greeks and
Spartans at Thermopylae, Xenofhon's Ten Thousand, the
Bowmen of Agincourt, the Spanish 'Tercios', the French
Foreign Legion at Camerone, the Old Contemptibles of
1914, the Brigade of the Guards at Dunkirk. And there
was also the 1st Marine Division at Inchon. Veterans of
Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Pelelieu, and Okinawa, the
leathernecks were the cutting edge of the force
which. .. MacArthur put ashore tehmd enemy lines on
September 15th. "isS
We can excuse some of the enthusiasm of Manchester, himself
an ex-Marine who had served in the Pacific during WW II.
Yet, the basic thrust of his statement is correct. The
Marines who stormed ashore at Inchon on that fall morning
were the best that the U.S. had to offer in the way of
specially trained/"elite" forces and their employment in a
task which was their forte represents the best use of these
types of units in war, whether limited or total.
HacArthur, in convincing the higher authorities in
Washington of the potential of the Inchon landing, remarked
that the amphibious landing "is the most powerful tool we
have. "156 Tiie results of this operation proved him correct.
On September 28th, less than two weeks after the assault at
Inchon, the politically important capital city of Seoul had
been recaptured by forces of the X Corps. This joint-
service campaign, which featured contributions from every
branch, stands as the foremost example of "selective inter-
vention" by U.S. /D.N. coalition in the Korean intervention.
isswilliam Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1S78), p-577-
issiiid, 575.
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It provides a classic case of the use of combined arms and a
goal toward which the employment of force in limited wars
should strive.
C. IHPLEMENTING OBJECTIVES
In this section we will deal with the actual quest for
the fulfillment of the objectives established in the Entry
phase on the battlefield. Two guestions will be addressed
in this context: Were the original goals of the war clearly
understood by the battlefield ccmmander(s) as evidenced by
their pursuit through military action? And, were any of the
objectives changed after the beginning of the conflict? The
Korean War offers a timeless example for the study of both
these inquiries.
The conflict in Korea will always, from the American
perspective, be considered controversial because of the
disagreement that it fostered between President Truman and
his commander in the Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In
the end the friction between the two resulted in the
latter' s relief from command, touching off a furor that has
lived on through the vehicle of history even today.
The point with which we will be concerned is whether or
not the Ear East Commander understood the objectives of the
United States in deciding to emjloy force in Korea. Such a
determination is not as easy as it might sound for there is
ample evidence that the members of the administration were
not in total agreement as to how to implement, through the
use of armed force, the pursuit of their goals in the Korean
War. This controversy centered around the decision to allow
the D.N. ground forces to cross the 38th parallel.
As was mentioned in our addressal of the initial estab-
lishment of objectives before ccnflict entry, the goals of
defending the ROK and establishing a setback to Soviet
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expansion were not out of harmony with the crossing of the
38th parallel. However, the objective that proved, in the
end, to be out of line with the expansion of the war to the
north was the limitation of the conflict. It was also on
this issue that MacArthur*s troubles with his superiors in
Washington stemmed.
Early in the intervention the confusion surrounding this
issue was already evident. On July 13th CBS Radio reported
that Korean President Ehee had issued a statement "to the
effect that the action of the North Korean forces had obli-
terated the 38th parallel and that no peace and order could
be maintained in Korea as long as the division of the 38th
parallel remained." The report further asserted that "an
American Army spokesman had publically stated that American
troops were only fighting to drive the North Koreans back to
the 38th parallel and would stop there and use force if
necessary to prevent South Korean troops from advancing
beyond- "1S7 The Department of State hastened to prevent the
occurrence of what it considered premature statements by
both Korean and American officials until a specific policy
had been determined.
In fact, the administration had always been ambiguous
about the possibility of crossing the 38th parallel. At his
weekly press conference of the same day the President was
asked if he intended to carry the conflict north of the
parallel. Truman's remarks were later paraphrased as
follows:
",..<! will> make that decision when <I come> to
it--,. This country has never recognized that line as one
separating sovereignties of a divided Korea but merely
as a geographic convenience fcr the original occupation
tasks of the American and Russian troops. "i^
a
157FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.373-
issj^nthony Lever io, "President Sees U.S. Holding in
Korea for Counter- Attack", New York Times, July 14, 1950,
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Truman's hesitance can be understood if one realizes that
there was a spirited debate going on among his advisors as
to the wisdom of crossing the parallel. Furthermore, the
issue did not appear nearly as pressing in July as it would
after the landing at Inchon, in September, opened the door
for a quick move by the a. N. ground forces to the north.
The iattlelines in Washington over the parallel issue
formed within the Department of State with the Policy
Planning Staff, headed by Paul Uitze and strongly influenced
iy George Kennan, arguing for the restriction of military
action south of the geographic line. Meanwhile, the offi-
cials manning the Asia desk, primarily John Allison and Dean
Eusk, urged that no political constraints be placed on the
employment of military power in Korea. The argument of the
former group was that the crossing of the parallel seriously
increased the danger of conflict with both the Soviets and
the Chinese. 159 However, the latter felt that the increased
risk of a widened war was more than outweighed by the need
to repel aggression, specifically that which was believed to
be Soviet inspired. Hence, it advocated the pursuit of the
war north of the parallel until the North Korean Army could
be destroyed and Korea could be unified. i^o The convergence
of their views can be found in NSC 81/1, dated September 9,
1950, which stated that:
"Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning
the future course of action in Korea, since the course
of action which will best advance the national interest
of the United States must be determined in light of: the
action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese
Communists. .. and <the> appraisal of the risk of general
war. ...It would be expected that the U.N. Commander
would receive authorization to conduct military
pp. 1,6. The rules of the Presidential press conference
under Truman prohibited his being guoted directly hence, his
remarks were reported in paraphrase form.
159PEUS 1950, Vol. VII, p.U53
isoiiid, p. 4-61.
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operations north of the 38th jarallel, for the purpose
oi destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at
the time of such operations there has been no entry into
North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no
announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter
our operations militarily in North Korea. "^^i
Thus the recommendation was that the U.S. pursue the unifi-
cation of Korea but, only if this could be accomplished
short of a widened war.
When the total success of the Inchon landing opened the
door for the extension of the ground war to the north the
President approved the employmert of U.S. forces across the
parallel. In late September, the message sent from the JCS
informing MacArthur of this decision was explicit about the
basis upon which this "escalation" was approved. In words
that were taken almost verbatim from NSC 8 1/1 they said:
Your military objective is the destruction of the North
Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you
are authorized to conduct military opera tions. .. north of
the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of
such operation there has been no entry into North Korea
by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no
announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter
our operations militarily in worth Korea. Under no
circumstances. .. will your forces cross the Manchurian or
USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no
non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast
provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area
along the Manchurian border- 1*2
On October 9th, when evidence of a possible intervention of
the Chinese Communists mounted after the U.N. forces had
crossed the 38th parallel the JCS revised their earlier
instructions:
"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment
anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units,
without prior announcement, you should continue the
action as long as, in your judgement, action by forces
isiltid, pp. 715-716.
162 JCS 92801 to CINCFE, September 27, 1950. Cited in
Goulden, p. 237. ^
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now under your control offers a reasonable chance of
success. In any case you will obtain authorization from
Washington prior to taking any military action against
objectives in Chinese territory. " ^ ^^
In these communications we can see that the Far East
Commander should have been well acquainted with the polit-
ical considerations that were preeminent in the minds of the
U.S. decision- makers. The stated "tactical" objective was
now the destruction of the In Min Gun and the Chinese Army
could be engaged, if necessary, on Korean soil in achieving
this end. When HacArthur, on October 17th, formulated a
plan that would send "non-Korean" forces to within 45 miles
of the Chinese frontier he was already stretching an order.
But, a week later, when he issued a directive that, in
effect, made the Yalu River, separating Manchuria from
Korea, the geographic goal of all of the forces under his
command he was directly challenging established policy, i^*
Some would later argue that the original decision to
carry the war into the north had signalled a quantum change
in U.S. policy and therefore, MacArthar's actions were only
representative of this transition. Yet, such was not the
case. The extension of the war into the north dnd the guest
for the annihilation of the In Min Gun flowed from the
earlier decisions to punish aggression and assure the
survival of the ROK. Besides, HacArthur had long sought the
destruction of the Communist forces from the north. His
Inchon operation had been specifically designed to hammer
the North Koreans between the anvil of the X Corps and the
hammer of the Eighth Army in an attempt to shatter its will
and capability to offer further resistance. What had
changed was something more subtle but, ultimately just as
disturbing to the pursuit of a limited war, the criteria for
163FEUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 9 15.
i6*Iiid, p. 256.
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measuring the accomplishment of objectives. However, what-
ever confusion may have surrounded this aspect of the war
one goal of the conflict remained undisturbed, the pledge to
limit the military action to th€ Korean Peninsula. It was
this constraint, in concert with MacArthur*s failure to
grasp its implications, that would get the U.N. Commander
into trouble.
Two distinct features appear to underpin the the failure
of MacArthur to fully grasp the political desires of his
superiors in the use of force in Korea. The first is the
image of infallibility that surrounded the General due to
both his vast experience and the recent astounding success
of the Inchon landing. The second was the tendency of the
authorities in Washington to assume that MacArthur under-
stood the realities of the changed world in which the United
States operated after the close of World War II, specifi-
cally after the Soviets joined the nuclear club.
MacArthur, by far the most senior officer still on
active duty in the U.S. armed forces, was far removed from
the Joints Chiefs who were tasked with passing the orders of
the President on to him. None had ever served with or under
the General and most, including the President himself, had
never spent a great deal of time with the him. This led to
judgements by both on the basis of second impressions and
perceptions. In such a context, the landing at Inchon and
its result were extremely significant. Gen. Matthew B.
Eidgway, who succeeded MacArthur as U-N. Commander, has
grasped well the implications of the Inchon success on the
image of the General:
"A... subtle result of the Inchon triumph was the devel-
opment of an almost superstitious regard for General
MacArthur's infallibility. Even his superiors, it
seemed, began to doubt if they should question any of
MacArthur's decisions and as a result he was deprived of
the advantage of forthright and informed criticism, such
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as any commander should have-.-''^^^
No one can say what the effect of outside advice would have
been on MacArthur. Yet, many of the authorities in
Washington would later claim that as the U.N. forces
continued their drive toward the Yalu the signs of an
impending disaster were growing. Unfortunately, none spoke
up until it was too late. i^^ There is little doubt that
MacArthur was out of touch with the political mood in
Washington. When the Korean War broke out it had been
fifteen years since he had been in the continental United
States. During this absence the thinking concerning the
employment of power and the grand strategy of the U.S. had
undergone a substantial transition. The Far East Commander
had access to all of the pertinent documents on the evolu-
tion of strategic thought and he was frequently visited by
Defense and State officials but, one has to wonder if he
really understood the new role cf the U.S. D. Clayton James
points out that "<u>nlike some cf the top commanders of the
wartime European Theater who had been in on the evolution of
the containment <policy> since 1945, MacArthur. . .was not
acquainted with the twists and turns of Pentagon thinking
nor with the officials who had teen developing the Cold War
strategy."! 6"^ This was to make the General's strategic
thinking out of step with that cf the contemporary political
and military leadership.
i65Ridgway, p.42.
i^^Acheson gives a good acccunt of his feelings during
this period and offers no excuses. See: Present at the
Creation, p.U66-U68.
i6"7D. Clayton James, Command Crisis: MacArthur and the
Korean War, The Harmon Lec'tures in Hilitar y~Hisrory.~Tro . "24




Such a background was certainly assumed by Secretary of
Defense George Marshall when he had sent CINCFE a "for your
eyes only" message on September 29, 1950. i*^ This communica-
tion, encouraging the General tc "feel unhampered tactically
and strategically to proceed north of <the> 38th parallel",
was later used by MacArthur as justification for his
ordering non-Korean forces all the way to the Yalu.i^^
Goulden states correctly that this message was intended to
induce the General "to cross the 38th parallel with as
little fanfare as possible. * "^o The message was also never
intended to authorize the U.N. Commander to use his forces
in a way which might precipitate a wider war.
When evidence of Chinese intervention surfaced in late
October MacArthur and his intelligence chief, Maj, Gen.
Charles Willoughby, were hesitant to admit the broadened
scope of the war. Afterall, CINCFE had assured President
Truman at ther face-to-face meeting on Wake Island two weeks
earlier that if the Chinese did enter "there would be the
greatest slaughter" because they had no air force and their
combination with Russian air "just wouldn't work".i7i Also,
the U.N. forces under his command were on the verge of a
great victory, having crossed the 38th parallel on October
1st and captured the northern capital of Pyongyang on
October 19th. The war in Korea, in MacArthur' s mind, was
all but over.
By November 1st the evidence of the massive entry of
Chinese forces became overwhelming. The next day Peking
Eadio formally announced that a "Volunteer Corps for the
ifi^Gen. Marshall had replaced Louis Johnson at the
Pentagon in mid-September.
i69por the text of the Marshall message see: FRUS 1950,
Vol. VII, p. 826.
i^OGoulden, p. 258.
1 'I Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Ho£e, p. 3 66.
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protection of the Hydroelectric Zone... had entered Korea
expressly to protect the dams and power complexes along the
Yalu."i72 On November 4th, in response to an inquiry from
the JCS as to the extent of Chinese military forces in
Korea, MacArthur remained calm- He stated that it was too
early to judge the scope of the Chinese commitment to Korea
warning that "a final appraisal should await a more complete
accumulation of military facts. "^''^ Over the next week his
assessment of the Korean situation would waver between the
prediction of disaster and that of reassurance, a situation
that, needless to say, was confusing to the decision-makers
in Washington.
MacArthur wanted to bomb the Yalu bridges which
connected Manchuria with the northern provinces of Korea.
In this way he hoped to stem the flood of Chinese men and
material that was surging to the south toward the U.N.
forces. When the scope of these operations threatened to
inadvertently carry the war into Manchuria he was ordered to
postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the
border. In a message dispatched to Washington on November
6th, protesting this restriction, MacArthur stated that
"...large force<s> are pouring across all bridges of the
Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but
threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my
command. "174 jt would seem that it was time to reconsider
the offensive in North Korea and consolidate the O.N.
contingent in a strong defensive position, for the chance of
continued successful operations was fast waning. Afterall,
MacArthur' s most recent directive had ordered him to
"continue. . .action <only> as long as in your judgement
i72Goulden, p. 297.
i73Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 373.
i74iLid, p. 375.
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<such> action offers a reasonaile chance for success."
Instead, by the end of the month MacArthur's command was on
the offensive again.
Just as uncertainty still surrounds the decision of the
Communist camp to initiate the Korean War so does it also
cloud the understanding of the PRC*s military entry into
Korea. 1 "75 However, one thing is certain, the drive of the
Chinese into the northern provinces of Korea in late October
and early November 1950 should have been a significant indi-
cator of the possibility of a widened war to the American
political and military analysts. Unfortunately for the U.S.
decision-makers in both Washington and the Far East, by the
middle of November the Chinese had broken contact all along
the front. It was in this situation that MacArthur
misjudged Chinese intentions and launched his ill-fated
offensive to end the war. That such an error could be made
now seems close to unbelieveable. In interpreting the
Communist perspective Whiting notes that the three week lull
that followed "was designed to maintain freedom of action
while observing the U.S. response to Chinese interven-
tion. "^''^ When the response was a continued drive toward the
Yalu coupled with a promise that "If successful, this
<offensive will> end the war" the breadth of maneuver left
to the Chinese was significantly narrowed. 1 7''' Thus, the U.S.
was destined to clash with the armies of Communist China for
well over two more years.
The actual outcome of the November offensive was a
disaster for the widely dispersed U.N. troops. The Eighth
Army, operating in western Korea was forced south of Seoul
i^SThe classic work on this subject is still considered
to be Michael Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu (New York;





before it could recapture the offensive. Meanwhile, X Corps
staging from the Wonsan/Hungnam beachhead was forced to
conduct a retreat to the south, by sea, for many of its
units. The blame for the results of this situation can not
be laid solely at the doorstep cf the MacArthur house.
Although, it stems from a true misperception of the extent
to which the U.S. was prepared to take the war in Korea by
the Jar East commander, officials in Washington must also
shoulder a portion of the blame for not correcting the
mistakes of their field commander and for underestimating
the commitment of the Chinese Ccmmunists.
This debacle was the beginning of the end for the
General. He had always been outspoken and had, on more than
one occasion, misstated or seemingly publicly disagreed with
government policy. Yet, in the bleak days before the stra-
tegic reversal at Inchon MacArthur was needed as a distin-
guished commander and respected tactician around which the
"Western" coalition could rally. After its overwhelming
success he was perceived as an "American Caesar"; a descrip-
tion which William Manchester sc deftly coined. It was only
after his repeated disagreements with the Truman
Administration over the conduct of the Korean War that he
was relieved of his duties, i''^ i^iis controversy remains
important, even today, for it urderlines the importance of a
full understanding of the political nature of limited war,
especially in an era when recourse to general war is close
to unthinkable.
iTSThe immediate cause of MacArthur's removal was the
reading cf a letter he had written to Minority Leader
MartinTR) on the floor of the House that was strongly crit-
ical of administration policy. It was this correspondence
that contained the well-known phrase: "There is no substi-
tute for victory." For the views of the two principal's on
this final collision see: Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial
and Ho^e, pp. 445-45 and MacArthur, pp.3'35-IW,
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In summary, the objectives cf the U.S. in Korea vere not
fully understood by the Far East Commander. Principally
this failure resulted from his inability to comprehend the
reasons for limiting the war. The fact that the criteria
used for the measurement of the other gaols of punishing
aggression and assuring the survival of the EOK did not help
matters for the General. (This situation will be discussed
in more detail in the section on Termination.) Therefore,
the U.S. effort in Korea that had begun so well was headed
for a long and bleak period.
D. ALLIES: RECEOITMENT AND BELATIONS AFTER ENTRY
The final section of our analysis of the Conduct phase
of this war will center on the relations between the United
States and its allies in the United Nations following their
entry into hostilities in Korea. The "allied" material
contribution to the effort in Kcrea was, as mentioned
earlier, expected to be minimal. However, as the justifica-
tion for military action was found in the resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council, continued support within
this international body was considered crucial to the
continued successful prosecution of the war. It is an exam-
ination of this situation which we will undertake.
The members of the U.N., who had supported the decision
to militarily defend the EOK, were less enthusiastic about
the extension of the war north cf the 38th parallel. Their
concern, much like that of the U.S., was centered on the
possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention should these
states feel threatened by such an escalation. The United
Kingdom was the natural leader of this group, for it was the
foremost contributor, other than the U.S., to the U.N.
effort. In fact, the U.K.'s leadership, in gaining interna-
tional support for the continuation of the war into northern
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Korea, would be essential in the U.N. Therefore, it was the
British who were the prime movers in the formulation of an
eight nation group for the drafting of a resolution to put
before the U.N. General Assembly which would tacitly support
the pursuit of the ground war north of the parallel. 1 7"'
As finally adopted on October 6, 1950 this "Eight Power"
resolution stated the U.N. position as follows:
"li^5i£5 iii ii^^ that United Nations armed forces are atpresent operating in Korea in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the Security Council of 27 June
1950.. -that Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Eepublic of Korea as may be necessary
to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in the area;
"Recalling that the essential objective of the
<previous> resolutions of the General Assembly ... <was>
the establishment of a unified, independent, and demo-
cratic Government cf Korea;...
"Reccmmends that ...all appropriate steps be taken to
ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea. "i®o
When first submitted, in late September, the "Eight
Power" resolution was, as every other aspect of the war,
seriously colored by the Inchon success. The North Korean
armed forces were in headlong retreat throughout the entire
peninsula and, though uncertainty still shrouded the possi-
bility of intervention by the Chinese or the Russians,
victory in Korea appeared to be at hand. However, the even-
tual unification of Korea was still considered a political
vice military problem. The wording used in the General
Assembly Resolution had been, "all appropriate steps shall
be taken to ensure stability throughout Korea." As far as
the parties in the United Nations were concerned this
I'^^This resolution was submitted by Australia, Brazil,
Cuba, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Phillipines, and the
U.K. on September 29, 1950. FEUS 1950, Vol. VII,
pp. 826-828-
laoGeneral Assembly of the United Nations Resolution
376 (V), Ibid, pp. 904-906. The resolution was adopted by a
vote of U7 to 5, with 7 abstentions.
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included and, in fact, mandated the use of negotiation as
well as military force in pursuit of this goal.
On October 3rd, as the General Assembly was debating the
Eight Power resolution, an event occurred which caused a
great deal of consternation among the U.N. allies and caused
them to seek a clarification of the U.S. position. This was
the meeting, in Peking between Chou En-lai and the Indian
Ambassador, K. M. Pannikar. It was at this time that Chou
threatened the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces
should U.N. troops cross the 38th parallel. Naturally, this
raised the blood pressure at capitals around the world which
had committed forces to the intervention in Korea.
Again, it was the British who took the lead for the U.N.
allies. Since the General Assembly resolution had not yet
passed they wanted a forthright statement of U.S. intentions
before U.N. forces plunged across the parallel. On October
6th Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to the United
States, met with Dean Rusk and fhillip Jessup of State to
get a clarification on American policy. Two important ques-
tions were put to the U.S. officials at this meeting: 1)
Was the American policy "still to localize the Korean
fighting"? 2) Did General MacArthur have "clear instructions
not to attack targets in Manchuria and Siberia. .. without
full consultation"? When assured that the answer to both
the these inquiries was yes the British seemed satisfied but
still insisted on attempting to reassure the Chinese of U.N.
intentions through Indian channels. Since the U.S, had no
objections to these attempts the British were encouraged to
continue in this vein-i^i Hence, the British were convinced
to continue their support for the crossing of the parallel.
181 FEUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 893-897.
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However, from this exchange one can detect that London was
far more interested in negotiation, in the days before
Chinese intervention, than Washington.
"We might also assert that the British were more
concerned about the possibility of the possibility of a
widened war than the D, S- Yet, as we have seen, the
American concerns in this area were very real also. In
actuality the British position en this issue, which was very
representative of the overall D.N. feeling, only reinforced
a predetermined U.S. objective in the conflict.
Subsequent to the massive intervention of the Chinese
Communists in late November there was again great consterna-
tion among the allies. Many privately accused the U.S. of
leading them down the path to a wider war. In early
Eecember Clement Atlee, British Prime Minister, felt the
situation serious enough to request a summit meeting with
the President. IS 2 The Truman-Atlee Summit, like other leet-
ings of this type, produced no dramatic change in ongoing
policy. Its primary purpose was to reassure the Prime
Minister of the purpose and limits of the respective
American political and military aims in Korea. 1^3 The two
leaders also took the opportunity to examine some of the
i82The actual catalyst of the summit request had been
some ill advised remarks concerning the use of atomic
weapons in Korea by President Truman at his press conference
of November 30th. The President had said, in effect, that
the use of the atomic bomb had always been considered in
relation to the Korean conflict. Although the connotation
intended by the Chief Executive had been that the use of
"the bomb", as another weapon in the U.S. arsenal, had natu-
rally been thought about and rejected, such was not the
impression rendered through the press. This kind of loose
talk scared the British, touched off a two day foreign
policy debate in the House of Commons, and eventually sent
Atlee scurrying across the Atlantic. For Truman's account
of this episode see: Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope,
pp. 3 95-3 95.
i83The summit was conducted over five days. Of the six
meetings held, the first and last two concerned the Korean
situation. The U.S. minutes of these conferences can be
found in FEUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 136 1- 1374 , 1392-1408,
144 9- 146 17~T768- 1475.
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other issues faced by their two nations. However, it was
obvious that the Korean conflict was the dominate topic of
the conference. The communique issued at the close of this
meeting is indicative of common resolve that the U.S. and
U.K. still shared in their search for an acceptable solution
to the Korean problem. Pertinent portions of this document
are reproduced below
:
"The situation in Korea is one of the utmost gravity and
far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the
forces of the United Nations had all but completed the
mission set for them. ...A free and unified Korea--the
objective which the United Nations has long sought— was
well on the way to being realized. At that point
Chinese communist forces entered Korea-...
"The United Nations forces were sent to Korea on the
authority and at the recommendation of <that body>. The
United Nations has not changed the mission which it has
entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries
will continue to discharge their responsibilities.
"We are in complete agreement that there can be no
thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression,
whether in tne Far East <or elsewhere>. . .
.
"For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to
seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotia-
tion. ... Every effort must be made to achieve the
purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful
means and to find a solution to the Korean problem on
the basis of a free and independent Korea, "is"*
Thus, the British Prime Minister and the American
President stated their joint policy on Korea. Though behind
the scenes agreement was never total, the ability of the
U.S. to keep the British actively involved on the peninsula
assured the continuation of the United Nations Command. For
their part, the British stayed tecause they wanted to see
the United Nations work and, in Rees words, "believed that
the Americans had been behaving irresponsibly." i ^s in their
ia*FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, 1476-1477.
xesfiees, p. 230.
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opinion the U.S. needed a watchdog and the British, still
looking for a global role, were only to happy to fill that
capacity.
The U.N. "alliance" was to undergo some other tough
times before their intervention was officially ended in July
1953. However, the biggest crises were now behind them.
Although the continued support of this organization was
important to the United States the Americans determined that
if the Chinese entry should force the dissolution of the
U.N. Command they would continue in Korea alone. ise with
this determination made the U.S. was not forced to make
concessions through the reorientation of its original objec-
tives to either keep or to recruit allies. In fact, the
addition of new allies was not avidly sought by the U.S.
after the Entry phase of the war.
E. SUHMATION
It is extremely hard to grasp to conduct of the Korean
War in the short space that has been afforded it here.
However, there are some items worthy of note for the
purposes of our study. First, there was an honest attempt
by the United States to translate the objectives of the war
into meaningful military action consonant with the percep-
tion of the type and scope of the conflict. The mobiliza-
tion effort is adequate evidence of this. Second,
"selective intervention" was also employed, the Inchon
landing standing as the foremost example of this. Third,
the original objectives of the war, principally the commit-
ment to its limitation, were not clearly understood by the
commander in the field. This situation was exacerbated by
changes in the indicators associated with the accomplishment
of the dual goals of resisting aggression and checking
iQ^Acheson, p.484-
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Communist expansion. And finally, relations with the allies
recruited prior to entry were enphasized in order to keep
them in coalition with the 0-S. However, this was not done
at the expense of compromising the original objectives
although, as we shall see in the Termination phase, the
indicators associated with objective accomplishment were to
undergo another change. It is to ending of this conflict
that we now turn.
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VI. THE KOREAN WAE: TEBMIii4TI0N
The Termination phase of the Korean conflict was, from a
chronological standpoint, the longest of the war. Most
historians date its beginning nc later than June 1951, when
a Soviet overture started the belligerents in Korea down the
road to peace. However, one could contend that its start
can be found in the peace feelers put out in December 1950
by the United Nations with the half-hearted endorsement of
the United States. Yet, regardless of its inception, the
eventual settlement that led to a cessation of hostilities
in Korea was to be a long time in coming.
In this chapter we will examine some of the important
issues and aspects of the termination of this war. In the
first section we will deal with the types of indicators that
were being employed by the American decision-makers in
keying them to the achievement cf objectives which would
then naturally lead to the initiation of steps toward termi-
nating the war. The second topic of this chapter will be
with the starting of and the early maneuvering surrounding
the process of actually ending hostilities. It will be
followed by an analysis of the role that the use of military
pressure played in eventually arriving at a formal armi-
stice. Of particular concern in this area will be the
threatened use of nuclear weapors in a ttempts to end hostil-
ities. And finally, we will address the actual signing of
that armistice and the relationship of its terms to the
objectives established in the Entry phase. It is to these
tasks that we now turn.
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A- MEASURING OBJECTIVE ACCOMPI ISHMENT
One of the problems which our analysis of the Conduct
phase pointed out was that there was confusion concerning
the difference between the objectives of the war and the
indicators signalling the accomplishment of those objectives
which were often framed as tactical or battlefield goals.
This bewilderment was to have a profound impact on the
historical interpretation of the war, particularly by those
who were involved the decisions surrounding this conflict.
A good example of this is a statement by Adm. C. Turner Joy,
the first Chief Negotiator for the United Nations at the
Korean truce talks. In his words "the political objectives
of the United States in Korea weather-vaned with the winds
of combat, accommodating themselves to current military
events rather than constituting the goal to be reached
through military operations. "i s
7
Perhaps capabilities did affect intentions for the
United States in Korea to some extent. However, the real
debate was not so much what the U.S. wanted to accomplish,
in a strategic sense, by engaging in a war on the peninsula
as how these goals would be evidenced on the battlefield.
Since Korea was the United States' first real exposure to
limited war the development of such indicators posed a real
problem. One that, unfortunately, was very late in being
solved.
The debate within the Department of State over the
wisdom of crossing the 38th parallel, discussed earlier, was
indicative of the quandary that U.S. decision-makers found
themselves in relation to the appropriate time to begin
attempting to terminate hostilities. MacArthur was later to
bemoan the fact that his smashing triumph at Inchon had not
1S7C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate, (New York
MacMillan, 1955), pp.173=17if:
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been utilized as an occasion for ending the war.i^e xn fact,
there were several plans put forward they could be construed
as potential indicators of objective accomplishment by the
political authorities in Washington. The problem with each
was that it was impossible to cross-reference the progress
made under one to that achieved under an earlier set of
criteria. Therefore, because each appeared so distinct they
were looked on as not a redefinition of an indicator but, as
an entirely new political objective.
The first of these indicators coincided with the commit-
ment of the United States to the survival of the ROK within,
at a minimum, it pre-war boundaries. This necessarily made
the reaching of the 3ath parallel a signal of the accom-
plishment of objectives. However, this definition did not
last long. Because two of the foremost objectives of the
conflict called for a the setting of a precedent against
overt aggression and Soviet expansion it was decided that
the infliction of a punishment in the form of a loss of
territory for the Communist held sector of Korea was impor-
tant. Furthermore, it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs
that the assurance of "stability" throughout Korea, called
for in the June 27th resolution of the Security Council,
necessitated the destruction of the North Korean Army. This
task was originally believed to entail only "mopping up"
operations in the north. For this reason it also appealed
to the political authorities because it would advance the
cause of a unified and independent Korea without unwarranted
risk. 189 Therefore, MacArthur, in September 1950 was ordered
to destroy the In Min Gun.
1 sejiacArthur, p. 359.
i«9collins, pp. 145-146.
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This change appeared and, in fact, was logical until it
threatened to have an impact on another political objective
of the conflict, the assurance of its limitation to the
Korean peninsula. When the initial entry of Chinese
Communist forces in October 1950 indicated that the destruc-
tion of the armed forces of the DPRK could not be accom-
plished short of dropping or altering this objective another
rethinking cf indicators seemed mandated. When this was not
done, the U.N. Commander put his own interpretation on both
the resolutions of the international body whose forces he
commanded and the directives that he received from its
appointed agent, the United States- The final result of
this freeplay by MacArthur was an stinging setback for the
U-N. forces and eventually his removal from command.
Meanwhile his troops were pushed south of the 38th parallel
and thus could not even meet the standards of the original
termination criteria.
When U.N. forces were once again able to reverse the
strategic trend in Korea and approach the 38th parallel a
new indicator signalling the beginning of attempts to termi-
nate the war was forthcoming. Eetermined not to make the
same mistake twice, the JCS sent the following message to
MacArthur on March 20,1951:
"State planning Presidential announcement shortly that,
with clearing of the bulk of South Korea of aggressors.
United Nations now prepared tc discuss conditions of
settlement in Korea.. .. Recognizing that parallel has no
military significance. State has asked JCS what
authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom
of action lor the next few weeks to provide for the
security of UN forces and maintain contact with the
enemy. "* ^o
190FEUS 1951, Vol. VII, Pt . 1, p. 251
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The U-N. Commander responded that his current directives
were "adequate to cover" the protection of his forces and
that he objected to any further limitations being placed on
his freedom of action. I'l gy early April the General
informed the Joint Chiefs that the limit of his offensive
progress would be along a line that provided a good defen-
sive position for his forces. 1^2 This band of ground ran
across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula and, with
the exception of the portion bordering the Imjin River, was
on the northern side of the 38th parallel. Known as the
"Kansas-Wyoming" line it was to provide the tactical objec-
tive, with some slight modification, for the U.N. forces
until the war in Korea ended over two years later.
On May 17, 1951 NSC U8/5 was approved which set forth
the current policy of the United States with respect to
Korea. VJhile still avowing that the "ultimate objective" of
the U.S. was to "provide for a unified, independent, and
democratic Korea" the document asserted that the this was
made "without commitment to unify <that country> by force."
A termination of hostilities in Korea would now be sought
that in part, contained "appropriate armistice arrangements"
and assured for the ECK, "to the maximum extent possible,
both administration and military defense" below a border
that was in no case to be south of the 33th parallel.
Meanwhile, until such a settlement could be reached, the
U.S. should. .. "inflict maximum losses on the enemy <and>
prevent the overrunning of South Korea by military aggres-
sion. "1^3 Thus, the policy of the U-S. and the indicator of
its accomplishment had now come together. When the
i^iThe full text of the MacArthur response can be found
in Ibid, pp. 255-256.
i92Collins, p. 268,
i93Tiie portions of NSC 48/5 dealing with the Korea
problem can be found in FEUS 1951, Vol- VII, Pt. 1,
pp. 439-442.
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"Kansas-Wyoming" line was reached all that remained was the
conclusion of an armistice. Unhappily, this was to take a
long time-
B- INITIATING TERMINATION
With the American decision- nakers now agreed that it was
time to end the military hostilities in Korea we will now
devote our attention to the beginnings of the actual process
of termination. Action in this area was slow for, as much
as they wished to breakoff the conflict, the U.S. seemed
unable to do so. This situation was in a large part due to
the lack of diplomatic contact between the United States and
its two primary adversaries, the PRC and the DPRK. All
feelers for the beginning of negotiations therefore, had to
be passed through third parties or unofficial channels. In
June a contact that had been made confidentially between
George Kennan, currently out of government service, and
Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative to the U-N. Security
Council, bore fruit. i^* Though not responding to the Kennan
initiative directly, Malik, in a radio address sponsored by
the United Nations, declared that "the most acute problem of
the present day--the problem of the armed conflict in
Korea—could be settled." The first step to such a settle-
ment would be the beginning of "discussions. .. between the
belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice. "i ^^ jt was
through this opening that the Korean Armistice talks
started.
However, the commencement of these talks proved to be
only a small hurdle in the road to conflict termination.
After the Chinese and Korean Communists accepted the
i9AFor the record of Kennan »s use in this reqard see:
Ibid, pp-460-462, 483-486, and 507-511.
i95ii3id, p. 547.
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invitation of the United Nations Commander, now Gen,
Matthew B. Eidgway, to negotiate the first meeting was held
at the town of Kaesong on July 10, 1951. This initial
session pointed to the long road that would be ahead for the
D.N. negotiators. To start things off, the U.N. rejected
the Communist proposal for an inunediate ceasefire and mutual
withdrawal to separate sides of the 38th parallel. In this
regard, it was felt that only continued military pressure
would force the Communists to negotiate faithfully. Also,
experience had shown that the parallel was far from defen-
sible and since the D.N. forces were establishing themselves
along the "Kansas-Wyoming" line the belief was that his
hard-won territory should not be so easily returned to the
enemy. There was also some holdover of the feeling that a
loss of territory for the Communists, which agreement along
the current battleline would macdate, was necessary to
discourage any future attempts at armed aggression. For the
moment, the D.N. delegation insisted that the first matter
for the conference should be the establishment of an agenda
from which the talks could then be structured. This
proposal was subsequently accepted by the Communists and
over two weeks were spent on its formulation.
On July 26th an agenda was agreed to by the respective
parties. In brief it called for: 1) the adoption of the
agenda, 2) fixing a military demarcation line, 3) arrange-
ments for a ceasefire and armistice, 4) arrangements
relating to prisoners of war, and 5) recommendations to the
countries concerned on both sides. i^* since the agreement
fulfilled the first item on the agenda the parties next
devoted themselves to the second. It was to take almost




During this period the FEAF kept unrelenting pressure on
the Communists from the air- Oe July 13th, just after the
negotiations had started, Ridgway had told the O.N. air
units that "during this period.. .<he desired> to exploit
<the> full capabilities of airpcwer to reap maximum benefit
of our ability to punish the enemy wherever he may be in
Korea."! ''^ This included massive raids against the northern
capital of Pyongyang itself in late July and early August
after overcoming the objections of Washington. i^
s
Unfortunately, this had little cr no immediate effect on the
Communist bargaining position. In fact, they walked out of
the talks on August 22nd and did not return until October
24th. 19^ Why the Communists did return is unclear. The
excuse used was the transfer of the talks from Kaesong to
Panmunjom six miles away. However, they came back with a
significant concession. They would now accept the current
battleline vice the 38th parallel as the armistice line.
This progress and the effort expended to accomplish it were
indicative of the pace of the negotiations.
After seven more months of tedious progress the end of
the conflict appeared in sight- By May of 1S52 the bellig-
erents had narrowed the final settlement of the armistice to
a single issue, the exchange of prisoners. The 0-N. posi-
tion in this area came to be kncwn as "voluntary repatria-
tion". This term simply indicated that no prisoner would be
forced, against his will, to leave South Korea and return to
either the PRC or the DPRK- The Communists violently
opposed this policy for understandable reasons. The failure
of a significant portion of their POW's to voluntarily
i97Futrell, Moseley, and Simpson, p.400-
i^^Barton J. Bernstein, " The Straggle Over the Korean
Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?", in Bruce Cumings,






return to their homeland would represent an enormous propa-
ganda coup for the West and set a dangerous precedent for
the future. On May 7th the negotiating parties announced
their stalemate on the POW issue to the world. 200
The issue of "voluntary repatriation" marked an inter-
esting point for deadlock in the negotiations. It had first
surfaced as a tentative position for the U.N. negotiators
when the truce talks started in the summer of 1951, had
undergone some challenge within both the Departments of
State and Defense, and had ultimately been accepted as a
firm policy by both Truman and Acheson in February 1952. 201
Our study requires that we ask how this position related to
the actual objectives of the intervention for the Onited
States. One answer lies in the American commitment to self-
determination in Korea.
Truman explained his support of "voluntary repatriation"
as entirely a stand on a moral issue. In early May the
President issued a statement which expressed his position
clearly:
"...there shall not be a forced repatriation of pris-
oners of war— as the Communists have insisted. To agree
to forced repatriation would te unthinkable. It would
be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian
principles which underlie our action in Korea. To
return these prisoners of war in our hands would result
in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the
United States and the U.N.
"We will not buy an armistice by turning over human
beings for slaughter or slavery. "202
2 00Allan E. Goodman, ed. , Negotiating While Fighting:
The Diary of Admiral C. Turner ^y al €He Korean IrmisTice





2 02T3:uiiian, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 461.
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It is obvious that Truman's regard for the "right" of each
prisoner to decide his own fate, specifically if he felt his
life in jeopardy should he return, was a principle on which
he would not retreat. This was intimately connected with
the 0.3. ideological stand for the right of self-
determination for the citizens cf the SOK for, in the
President's mind, if one was worth fighting over then the
other was also.
Another explanation for the D.S.'s intransigence on this
point is its connection with the pursuit of the Korean War
as a campaign against the expansion of Communism under the
direction of the Soviet anion. In a February 1952 memo-
randum to the President urging the acceptance of "voluntary
repatriation" as an immutable position of the Qnited States
Dean Acheson demonstrated that he was well aware of this
issue. Acheson noted that any agreement in Korea which
forced the return of prisoners against their will "would
seriously jeopardize the psychological position of the
United States in its opposition to Communist tyranny. "203
Acheson's support on the repatriation issue was significant
because when the position had originally been conceived he
had doubted its legality. Nevertheless, once won over, the
Secretary proved a powerful advocate on the correctness of
the policy. Hence, it was with the justification of these
two objectives that the truce talks, now being held at
Panmunjoni, stalled on the POW issue for over a year.
C. TEBBIHATION AND MXLITABY PBESSORE
The frequent stalemates at the Korean truce talks
provided ample opportunity for the use of military pressure
to quicken their pace or force concessions. We have already
noted that an attempt along these lines in the summer of
203FEUS 1952-1954, Vol. XV, Pt. 1, p. 44,
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1951 was not particularly successful. However, a good case
can be made for the positive effect that military pressure
had on negotiations in the late stages. Of specific note in
this area was the use of an "air pressure" strategy by the
PEAF and later, the thinly veiled threat of the use of
atomic weapons by the United States against its adversaries
were the talks not soon to produce results.
In April 1952 an exhaustive study was completed which
examined the most efficient contribution that the Air Force
could make to the war during the prolonged period of negoti-
ations. This analysis concluded that, while the maintai-
nance of air superiority over Kcrea would remain the number
one priority of FEAF, the remainder of its effort should be
devoted to "the selective destruction of items of value to
the Communists nations fighting in Korea. "204 when the
conclusions of this report were approved in principle it was
left to the Air Force to find the appropriate tactical
objective for its new "air pressure" strategy within the
confines of the remaining target suite in North Korea.
This proved to be a task that was not as easy accom-
plished as it might sound. Almost two years of rail inter-
diction had reduced that system in Korea to the point where
further massive air attack against it would be a waste of
assets. Air Force planners admitted that, outside of the
hydroelectric system, there were few "gold" targets left in
the north. Unfortunately, it was the policy of the U.N.
Command that the power producing dams in the north would not
be attacked- This was based on two rationales. First,
several of the hydroelectric facilities, specifically the
huge complex at Suiho, were situated near the Manchurian
border and their attack might well violate Chinese air
space. Second, it was feared that the adverse global
204Futrell, Moseley, and Siopson, p. 444.
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publicity that would surround an attack against a target
with marginal military value would negate, through the
disaffection of allies, any tactical advantage gained
through their destruction. Thus FEAF seemed left with a
plan that defied implementation.
However, when the truce talks bogged down over the POW
issue the attitude of the U.S. toward attack on the North
Korean hydroelectric complex changed. The arrival of Gen.
Mark Clark, replacing Gen. Ridgway as U.N. and Far East
Commander in May 1952, 205 also could have contributed to
this change. Clark insisted that "only through forceful
action could the Communists be made to agree to an armistice
that the United States considered honorable. "206 Therefore,
on his recommendation the President authorized an attack on
all of the hydroelectric plants and related transmission
grid in North Korea. This was accomplished in joint Air
Force and Naval Air strikes in the last week of June 1952.
However, as predicted the attacks caused such an interna-
tional uproar that they were discontinued, though not before
causing a severe blackout in most of Communist held Korea
and parts of Manchuria. These results demonstrated that an
"air pressure" strategy employed against well selected
targets could be somewhat effective- But, more than just
the threat of conventional air attack would be needed to
treak the deadlock at Panmunjom.
The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the
United States in November 1952 signalled a shift in the
policy surrounding the limitation of force in Korea-
Eisenhower, probably the most experienced military commander
in the West, realized that the situation in Korea could not
be continued forever. The month after his election he made
205Ei^gway was transfered to the command of Supreme




a secret trip to the battlef rout oq the peninsula to person-
ally assess the situation there. "Ike" spent several days
talking vith American, U.N. , and EOK military leaders in
Korea. By the time he left, Eisenhower had decided roughly
the tact he would take once he had assumed office. In his
words
:
"My conclusion as I left Korea was that we could not
stand forever on a static front and continue to accept
casualties without visible results. Small attacks on
small hills would not end this war. "207
Eventually this perception would lead Eisenhower to consider
the use of atomic weapons to end this elongated war.
The use of "the bomb" in relation to the war in Korea
did not begin with Eisenhower. He saw earlier that
President Truman, at his press conference on November 30,
1950, admitted that their use had been considered. The
uproar that followed his statement was indicative of the
trepidation with which the use of these weapons was now
considered. This was particularly true in a world where the
Soviet Onion possessed the atomic bomb and was known to be
on the way to the development of a thermonuclear device.
However, when Truman stated that he had considered the
use of atomic bombs in Korea he was not being misleading.
In fact, the first discussion of the use of "the bomb" in
this regard can be found in the initial Blair House meeting
of June 26, 1950. At this conference the President had
asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Vandenberg, if his
service possessed the ability tc destroy the Soviet air
bases in the Far East should the conflict in Korea escalate
to a general war- When Vandenberg responded that it was
possible "if we use A-Bombs" the President ordered that the
2 07Eivight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: .Man date
^2L Change, 19.53-1956 (Garden X!Ity, TIY: DouEleday anHCompany , inc. , TWJf, p. 95.
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"Air Force. . .prepare plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases
in <that area>."2oa This potential use of the atomic bomb
was indicative of Truman's concept of its role in the Korean
conflict— a weapon that would b€ used only if the war there
escalated to a direct confrontation of the "superpowers".
In the late summer of 1951, as the war developed into a
tactical stalemate, Truman's view of the use of "the bomb"
altered slightly. This was due to the advice of the Joint
Chiefs who were worried that a sudden change in Communist
strategy could spell disaster for the O.N. forces. In such
a scenario it was feared that a breakoff of the truce talks
followed by an enormous attack, augmented by reserves drawn
from Manchuria, would sweep the less easily reinforced U.N.
Command off the Korean Peninsula. To prepare for this
contingency the JCS suggested that the Air Force practice
the use of atomic bombs "in supi-ort of engaged land forces."
These flights commenced in September and were designed to
provide the American decision-makers with a valid option
should they be faced with a military disaster in Korea. 20
9
The ascension of Eisenhower to the Presidency in January
1953 signalled a more fundamental change in the American
view of the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea. In
NSC 147, a Top Secret study dated April 2, 1953 and titled
"Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea", the new
administration's changed attitude toward the possible use of
nuclear weapons is set forth clearly. While concluding that
"the use or non-use of such weapons is left open for future
determination", the document addressed theuse of atomic
bombs in several different circumstances. It also detailed
the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the employment
of these weapons from both a political and military
208FRnS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 159-160.
sogiiMemo JCS to Lovett (SECDEF) " , August 14, 1951, cited
in Bradley and Blair, pp.649-65C-
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standpoint- In all, it was the most sophisticated treatment
of this subject since the U.S. had become involved mili-
tarily on the Korean Peninsula. 21
o
With NSC 147, Eisenhower made an intellectual leap that
Truman had considered dangerous, that atomic weapons could
be employed in a "limited war". This study was to form an
important building block for the "New Look" policy of his
administration, later embodied in NSC 162. The reason for
this was simple. To paraphrase John Lewis Gaddis: It
became an article of faith that the threat of the use of
these weapons was decisive in bringing about the July 1953
armistice. 2x 1 we now turn to the substance of this claim.
In recalling his thoughts atout ending the Korean War
Eisenhower later wrote that one of the possibilities that he
considered was to "let the Communist authorities understand
that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended
to move decisively without inhibition in the use of our
weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining
hostilities to the Korean Peninsula. "212 Although such a
step would cause great concern among America's allies, it
had surprising support in an American domestic context where
the prolonged hostilities in Korea had become increasingly
unpopular. In a Gallup Poll taken in late 1951, 51% of
those asked had responded that they felt the atomic bomb
should be used in Korea. 213 Though no direct threat of the
use of atomic bomb was made, Eisenhower recalls that "we
2iOThe entire text of NSC ^^7 can be found in FEUS
1952-1954, Vol. XV, Pt, 1, pp. 838-857. The section~3ealing
with the use of the atomic weapons is in pp. 845-846.
2iiGaddis, p. 169.
2 i2Eisenhower, p. 181.
2i3The question, asked on November 10-11, 1951, was: Do
you think the United Nations shculd use the atomic bomb on
enemy military targets in Korea? Answers: 41% Should, 10%
Qualified Should, and 37% Should Not. Dr. George H. Gallup,
ed. , The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, Vol. 2, (New
York: Random House, 1^7^r7 pp. TCJ27- laZH.
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dropped the word, discreetly, of oar intention. We felt
quite certain that it would reach Soviet and Chinese
Communist ears. "21* it would appear that this subtle coer-
cion worked for in the spring of 1953 there was again prog-
ress on the negotiating front.
When the talks began again at Panmunjom in April the
Communists revealed that they still were not prepared to
sign an armistice. While the threat of escalation in the
war had brought them back to the table it had not as yet
forced the termination of hostilities. Though both sides
made small concessions, the Communist's, as yet, would not
accept the policy of "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners.
Fehrenbach points out that the pressure on the psycho-
logical front became intense during these last months of the
Korean War. The U.S. shipped the 280mm "atomic cannon" to
the Par East during this time and, though its nuclear shells
were not stored with it in Korea, they were kept within
range of easy shipment. Meanwhile a rumor wafted about that
"the D.S. would not accept a stalemate through the end of
the summer. "21 5
The Air Force also put increased pressure on the
Communists. In April and May it pounded the North Korean
irrigation dam system. The success of these attacks which,
due to the resultant flooding, seriously affected the
planting of rice in the north and temporarily denied some
crucial transportation links to the Communists between
Manchuria and the front battlelines, has been pointed out by
some as key to the final signing of an agreement . 2 1 &




2i6Futrell, Moseley, and Simpson, pp. 623-629.
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D- FINALIZING AND JDEGIHG TEBfllNATION
Shortly before ten o'clock in the morning on July 21,
1953 It. Gen. William Harrison, 03A, representing the
United Nations, and Nam II, representing the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, met in the truce tent at
Panmunjom for the formal conclusion of the Korean Armistice.
After each had signed nine copies of the document the truce
was official though it did not actually go into effect until
ten that evening. In this final paper the Communists agreed
to "voluntary repatriation" which was to be supervised by a
neutral nation, India. Thus ended the hostilities of the
Korean War, a conflict which cost 142,091 American
casualties--33 ,629 killed, 103,284 wounded, and 5,178
captured or missing. 217
Did the United States accomplish its objectives in the
Korean War? The answer to this question must be a qualified
yes. Certainly, the EOK's survival was assured. The people
of that nation also retained the right of self-
determination, although it would, in the future, be occa-
sionally usurped by their own leaders. This can in some way
be traced to the existence of a "national emergency" in the
south since the conflict ended, for though the United
Nations had ceased its hostilities with the north the compe-
tition between the two Koreas was not to end. However, the
EOK regained most of the territory lost at the beginning of
the conflict and, in fact, had a net gain of square mileage
and a far more defensible border. therefore, from a pure
security standpoint, the south was in better shape.
The U.S. was also successful in checking the expansion
of communism through the vehicle of overt aggression into
the southern republic. This was important as both a prec-
edent and in the psychological tattle perceived as ongoing
2i7Goulden, p. 546.
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ietween East and West. Though in the future some would
point to this war as the precursor of the American debacle
in Vietnam, the U.S. military action in Korea, while not
overwhelming, must nonetheless he considered a success.
The final objective of limiting the war to the Korean
Peninsula was also successful. However, the score in this
area was far from satisfying. Though able to geographically
contain the conflict the miscalculation that resulted in the
entry of the Chinese Communists into the war brought the
American effort on the peninsula close to disaster.
Furthermore, the hostilities in Korea were, in the end,
restricted primarily by the limitation of U.S. power.
Although Chinese entry added more than two years to the
intervention, when compared to the possibilities inherent in
escalation to total war the effort in this area was not
wholly negative.
The Korean War, while far from a perfect example of the
use of the limited war instrument, still holds lessons for
the contemporary decision-maker. We have tried to focus on
these in our analysis. The conflict appears to conform to
the structure of the Limited War Model. In the concluding
chapter of this study this will be examined in more detail.
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VII. THE FALKLANES SAE: ENIM
Our second case study involves an examination of the
conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the
possession of the Falkland Islands in the spring of 1982.
This conflict provides an interesting focus for study,
specifically in regard to the validity of the Limited War
Model, because it was from its inception, a war pursued for
limited ends with limited means. Our analysis of the
Palklands (or Malvinas as the Argentines would call it) War
will tend to concentrate on the British perspective. This
allows us to examine the decisicns of the actor which most
severely restricted itself from the standpoint of military
means throughout the Entry, Conduct, and Termination phases
of the conflict and also the one which is most clearly
documented.
This war may, with the perspective of history, be looked
on as just as much of a watershed for the United Kingdom as
the Korean conflict was for the United States. Certainly
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the British leader during
the crisis, thought so. In a speech given shortly after the
end of the hostilities in the South Atlantic she said:
"When we started out, there were the waverers and the
fainthearts. The people who thought that Britain could
no longer seize the initiative for herself.
"The people who thought we could no longer do the great
things which we once did. These that believed that our
decline was irreversible— that we could never be what we
once were. ...
"Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is
that Britain has not changed and that this nation still
has those sterling qualities which shine through
history. "218
2i8The Prime Minister, The Et. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
M.P. (Barnett, Finchley) , "Speech Before the Conservative
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To Thatcher and to much of the Eritish citizenry the
Faiklands was not only a vindication of all of the good
things about Britain but, also the beginning of a return to
greatness for their country. This feeling, dubbed by the
Prime Ilinister herself as the "lalklands Factor", may even-
tually be looked at as of more importance than the actual
war itself. 219
The effect of this war outside of the United Kingdom
could also become of lasting import. Jeffrey Record noted
that the war "possessed a peculiar appeal to both the public
and the professional defense conmunity" because it "was
short, simple, and 'clean'" and not "adulterated by ideolo-
gical struggle. "22 in fact, this interest produced a large
literature that analyzed the events surrounding the
Palklands from almost every conceivable political and mili-
tary angle. This characteristic also benefits our purpose.
Because this conflict was so straight forward and absent of
major superpower clash, it forms a convenient counter-weight
to our earlier analysis of the Korean War which exhibited
both of those qualities.
Our analysis of the decisior of the United Kingdom to
attempt to regain the Falkland Islands by force will be
addressed in this chapter. Four sections will consider rhe
specific aspects of this problem. In the first the polit-
ical and military considerations that form tne bacK ground of
the Faiklands conflict will be reviewed. The second section
will analyze the formation of the objectives or goals of the
war prior to actual intervention. The third topic to be
examined will be the process of "risk assessment" in the
Rally at Cheltenham Race Course, July 3, 1982". Reprinted
in full in: Anthony Barnett, Ircn Brittania (London: Allison
S Busby, 1982), pp.1U9-153.
2i9iiid^ p. 150.
22oj€ffrey Record, "The Faiklands War," The VTashington
^ai:ierl^. Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1982), p. 437—
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deliberations of British decisicn-makers during this phase.
The final subject of this chapter will be the recruitment of
allies before the actual commencement of hostilities.
A. PEE-EHTEI POLITICAL AND MILHARI CONSIDERATIONS
Our first concern in this study is with the decision of
the United Kingdom to respond to the seizure of the Falkland
Islands, their territorial possession in the South Atlantic,
hy the forces of Argentina on April 2, 1982. In their anal-
ysis of this conflict Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins note
that it has been the misfortune of these barren and wind-
swept isles to have "always been wanted more than they were
loved. "221 iji brief, this clash, within the ostensible
boundaries of the "Western" bloc, is not explained by either
its strategic value or any traditional affinity for the
archipelago as much as by the motive of national pride
amplified by miscalculation.
The sovereignty of these islands has been surrounded by
controversy for well over 200 years. First landed upon by
the English explorer Sir John Strong in 16 90 they were named
after the First Sea lord of Admiralty, Lord Falkland.
However, the islands were not settled until a French expe-
dition landed on the easternmost of the two large islands,
known simply as East Falkland, in 1764. This expedition was
shortly followed by an English settlement on West Falkland
in 1765. In fact, both of these early colonization efforts
were technically illegal for in 1713 Spanish control of its
traditional colonial areas in the New World, which included
the Falklands, had been confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht.
When Spain became aware of these settlements within its
recognized sphere of influence, the Falklands "stumbled on
221 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the




to the stage of world politics. "2 22 The result was the first
Palkland's crisis-
The French, who were allied to Spain, sold their colony
and left peacefully but, the English departed only after a
year of fairly intense negotiations. Therefore, open
hostilities, in this instance, were avoided. Later, in 1790
Spanish sovereignty was once again confirmed by the the
Nootka Sound Convention in which the British renounced any
colonial ambitions in South America. The islands were then
occupied as a Spanish colony for the next 20 years- In 1820
the newly independent forerunner of modern day Argentina,
the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, announced its claim
to the islands as an extension of Spanish sovereignty.
The Argentines, in fact, did administer the colonies
from 1823 until 1833, when this arrangement was abruptly
terminated by an American naval expedition led by Captain
Silas Duncan. The cause of this action appears to have been
the confiscation of an American sealing vessel and its catch
by the Argentine Governor, Louis Vernet. In the resulting
confrontation, the Americans not only recovered their stolen
property but, spiked the Argentine guns and sacked the
capital city of Puerto Soledad before declaring the islands
free of all government and sailing away. When the British
became aware of this power vacuum they reoccupied the
Falklands forcing the lone Argentine frigate guarding the
archipelago to depart in deference to superior force, though
only after strong protest. It is this armed seizure that
forms the basis of the Argentine argument for the return of
these islands today.
With the exception of the two months in 1982, when
Argentina occupied the Falklands, these islands since 1833
have been under continuous British administration. This is
222ii3id, p,3.
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not to say that the Argentines have not periodically
advanced their claims to the archipelago. A good example of
this can be found in the negotiations at the Inter-American
Conference 1947 when Buenos Aires aired its claim to sover-
eignty over the "Mai vinas". 223 ihus, the controversy over
who rightly owns the Falklands has been an ever present, if
not often publicized, issue for many years.
The current period of tension over the Falklands can be
traced to the mid-1S60's when the Argentines took their
grievance to the United Nations "Committee of 24", tasked
with overseeing the independence of colonial countries and
peoples. As a result of this action Resolution 2065 was
passed by the D.N. General Assenbly in 1965. It called for
negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom
without delay with a view toward finding a peaceful solution
to the problem. 224 in response to this and sevsral other
events Britain, though still maintaining that their occupa-
tion of the islands was entirely legal, began discussions
with Buenos Aires about the future of the Falklands. These
talks were to drag on, with little result, until the early
months of 1982.
British claims to sovereignty by now rested on three
pillars. The first stemmed from its early settlement of the
islands in 1765. However, this claim had obvious weaknesses
because of the questionable legality of the original coloni-
zation and is known to have been a source of concern within
Britain's own Foreign Office. The second edifice on which
the British case was built was the doctrine of prescription.
223U.S, Department of State, Foreiqn Relations of the
United States 1947, Vol. VIII. (WasEIngfon :~ir^GPCf
, p. 757
THIs conference resulted in the signing of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio
Treaty.
224A Committee of Privy Counsellors, The Lord Franks,
Chairman, Falkl and I slands Review (hereafter The Franks
Report) Presented to ParIiamenT~By the Prime Minister By
Command of Her Majesty (London: HMSO, January 1983), p. 4,
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One could broadly define this as an assertion that contin-
uous possession of territory over a period of time eventu-
ally constitutes the right of ownership. Such a claim is
naturally reinforced if it is never challenged.
Unfortunately, we have seen that this was not exactly the
situation with the Falklands. Ihe final argument was
rightly stated by Hastings and Jenkins as the strongest.
This is the right of self-determination, a concept "ensh-
rined in the United Nations charter" and underlying several
decades of decolonization. The fact is that the indigenous
population of the islands are of British stock and passion-
ately want to remain within the United Kingdom. It is this
desire that dominated and, in the end, negated any attempts
to find a negotiated settlement to the Falklands problem. 225
The islanders or "Helpers", as they are called, have
always enjoyed an extremely effective lobbying organization
within the British Parliament. More than one minister from
the Foreign Office has suffered a mauling for even hinting
that the Falklands might be "sold out". The most recent
example of this was the treatment accorded Nicholas Ridley,
a Minister of State who had beer assigned the task of the
Falkland negotiations after the ascension of the Thatcher
Government in May 1979. Ridley, after appointment, made a
trip to the islands to get the views of the "Kelpers" in
person, particularly to the possibility of a leaseback
arrangement similar to that which covered Hong Kong. Upon
his return he reported to a House of Commons already aware,
through sources on the islands themselves, of what was
construed as a government attempt to relinquish sovereignty
of the Falklands. The scene that followed, in which Ridley
was repeatedly attacked by MPs from both parties, is said to
have left the minister so shakec that he departed the
22SHastings and Jenkins, pp.6-7.
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"chamber pale and trembling. "22 6 This demonstrates well the
fact that the islanders had a virtual veto on any government
plan which would compromise on the sovereignty issue and
thereby avoid a confrontation with Argentina.
The "Franks Committee", tasked with reviewing the
discharge of the res^ionsibilities of the Government with
regard to the Falklands in the period leading up to the
Argentine invasion in April 1982, provides in its report a
good summary of the developments which affected both the
British and Argentine attitudes as events moved toward overt
military confrontation in the South Atlantic, In actuality,
their respective positions formed the two halves of what
eventually became an uncontrollable critical mass exploding
into a war that each neither expected or truly wanted.
Miscalculation and misunderstanding in both countries made
the diffusion or avoidance of this situation increasingly
unlikely.
The Franks R epor t notes three factors worthy of mention
from the Argentine perspective. The first is the rise of
the military Junta which overthrew the government of
Isabella Peron in 1976. This placed Argentine decision-
making in the hands of a small clique of military officers
who would be much more likely tc use force to advance their
perception of the national interest of Argentina. The
resulting arrangement also gave an increased voice to the
Navy, known to be the most hawkish of the services on the
Falklands issue. 227
Secondly, most contemporary Argentine efforts at overt
territorial aggrandizement had routinely been directed
toward its neighbor Chile. This was particularly in regard
to their longtime dispute over the Beagle Channel near the
^2f>lh±d., p. 40. The full text of Ridley's reoort to the
Commons can be found in the The Franks Report, pp. 101-105.
^^''The Franks Report, p.75-
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southernmost tip of tie South Anerican continent. When in
1977 a International Court of Arbitration awarded the terri-
tory in question to Chile, a ruling later confirmed by a
Papal mediator, the Argentines were bound to focus more
attention on their claim to the Malvinas.228
A final factor that was to prove crucial to later
Argentine actions was their country*s reproachment with the
United States after the Reagan Administration took office in
1981. The "Franks Ccmmittee" states: "It seems likely that
the Argentine Government came to believe that the United
States Government was sympathetic to their claim to the
Falkland Islands and, while not supporting forcible action
in furtherance of it, would not actively oppose it. "229
Thus, the convergence of the creation of a military Junta
and the failure of Argentina in the Beagle Channel arbitra-
tion along with a resurgence of interest in the country by
the United States, directed and then boosted the efforts of
this Latin nation toward repossession of the Malvinas. This
is a goal which ultimately it wculd achieve, though for only
a short time.
While the Argentines seemed to be showing increased
interest in the Falklands the British concern in the area,
if one can judge intentions from actions (an interesting
proposition) , was lessening. The naval presence of the
British had steadily declined in the South Atlantic. In
1967 the decision had been made to terminate the
Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic and in 1974 the Simonstown
agreements which allowed the British to forward base their
fleet out of South Africa had been ended. The 1981 Defence
Review had put a further nail in the South Atlantic coffin




area, the Antarctic survey ship HMS Endurance, would
eventually be withdrawn. 230 There can be little doubt that
these actions, though based on needs to economize rather
than changes in British policy, were misread by the
Argentines.
The British were also faced with a military establish-
ment that was becoming increasingly single task oriented.
All of the services now saw their central mission as being
in direct support of NATO. The Navy was particularly
affected by this strategic conception. By the early 1980 *s
it had become a force which was equipped principally for one
task, anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. It is
well known that had the Argentines waited another eighteen
months to seize the Falklands the Royal Navy would have
faced a much harder logistical task than it, in reality,
confronted. By this time the aircraft carriers Hermes and
Invincible would have been scraped and sold to Australia
respectively. 23 1 Even with these assets, the conventional
power projection force available to the British was minimal.
It was the ability to adapt commercial platforms to military
uses that, as we will later see, was the key to success for
Britain.
The vote within the House of Commons on the British
Nationality Act in 1981 did little to belay the growing
ambitions of the Argentines. This law, intended to stem any
flow of refugees from Hong Kong in anticipation of that
colony's reversion to China in the 1990»s, excluded from
citizenship any person who did not have at least one United
Kingdom-born grandparent. Though residents of Gibraltar
230ibid, pp. 76-77.
23iGerald W. Hopple, "Intelligence and Warning:
Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War," Worl d
Politics, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (April 1984), p. 351-352.
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were specifically excluded from the provisions of this law a
similar attempt to bar the "Kelpers" from it failed.
But, if economy was forcing the British to retreat from
empire it was more than countertalanced by the desire to
retain a global role. The British in many ways still
fancied themselves as a world power. Many would argue that
they maintained an independent nuclear deterrent, by trading
off much needed conventional military forces, just to retain
a claim to this role. This left the British in somewhat of
a predicament, for a global power could not be seen backing
away from what some would say was an insignificant South
American dictatorship. Sir James Cable puts Britain's
awkward position into perspective. Noting that the U.K. is
a medium strength power, he states:
"Some <such powers> aspire to greater influence and
status than the statistics of their military and
economic strength would altogether justify. Their
standing in the world depends as much on their reputa-
tion as it does on their measurable assets. They cannot
afford humiliation, least of all at the hands of another
country in that debatable middle ground between the
superpowers and the minor nations. "232
A final factor in the ultimate decision of the United
Kingdom to resort to the use of military force to retake the
Faiklands was a belief that the contemporary international
structure could no longer afford the existence of unchal-
lenged aggression. Anthony Lejeune, though conveniently
forgetting that the "Kelpers" were not actually "citizens",
captured the British feeling on this subject well: "The
point is simply that no nation which allows its flag to be
hauled down and its citizens captured— however far off the
flag, however few the citizens—will long survive as a
232sir James Cable, "The Faiklands Conflict," U.S. Naval





nation or deserve to do so. "233 This concern was fully
demonstrated in the debate held in the House of Commons the
day after the Argentine seizure of the islands. Michael
Foot, leader of the labour opposition, stated the matter
fort hrightly:
Even though the... people who live in the Falklands are
uppermost in our minds. .. there is a longer term interest
to ensure that foul and brutal aggression does not
succeed in the world. If it does- there will be a
danger not only to the people of the Falklands, but to
people all over this dangerous planet. "23*
This ends our review of the background issues that
impacted on the initiation of the Falklands War. We have
looked briefly at the historical context in which this
confrontation arose and some factors which speeded the
advance of the parties involved toward armed hostilities.
From the Argentine standpoint the conflict formed the head
of almost 150 years of frustration exacerbated by some
developments on both the domestic and international fronts.
In Britain the issue was one of relatively steadfast support
for the self-determination of the "Kelpers" magnified by a
vocal Parliamentary lobby. However, the economics of
defending the strategically insignificant islands and the
political message of a seeming withdrawal were problems that
were given too little consideration. The British also felt
that certain standards of international conduct were impor-
tant enough to fight for. Hence, much like the Korean War
the intervention in the Falklands would be justified and, to
some extent, fought as a precedent against a mode of inter-
national behavior that was not only considered anathema to
democracy but, dangerous in today's world. The instrument
233Aiithony Lejeune, "Colonel Blimp's Day," National
Beview, July 23, 198 2, p. 898.
23ABarnett, p.-32.
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favored in such circumstances was again to be that of
limited var.
B- ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES
Perhaps part of the success of the British in this war
steins from the establishment and maintenance of a set of
objectives that were from the beginning clear and unegui-
vocal. Two goals stand out as being conceived early on and
later translated into successful action. They are: 1) the
return of the Falkland Islands to British administration^
and 2) the creation of additional preceden t agai nst the use
2£ aggression. We have already noted some of the roots of
these objectives earlier. They will now be examined in more
depth.
The goal of assuring the return of the Falklands to
British administration was the predominant concern of the
Thatcher Government from the tiae that the islands were
first seized by Argentina. In the debate before the House
of Commons on April 3rd, 23s the day following the invasion,
the Prime Minister made this very clear:
"The Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain
British territory. No aggression and no invasion can
alter that simple fact. ±t is the government's objec-
tive to see that the islands are freed from occupation
and returned to British administration at the earliest
possible moment. "2 36
235it is interesting to note that this special session
of the House of Commons was convened on a Saturday morning.
The last time the Commons had met on a Saturday was during
the 1956 Suez Crisis. The irony of this coincidence was not
lost on its membership.
236The Times Parliamentary Staff, "Our Objective is to
Free the Islanders, Says Thatcher", The Sunday Times, April




Three motivations can be seen behind this objective.
Two, the concern surrounding the right of self-determination
for the islanders and the national honor of Britain have
already been mentioned. However, to further reinforce their
importance we will trace them tc the Commons debate on the
3rd. The remaining reason for the pursuit of this goal was
of a domestic political nature, although it is somewhat
connected with the latter of the other two factors. Put
simply, the Thatcher Government would not survive the loss
of confidence inherent in the failure to return the
Falklands to the "status guo" of April 1st. Consequently,
if the islands were not retaken, the Conservative Government
in Britain was almost certain to fall. This was a develop-
ment that had little appeal to Mrs. Thatcher or several of
her allies within the Atlantic Alliance, most notably the
Dnited States.
The right of self-determination was to become the inter-
national rallying cry of the United Kingdom in much of its
public justification for the pursuit of the return of the
Falklands via armed force and also for garnering support
within the international community. Again, in the Commcns
on April 3rd, the Prime Minister most lucidly stated her
position:
"The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of
the U.K. are an island race. Their way of life is
British, their allegiance is to the Crown- The people
are few in number but have the right to live in peace,
and to determine their own allegiance.
"It is the wish of the British people and the duty of
the government to do everything we can to preserve that
right. That will be our nope and our endeavor and I
believe the resolve of the people themselves. " 237
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The case for national honor was succinctly stated by
Edward du Cann, a noted Conservative MP. He also addressed
the Commons on April 3rd and said:
"In the United Kingdom, we must accept reality. For all
our alliances and lor all the social politeness which
the diplomats so often mistake for trust, in the end in
life it is self-reliance and only self-reliance that
counts. ...We have one duty only, which we owe
ourselves— the duty to rescue our people and uphold our
rights. Let that Be the unanimous ana clear resolve of
the House this day. ...We have nothing to lose now except
our honor. "2 3
8
In du Cannes mind the issue was well-defined. The return of
the Falklands was nothing less than a test of Britain's own
sense of "self-reliance" which in his view was the bottom
line of international reality. While he may have overstated
the case in relation to the majority of Parliament, the
thrust of his argument was widely accepted. The honor of
the United Kingdom and hence, seme argued, its position in
world affairs, were challenged by the Argentine occupation
of the Falklands by force. Only a return to the previous
situation of British administration over the archipelago
could heal this wound.
A final look at the events of the 3rd of April in the
House of Commons helps to highlight the domestic context
with which Prime Minister Thatcher was left to maneuver.
The speech of John Silkin, Labour's shadow spokesman for
Defence, offers the best insight into this situation.
Beginning his speech by proclaiming that Labour's Michael
Foot was now "the leader of the nation", Silkin went on to
note that the Conservative Government was "on trial today"
and added "the sooner you get out the better." Declaring
his solidity with the people of the Falklands, Silkin could
only wonder what their fate might now be in the hands of the
238Barnett, p. 35.
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Argentine Junta with its well-kcown record on human rights.
In short, Silkin challenged the government to rectify the
the situation in the Falklands cr resign. 239 clearly the
Labour Party, anxious to sgueeze the maximum amount of
political capital possible from the advantageous
circumstances, had thrown down the gauntlet. It was left to
Thatcher and her cabinet to either pick it up and fight or
beat a hasty strategic retreat cut of office. It is not
surprising that they chose the former course.
The objective of defeating the use of armed aggression
was also a goal that was widely advertised by Britain during
the Falkland crisis. It was ultimately this issue which
enabled the U.K. to construct an extensive international
front against Argentina. In her Cheltenham speech following
the war Thatcher would be able to say:
"This nation had the resolution to do what it knew had
to be done— to do what it knew was right.
"We fought to show that aggression does not pay and that
the robber cannot be allowed to get away witn his
swag. "2*0
The aversion to unchallenged aggression comes from what
might be the most oft used historical analogy in crisis
management in the contemporary era, the case of Chamberlain
and Munich in 1938. We know that its "lesson" influenced
the deliberations of Margaret Thatcher regarding the
Falklands situation. Alexander Haig, the American Secretary
of State, who, after the sailing of the British Fleet,
undertook a mission of shuttle diplomacy to avert the
outbreak of actual hostilities, recalls well Mrs.
Thatcher's grasp of the Munich parallel. At his initial




had rapped the table they were sitting around and reminded
Haig that this was the same table that Chamberlain had
conferred at during the Sudetenland crisis. In the
Secretary's words she then begged him to "not urge Britain
to reward aggression, to give something to Argentina that it
could not attain by peaceful means. ... "24i ultimately, this
was to be a most persuasive argument. Yet, in our current
context it exhibits the emphasis that the British placed on
the international responsibili t ;j it felt to not succumb to
aggression.
This ends our examination of the formulation of objec-
tives by the British decision-makers in their deliberations
prior to the commencement of hostilities in the South
Atlantic. To reiterate, the goals of Britain were dual.
The first was the return of the Falklands to British admin-
istration while the second was the establishment of addi-
tional precedent against the use of aggression as an
accepted action in the contemporary era. Having established
the development of goals we now turn to the assessment of
risk by the British in their planning for the possibility of
entry into a limited war.
C, PEE-COHFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT
This section will look at the analysis of risk under-
taken by the leadership of the United Kingdom before their
commitment to employ armed force in an attempt to regain the
Falkland Islands. In this regard, we will examine the
Falklands situation in the period leading up to the
commencement of hostilities in the spring of 1982. As this
is done, the actions taken by the Thatcher Government to
first, avoid a confrontation, and later to exhibit their
2*iAlexander H. Haig, Jr., Caveat (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1984), p. 2727 ~
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resolve to use force, if needed, to defend the islands will
fce studied.
We have already established that no one really expected
a large-scale military confrontation over these islands.
The British intelligence community had long maintained that
the chances of such a move by Argentina were small. Since
1965 the Joint Intelligence Comnittee (JIC) had periodically
assessed the Argentine threat to the Falklands. 2 -vz The
latest comprehensive assessment available to the British
decision-makers prior to the advent of the 1982 Falkland
crisis was completed in July of 198 1. According to The
Franks Report this document had conformed to the traditional
analysis that Argentina "would turn to forcible action only
as a last resort." Much more likely was the possibility of
economic and diplomatic moves designed to pressure the
British into reaching an agreement in regard to the islands
that was favorable to Buenos Aires. However, the assessment
warned that should Argentina come to the conclusion that the
transfer of the islands could not be achieved peacefully
then there was a distinct chance that "military action
against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the
Falkland Islands could not be discounted. " 2*3
The last round of talks by the U.K. and Argentina, prior
to the seizure of the islands, were held in New York on
February 26, 1982. They ended with a communique which
referred to a "positive and cordial atmosphere" and seemed
to augur well for some future movement toward a settlement
on the diplomatic front. Hopple states that, because
2*2The Joint Intelligence Ccmmittee is normally chaired
by a Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. It includes members from all of the
intelligence agencies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
the Ministry or Defence, and the Treasury. For a further
description of the functions and responsibilities of this
group see: The Franks Report, pp. 94-95.
2*3ibid, pp. 26-27.
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negotiations were still ongoing, the British may have
misjudged the intentions of the Argentine Junta. 2**
Certainly, this fits in well with the conclusions of the
1981 intelligence assessment, an analysis that, eventually,
was to be proven overly optimistic.
Peter J. Beck, in a now forgotten but, extremely fore-
sighted article, noted in February 1982 that the Falklands
remained "a source of potential confrontation" for the
British in Latin America. 2*s while this fact was accepted in
London, there was a belated realization of the extent to
which the circumstances had slowly pushed both the United
Kingdom and Argentina toward a hostile encounter in the
South Atlantic. This misguided preconception not only
impacted on the accuracy of British intelligence estimates
leading up to the seizure of the Falklands but, also
affected the rational assessment of risk that London felt it
was taking. The result was that Britain's efforts to deter
the Argentines from aggressive military action failed and
were only to catch with the situation after the occupation
of the islands.
Often crisis situations result from a catalytic event
and such was the case vith the Falklands affair. The inci-
dent which triggered the escalation toward open hostilities
in the South Atlantic was the arrival on the island of South
^Hopple, p. 348- It is wgrthy to note that Hopple's
analysis disregards one significant fact. This was that-
though the talks held in New York appeared to go well, there
vere ominous stirrings in Buenos Aires immediately after
their conclusion. In fact, the Argentine Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had issued an unilateral communique on the
day following the end of the meetings in New York which,
while acknowledging the advances made at the current talks,
stated that should future progress prove unsatisfactory
Argentina reserved the right to "terminate <the> mechanism
and to choose freely the procedure which best accords with
her interests." Cited in The Franks Report, p.Ul,
2*speter J. Beck, "Cooperative Confrontation in the
Falklands Islands Dispute: The Anglo-Argentine Search for a
^ay Forward, 1968-1981," Journal of Interamerican Studies
Md World Affairs, Vol. 2^7~TIo7~1~TFenfuar y~Tg"8"2f ,~p75F7~
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Georgia, a part of the Falklands Dependency though 800 miles
to the east of the main archipelago, on March 20, 1982 of a
cadre of Argentine workers to dismantle the old whaling
station near Stromness Bay. The disagreement that resulted
from their appearance was not that their presence was
entirely unexpected. In fact, an Argentine scrap metal
merchant, Constantine Davidoff, had secured the rights to
the remains the the old whaling station in 1979. However,
when the Argentines refused to check in with the British
base at Grytviken to obtain clearance to land on the island
and subsequently raised the flag of Argentina over their
encampment the makings of an international incident were
evident. 2*6
When the Argentines refused to leave or to normalize
their presence, London exercised the only real option it had
available on short-term notice in the South Atlantic by
dispatching the HMS En dur ance with a contingent of Royal
Marines to South Georgia. This platoon sized group was
instructed to position themselves so as to be able to remove
the Argentines by force should such a move become necessary.
This action seemed momentarily to have succeeded in defusing
the crisis, for on March 22nd the Argentine naval vessel
which had carried the workers to South Georgia sortied from
the island with what appeared, at first, to be all of the
Argentine landing party. Unfortunately, further investiga-
tion revealed that a number of its group had been left
behind. Furthermore, the British later monitored a message
from naval headquarters in Buencs Aires to the departing
vessel, the Bahia Buen Sucesio, congratulating it on a
2*6There are some indications that this event was
orchestrated by the Argentines. Most of this speculation
centers around the actions of the chief of the argentine
Navy, Admiral Jorge Anaya, who vas also a member of the
three-man military Junta. See: "Falkland Islands: The
Origins of a War," Economist, June 19, 1982, p. U3 and
Lawrence Freedman, ""The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,"
Foreign Affai£§/ Vol. 61, No. 1, (Fall 1982), p. 199.
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successful mission. 2*7 jt was fast becoming apparent that
the D-K. and Argentina were headed for a clash over their
dual claim to sovereignty of the islands.
On March 24th the British Defence Attache in Buenos
Aires warned that, in his opinion, any attempt to remove the
Argentines from South Georgia by force would result in a
military confrontation. 2*8 Further evidence was provided in
support of this analysis when one week later the Naval
Attache reported that five Argentine warships, including a
submarine, had been dispatched to that island and that
another four warships had departed from Puerto Belgrano for
an unknown destination. Also, en the same day, the Defence
Operations Executive (DOE) , which acts on behalf of the
British Chiefs of Staff for the central direction of mili-
tary operations, noted not only the increased Argentine
naval presence around South Georgia but, the existence of an
Argentine task force comprised of its lone aircraft carrier,
four destroyers, and an amphibious landing ship on exercises
600-900 miles north of the Falklands. 2*' i^ short, it was
now obvious that the Argentines were raising the stakes in
the South Atlantic and, due to their closer geographical
proximity to the area, had created a temporary capacity for
escalation dominance.
The British, finally realizing that the situation was
approaching a crisis point, began to make moves on March
29th. The first was the dispatch of a nuclear powered
submarine to the South Atlantic along with the naval auxil-
iary RFA Fort Austin . Interestingly enough, the departure
of the former was kept a secret so as not to push the
Argentines into a postion where they felt their interest




merited preemptive action. This tendency toward emphasizing
the provocation inherent in the overt dispatch of naval
forces continued to dominate British deliberations
throughout the week prior to the invasion of the Falklands.
In the current situation, it was felt that the risk of
publicizing the departure of naval forces outweighed their
potential as a deterrent factor.
The next day this mindset was still predominant. John
Nott^ the Defence Minister, noted at a meeting of the DOE
that not only would a naval surface force seem provocative
but, it would require the accomjaniment of a carrier to
provide air support. 250 ^t this point, London did not want
to make the effort required to dispatch such a large force.
Instead, it was decided to send another nuclear submarine
covertly to the South Atlantic and hope for the best.
Though the political leadership might be hesitant about
committing naval forces, such concerns were not shared by
Fleet Command at Northwood. Led by First Sea Lord, Sir
Henry Leach, and Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Sir John
Fieldhouse, the Royal Navy began to make contingency plans
for deployment to the South Atlantic well before their
civilian superiors. It was decided early on that any task
force sent south would have to te large and "balanced", that
is, possessing all the capabilities necessary for the
conduct of comprehensive naval warfare. Fieldhouse, who on
March 29th was observing Exercise Spring Training off
Gibraltar with the First Flotilla, decided to take action
immediately. He summoned Rear Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward
to his cabin aboard the Glamorgan early on the morning of
the 30th and put him on alert tc be prepared to move to the
South Atlantic. 251 xn fact, contingency planning by the
250liid.
25iHastings and Jenkins, pp. 62-63
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Eoyal Navy continued at such a jace as to enable Leach to
inform the Prime Minister on the evening of the 31st that
the fleet would be able to sail by the weekend if necessary.
However, it was recognized by all the decision-makers by
this time that, if an Argentine invasion was imminent, there
was no possibility for any British military action in the
South Atlantic to stop it. 252
By April 1st a review of Argentine military dispositions
indicated that they could launch a successful invasion of
the Falkland Islands as early as the next day. That evening
it was decided to put troops on alert for deployment to the
South Atlantic. 2 53 on April 2nd the worst fears in Britain
were confirmed when Argentina staged a successful amphibious
landing near Port Stanley and after a brief firefight forced
the small Marine garrison there to surrender. In response,
London determined that a task force, comprising most of the
conventional strength of the Rojal Navy, should sail for the
contested area as soon as possitle. Though the political
battle to deter the Argentines from invading the Falkland
Islands had been lost Thatcher was determined that the mili-
tary battle to retake them would be won and she was willing
to wager the bulk of the Royal Kavy to assure that this was
accomplished.
Unfortunately, neither the Erime Minister nor her mili-
tary advisors realized, at the time, the full extent of the
risk to which the Royal Navy was being subjected. This fact
would only become clear long after the dispatch of the task
force. However, there is no reason to believe that this
would have changed the minds of the British decision-makers
although, it might have lessened the shock stemming from the
losses later sustained.
2S2I]3id, p. 66.
2 53The Franks Re por t, p. 71.
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The possibility of confronting not only Argentina but,
its allies also had to be considered. The British leader-
ship realized that Argentina had few friends on which it
could depend to provide assistarce in a military confronta-
tion in the South Atlantic. Three possibilities existed
from which the Argentines could draw support. The first of
these was through the Rio Treaty, a Western Hemispheric
collective security pact. Yet, this agreement had always
been focused on the challenge of international Communism to
Latin America and its real teeth rested in the commitment of
the Onited States to militarily assist its "new world"
neighbors. Obviously, the Falxlands situation did not
conform to the expected uses of this treaty hence, Britain
could be relatively certain that the O.S. would not side
against it. 25*
The second was the Onited Nations. In this arena there
was an outside chance that tlie Argentines would be able to
mobilize the Third World into some mild condemnation of
British actions in the General Assembly. But, the possi-
bility cf invoking the collective security provisions of the
ON Charter were considered non-existent since the South
Americans had been the first to revert to force.
Furthermore, any speedy action by the UK Security Council
was precluded by the existence cf the British veto.
The final source to which Argentina could turn for aid
would be to the Eastern Bloc. fihile the chance of this
always existed, the British were willing to take the risk of
pushing the Argentines toward the East realizing that.
2S4For a good overview of the application of the Rio
Treaty and its related organization the Organization of
American States (OAS) to the Falklands crisis see: Gordon
Connell-Smith, "The OAS and the Falklands Conflict," The
WoEii Today, September 1982, pp. 340-347.
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should such a shift threaten their chances for success , they
could expect increased assistance from their own allies in
the West.
The British thus decided to edge the conflict
surrounding the Falklands toward a large-scale naval
confrontation. It was felt by almost all concerned in
london that the famed Royal Navy would make short work of
their Argentine counterpart, should such a course become
necessary. This assessment made the dispatch of the fleet
seem, initially, to be an attempt to coerce the Argentines
into abandoning their "ill-gotten gains". Its long transit
time to the south (it would be over three weeks before it
was on station) was beneficial in this light, because it
gave time for diplomacy, backed by shown resolve, to end the
crisis. 255
Due to excellent and timely prior planning, the British
naval task force departed Plymouth on April 5-6 to a rendez-
vous with Woodward's first Flotilla before proceeding south
to the Falklands. The conflict was now rapidly moving
toward the Conduct phase. However, before we embark on an
examination of that aspect of the war let us first look at
Britain's search for international support before its mili-
tary effort to retake the Falklands began.
D. EECBDITIHG ALLIES
The search for "allies", in support of its guest to
assure the return of the Falkland Islands, was important to
the United Kingdom for three reasons. First, the O.K.
sought to isolate Argentina from its economic partners in
the West, particularly those whc provided it with arms.
2 55Hastinqs and Jenkins give a fairly sophisticated
treatment of the developments of British military policy
during this period of transition from entry to actual pros-
ecution of tne war. See: Chapter 7, "Ascension to South
Georgia", pp. 114-134.
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Second, it was hoped that international pressure might force
Argentina to abandon its gains en the Falklands before
Britain would be compelled to use force in their recapture.
And finally, Britain realized that, while the actual
involvement of forces from other nations would be ill-
advised, it might at some point need material and technical
aid from abroad to prevail-
Several forums were open to the United Kingdom through
which international support could be garnered. They were
the three "alliances" of which Britain was a member: the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , the United
Nations (UN) , and the European Economic Community (EEC) or
"Common Market". All of these organizations were utilized
to build an international coalition that would support
British actions to regain possession of the Falklands. We
will now examine the pre-entry aoves made in each of these
in turn.
Though the NATO commitment restricted the actual
involvement in reciprocal defense to "the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer"256 the British were able
to appeal to their allies in this pact for they knew that it
formed the cornerstone of each member state's national
security. While not expecting or desiring any help in the
actual campaign to recapture the Falklands, Britain did need
the tacit acquiescence of their Atlantic Alliance partners
to move the major portion of their fleet to the south. This
is because the dispatch of the Royal Navy, which was slated
to provide two-thirds of NATO's defense in the eastern
Atlantic in the event of a contingency, left a yawning gap
in alliance defenses. Thus, when the U.K. 's NATO partners
quietly assumed an increased naval presence in the Atlantic
and North Sea and excused the Ecyal Navy from its duties
2S6Ai:ticle 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
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there, they were allowing Britain to devote its full
attention to the Falklands War. 257
Britain was also able to motilize support for its cause
in the EEC. The European community, subjected twice in this
century to invasion, was sensitive to the risks of unchal-
lenged aggression. It was on this note that Britain was
able to secure the imposition of economic sanctions against
Argentina. This was important because many of the Western
European states had strong commercial ties with Buenos Aires
that including not only trade in consumer goods but, defense
related equipment and weapon systems. 258
When President Mitterand of France, which had substan-
tial defense related connections with Argentina, forth-
rightly condemned the "Argentine aggression" soon after the
seizure of the disputed islands, Britain was almost assured
that the EEC would give it the tacking it desired. 259
Economic sanctions by the EEC against Argentina were, in
fact, requested by the United Kingdom on April 6th and on
the 14th it was decided that they would be imposed and in
effect for thirty days. 26O This effectively cut the
Argentines off from most of their sources of military supply
and further alienated them in the Western world.
It should be noted that sanctions hurt many of Britain's
economic partners. 26 1 However, their imposition resulted
from a careful cost-benefit analysis on the Continent. From
257Bj^adley Grahm, "British fleet's Move Thins NATO
Defense," Washington Post, May 7, 1982, p. 25.
2S8For an insight into who the principle Argentine
weapons suppliers were and what they provided see: "Who
Armed Argentina," The Sunday Tines, May 9, 1982, p, 18-
259"The Best of Two Difficult Choices," The Sunday
Times, April 4, 1982, p. 16.
260M. s. Daoudi and M. S. Daiani, "Sanctions: The
Falklands Episode," The World Today, April 1983, p. 150.
26ipor example see: "Penalizing Argentina Will Hurt
Germany," Business Week, April 26, 1982, pp. 33-34.
183
a long-range perspective. Western Europe needed a
cooperative and economically integrated United Kingdom much
more than it did a South American trading partner.
Furthermore, the method by which Argentina had "acquired"
the Falklands was historically and ideologically distasteful
to members of the "Community". Thus, sanctions, though
never intended as an indication of support for British
sovereignty over the disputed islands, were a logical and
predictable response by the Europeans regardless of the
sliort-term economic problems they might create.
The last arena in which Britain sought international
support was within the context of the United Nations, The
maneuvering in this diplomatic forum was interesting, for
both the British and the Argentines sought to condemn the
actions of the other in the court of global public opinion.
The Security Council met on April 3rd to consider its stand
on the Argentine occupation of the Falklands. 262 xhe mishan-
dling of the debate that followed by the Argentine Foreign
Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, sent from Buenos Aires to
iegin the building of a favorable consensus, provides a
model of how not to seek international support. After
expressing the frustration of his country, which he noted
had negotiated for the transfer of the islands for fifteen
years, the Argentine Minister contended that the "require-
ment found in the United Nations Charter to settle disputes
peacefully <did> not apply to quarrels that arose before its
adoption in 1945." This prompted Sir Anthony Parsons, the
British representative to the Council to remark that if this
262Tiie makeup of the Security Council for this debate
was a follows: Permanent Members- France, People's Eepublic
of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.
Rotating Members- Guyana, Ireland, Japan. Jordan, Panama,
Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, and Zaire who was serving as
President-
18U
were true "the world would be an infinitely more dangerous
and inflammable place than it already is. "263
By the end of the debate it was obvious that the Council
overwhelmingly agreed with Sir Anthony. The passage of UN
Resolution 502 which called for the "immediate withdrawal of
all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas)" and an "immediate cessation of hostilities" is
ample evidence of this. 264 xts adoption can also be inter-
preted as an unqualified SMCcess for the British because it
meant that the ON probably would not interfere in its
attempt to retake the islands and that the international
feeling against the use of armed aggression was still
strong. In addition, the lack of a Soviet veto indicated
that they would, for the present, not become directly
involved in the crisis and thus, the Argentines would be
almost completely isolated on the international front.
Britain's diplomatic victories in all three of these
"alliance" forums was, without question, encouraging to the
decision-makers in London. They had been able to show
substantial progress toward each of the objectives origi-
nally envisioned as underlying the recruitment of interna-
tional support. The British had secured the cutoff of
economic and military aid from the West to Argentina and
also had assured that international support would swing its
way. Though the credit for this success goes as much to
Argentina's choice to be the first to employ armed force and
their poor feel for the use of the United Nations, one can
263Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.N. Bids Argentina Withdraw
Forces," New York Times, April 4, 1982, pp. 1,15,
264The vote on the resolution was 10 in favor, 1 opposed
(Panama), and four abstentions (PRC, Poland, Soviet Union,
and Spam). For a complete text of the resolution see; New
I9.LK limes April 4, 1982, p. 15- -
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say that Britain took full advartage of the Argentine
mistakes and translated them into a loose but, politically
meaningful coalition against Buenos Aires.
E. SUHMATIOH
This ends our treatment of the deliberations and actions
surrounding the decision of the United Kingdom to enter into
conflict in the South Atlantic. With the departure of its
naval task force Britain was now ready to use force, if
necessary, to achieve its dual goals of regaining
administration of the Falklands and checking aggression.
Both the assessment of the risk inherent in such an opera-
tion and the need for international support as rationaliza-
tion and justification had been undertaken. It was now left
to the political and military leadership to translate this
start into action which honestly reflected the original
objectives.
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71II. THE FALK LANES WAR: QQNDOCT
In examining the Conduct phase of this war we will
attempt to trace the objectives of the armed intervention,
noted during the deliberations ever entry, into their trans-
lation into military action. Our purpose will be to relate
the experience of the Palklands conflict to the theory on
the conduct of limited war advanced in the Limited War
Model.
Even though the Falklands War was of short duration,
lasting less than eleven weeks, it would be impossible to
cover all of the combat operations and their relationship to
our theoretical model. Instead, our efforts will be
directed towards a few selected examples of the use of the
instrument of controlled and liniited force in war. 265 xn
this regard, four different aspects of the war will be
studied- The first is the development of military action.
In this section we will look at the mobilization and
dispatch to the South Atlantic of the military forces neces-
sary for the accomplishment of the predetermined objectives.
Our second topic will deal with the use of "selective
265Those interested in a complete examination of the war
are now offered a number of books and articles that deal
with either the conflict in tote or some specific aspect of
it. One British Government document is particularly helpful
in reviewing the conduct of the war. This is: John Nott,
Secretary oi State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign; The
Lessons (hereafter The Nott Repor^r Presented fo Parliament
!5y Command of Her Majesty jLondon: HMSO- December 1982) .
Two unofficial "histories" from the British perspective as
also widely quoted. These are Hastings and Jenkins, already
cited, and The Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War:
The Inside Storx (London: Sphere Publishing, 1^52)". THe
'Srgen'Eine srde of the war is, at present, much harder to
document. The best attempt m English has been made in
Eobert Scheina, "The Malvinas Campaign," U.-S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 3 (March T^"83T-
pp.^H-TTT. S~goo3' review of sotte of the other Falklands
literature is found in Walter little, "The Falklands Affair:
A Review of the Literature." Political Studies, Vol. XXXII,
No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 296-310.
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intervention" during the subsequent military campaign. This
treatment will focus on the amphibious landing at San Carlos
and the battle for that beachhead which resulted. The third
section will examine the implementation of objectives. In
this area, the British use of the "exclusion zones" around
the Palklands will be analyzed. Our final topic in this
section will be a look at Britain's relations with the
international community during the Conduct phase of this war
with specific attention given tc those with the United
States,
A. SHAPING MILITARY ACTION
From the moment of the Argentine seizure of the
Falklands it was obvious to the most casual observer that
the effort to retake the islands would be primarily a naval
show. This necessitated the mobilization of a naval task
force that was proficient, if net dominant, in the two basic
missions of seagoing forces: sea control and power
projection. Sea control was necessary because the British
would be operating with an 8000 mile logistical tail that,
with the exception of the base en Ascension Island, was
entirely over water. A power projection capability was
mandated by the objectives of the intervention itself, which
ultimately might require the forceful expulsion of the
Argentines from the islands.
To accomplish these tasks the British Admiralty had to
deploy a force with the ability to wage sea warfare in all
three of its dimensions. Hence, it was correctly perceived
that surface, air, and submersible elements would all have
to be used in the ensuing battle. We have already seen that
Britain's allies in NATO helped substantially in this
problem by allowing the Royal Navy to be momentarily
relieved of many of its duties for the Alliance in the North
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Atlantic. However, there were several areas where this
hiatus did not appreciably augment the capabilities of the
RN- This was primarily in the field of amphibious warfare
and integrated naval air support. It is the requisitioning
of the Merchant Fleet to fill this void which will be
addressed in this section.
The deficiencies in these areas were with the capability
of the 5N to transport large numbers of troops for an
opposed landing and to provide them with aviation support,
of both the fixed and rotary winged variety, necessary for
their success. In fact, the shortcomings of the British
went even deeper, for they could only muster one unit from
the Royal Marines{EM), 3 Commando Brigade commanded by
Brigadier Julian Thompson, RM, which had the all-arms capa-
bility needed to make a seaborne assault. 266 Thus, the
problem confronting Fleet Chief Fieldhouse was to acquire
sufficient transport to take the Marines and aircraft to the.
Falklands and later to stage another brigade that could be
used to reinforce the beachhead once established.
At first it was believed that the Marines would be
carried on board the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes but, it was
soon discovered that she would be needed for the operation
of Sea Harriers, an asset that would be in short supply even
with the use of this flattop. Momentarily, the Admiralty
was in despair as to how it would transport 3 Commando to
the theatre of operations. Then, suddenly, most of these
worries evaporated. 2 67
The reason for their relief was the requisitioning of
the luxury liner Canberra for use in the war. The transfer
of this ship, along with a number of others, was done under
the STDFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) program, later noted by
266Hastings and Jenkins, p. £5.
267itia, p. 88,
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A. D. Baker as "a remarkable piece of improvisation. "26 a for
the Marines, the availability of the Canberra was a godsend
because it allowed the entire assault brigade to remain at
sea indefinitely and to be able to continue training while
in transit. 269 This passenger liner was only the first of
several to be impressed into military service. Later the
Dganda was used as a hospital ship and the Queen Eli za beth
II or QE II was employed to transfer the 5th Infantry
Brigade, the other major unit of the Falklands occupation
force. The Canberra and QE II requisitions standout as
crucial to the ultimate success of the campaign for, if they
had not been available, the military options open to the
British would have been seriously curtailed. Both of these
ships were adapted for military service in less than a week
after requisition. 27
o
Secretary Nott noted that the "smooth and rapid imple-
mentation of existing contingency plans to use merchant
shipping in support of the Services was a major success
story of the campaign. "2^ i The conversions made to these
vessels were not of a small nature. Among the more notable
changes made to many of the merchantmen were: the fitting of
flight decks for helicopter operations, the provision of
equipment that enabled each to replenish at sea, the equip-
ping of some as minesweepers, the provision of additional
communication, navigation, and cryptograghic equipment, and
the installation of shipboard water production plants. 272
268A. D. Baker III, "Sealift, British Style", U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 109, No. 6 (June 19 8 3), p. ITT.
269Hasting and Jenkins, p. 88.
270Tiie conversion and the experiences of ths QE II in
the conflict are documented in William H. Flayhart IIT and
Ronald W, Warwick, "The Liner She's a Lady," U.S. Naval
Instit ute P roc eedings, Vol. 110, No. 11 (November T"9F3Tf,
pp753-E:^
2 7iThe Nott Report, p. 26.
272Il)id.
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SIDFT also addressed the inadeguate capability of the
British Pleet to carry sufficient numbers of aircraft to
provide for simultaneous air superiority, close air support,
and logistic services. This was particularly true when the
probability of the loss of units to battlefield attrition
was taken into account. Four roll on-roll off (Ro-Ro) ships,
the E uropic Ferr_y, Atlantic Conveyor, Atlantic Causewa_y, and
Contender Bezant, along with one container ship, the
Astronomer, were reguisitioned to provide this service.
Though none launched aircraft directly into combat the
"spares" they carried proved extremely useful in the battle
for the islands. 27 3
Captain David J. Kenney has argued that "the visibility
of Britain's massive logistical effort showed better than
anything else its resolution to retake the Falklands."274
Nothing exemplified this effort more than the conversion of
merchant vessels to military service. In all, this project
offers an excellent example of the mobilization of the
assets necessary for the pursuit of the goals established
earlier in the crisis. With the dispatch of its augmented
fleet to the South Atlantic, Britain now had the capability
to achieve its objectives.
B. SELECTIVE INTERVENTION
In this section we will look at the use of "selective
intervention" by the British forces in the Falklands
conflict. Our concern will be with the integrated use of
mobility, specially train ed/"elite" forces, joint service
operations, and technological superiority on the
,
273A complete listing of all of the STUFT and the roles
which they filled in the Falklands War can be found in
Baker, pp. 112-113.
274captain David J. Kenney, OSNR, "The Fascinating
Falklands Campaign." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.
109, No. 6 (June 198 3y,~p.TUU7
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battlefield. As usual, there are several examples from
whicii one could draw. However, we will focus on the icitial
large-scale British landing on Falklands, the amphibious
assault at San Carlos Water.
The attack at San Carlos, known as OPERATION saTTON, was
a unequivocal success for the British. It permanently rees-
tablisied the forces of the Dnited Kingdom on the Falklands
and, in retrospect, spelled the beginning of the end for the
Argentine occupation forces. The landing and subsequent
defense and consolidation of the beachhead provide an excel-
lent example of the use of "selective intervention" on the
modern battlefield.
If the British were going tc fulfill their goal of
restoring their administration to the Falklands they knew
that the islands would eventually have to be reoccupied.
There was some debate in London as to the timing and method
of this military occupation. Several possiblities were open
to planners: a blockade could be put in place around the
archipelago and its Argentine defenders could be starved
into submission, strategic bombing could be employed against
the islands to reduce their defenses, or an amphibious
assault could be made against the islands before any signif-
icant attrition had taken place. The course decided on was
a combination of the first and last options. The exclusion
zones would be put in place to isolate the islands from the
mainlacd and hence, any significant reinforcement. However,
the Falklands would be retaken hy ground forces as quickly
as practicable. This is because London wanted the war to be
of as short a duration as possible. British decision-makers
realized that both international and domestic support,
strong at the beginning of the campaign, would perceptibly
weaken as time passed.
Once it was decided that the British would make an
amphibious assault against the islands it was left to the
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military planners to select the appropriate target, though
final approval for the operation would always rest with the
Prime iMinister and her "War Cabinet". The task of assessing
the possibilities for and location of the landing became the
responsibility of Commodore Amphibious Warfare Michael
Clapp^ RN, who would stage the operation from his assault
ships and Brigadier Julian Thompson, RM, whose men would
make the attack. They considered three different permuta-
tions in their planning.
First, they could land on West Falkland. This had the
advantage of sidestepping the major portion of the Argentine
defense which was stationed on the other island but, offered
no opportunity to quickly convert a success into a drive
toward the politically strategic capital at Port Stanley.
For this reason, it was rejected.
Second, they could land on East Falkland near Port
Stanley itself, thereby immediately putting the capital at
risk. However, this plan just reversed the advantage and
disadvantage of the first option. Though it would provide a
direct thrust toward the ultimately crucial battleground
around Port Stanley, it would also challenge the Argentines
in the area where they were the strongest. This is because
the bulk of the Argentine occupation troops, thought to
neighbor approximately 10,000, were deployed in the greatest
number around the capital. Therefore, this option was also
rejected.
The final plan also entailed a landing on East Falkland,
but in an area that ¥as isolated from major Argentine force
concentrations. It was this plan that was finally accepted
as the soundest. 275 san Carlos Water, an inlet in the north-
west corner of the island, was decided upon as the actual
275por a interesting account of some of the deliberation
that went into the selection of an amphibious assault sight
see: Hastings and Jenkins, pp. 176-179.
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target for the landing. Defence Minister Nott later noted
that San Carlos was selected because it offered an excellent
anchorage, was easily protected from submarines, and was
difficult for the enemy to reinforce. 276 After this issue
had been settled, the matter became not where the landing
would be made but, when.
Commodore Clapp notified Fleet Headquarters at Northwood
on May 8th of the preference of the tactical planners for
the San Carlos sight. 277 it^e Admiralty later briefed the
political authorities on the plan, expressing its concur-
rence with the deployed staff's decision. On May 19th,
Thatcher had Headquarters signal the task force to implement
OPERATION SUTTON at its discretion. 2 78 on the 20th, Rear
Admiral Woodward, now commanding the entire British expe-
dition, directed Clapp and Thompson to execute their plan on
the next day. The landing at San Carlos was subsequently
made against light opposition on May 21st.
How did this operation exhibit the traits of "selective
intervention"? Each of these characteristics will now be
examined in turn. Again, the instances sighted are by no
means all inclusive but, offer only examples considered
representative of this type of tactical action.
The exploitation of mobility is key to any "selective
intervention" operation and this was also part of the San
Carlos assault. The Falklands themselves were extremely
hard to traverse. Covered with soft peat and numerous bogs
the islands were a nightmare to landlocked maneuver warfare.
However, they were surrounded by an element that could be
negotiated much more easily--th€ sea. This gave the advan-
tage of maneuver to the force which could control the waters
2 76 The Nott Report, p. 7.
277Kastings and Jenkins, p. 184.
278ibid, p. 190.
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around the islands. Jeffrey Record properly notes that due
to rugged terrain interior lines of communication were
virtually non-existent on the Falklands. As a result, the
British, who controlled the sea, "could move much faster and
in greater force. ..than <the Argentines> could on land. "279
The landing at San Carlos is an example of the British
translating their superiority in sea control into a signifi-
cant strategic victory-
Specially trained/"elite" forces are also part of a
"selective intervention" strategy. Virtually the entire
British landing force that went ashore at San Carlos could
he described in this manner. The Marine Brigade augmented
Ly two Parachute Regiments were the core of the assault
team. This force was further supplemented by elements of
the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and Special Air
Squadron (SAS) , two units which represent the most highly
trained combat teams that Britain could put in the field.
Many have commented that th€ difference between the
calibre of the troops fielded by the O.K. and Argentina was
the difference in the war. Nott said: "The most important
factor in the success of the task force was the skill,
stamina and resolution displayed by individual
Servicemen. "280 The San Carlos operation provides irrefut-
able evidence of this. The fact that the initial attack was
carried out in the night and the beachhead secured before
sunrise (a movement of several thousand men) , without major
incident, is testament to this fact.
OPERATION SUTTON also was a joint services venture. It
combined the seamanship of the Royal Navy with the assault
capabilities of both the Royal Marines and the British Army.
During the days that followed, air units from these services
279Record, p. 49.
2 80The Nott Report, p. 16,
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would also be employed in safeguarding and expanding the
beachhead. While the contribution of the Royal Air
Force (HAF) was minimal to the actual landing, its logistical
support in the days leading up to the assault was vital.
Thus, each branch played their part in this operation.
The exploitation of technological superiority was also a
part of the San Carlos assault. In the initial night
landing night vision goggles and thermal image indicators,
both excellent sensors for the location of enemy pcstions in
the dark, were used.^ei This was equipment that the
Argentines did not share and contributed to the total
surprise of the small garrison that had been deployed to
defend the inlet.
Technology played an even bigger role in the air war
that raged over the beachhead in the week immediately after
the landing. Though Britain did not escape from this
confrontation unscathed, many felt that the possession of
certain weapons systems forced the Argentines into tactical
situations that eventually contributed to their defeat.
Captain C. H. Layman, RN who commanded the frigate HMS
Argonaut cites such an example. In his opinion, the British
possession of the Sea Dart, a surface-to-air missile known
to be deadly to high and medium altitude targets forced the
Argentines to make their attacks on the British shipping in
San Carlos Water at low altitude. This, in turn, caused
many of the Argentines bombs to not faze on impact, thus the
British Fleet was spared the loss of more than one ship by
this advantage. Captain Layman spoke from experience, for
the Argonaut itself took two bombs that never exploded. 28
2
One might also add tiat the lack of any Argentine electronic
seiHastings and Jenkins, p. 176.
282captain C. H. Layman, RN, "Duty in Bomb Alley", U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 109, No. 8 (August 19B37,pp~3 5=^U7
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counter-measures (ECH) capability, which could possibly have
degraded the performarce of the British weapons, was another
factor that forced them out of their optimum weapon's
delivery profiles.
One further area of technological superiority that
impacted on the air defense around the San Carlos landing
area is worthy of mention. This is the British possession
of the Sea Harrier armed with the AIM-9L missile. Several
writers have noted that this offered a significant advantage
to Britain's aviators. 283 simply put, this weapon gave the
British pilot the chance to achieve a kill on an enemy
aircraft from any aspect while his Argentine counterpart was
compelled to maneuver to his opponent's rear quarter before
he could successfully launch hi£ weapon. This divergence
goes much of the way toward explaining the British 23 to
air-to-air kill ratio during the war.^sA
Exhibiting all of the necessary traits of "selective
intervention", the San Carlos operation is one of which
Britain is understandably proud- Though not without losses,
due almost entirely to the air attacks on the beachhead
after the landing, San Carlos remains the type of action
through which limited wars are won. In Hastings and Jenkins
words: "...this was a moment at which the British reaped
the fruits of boldness, "28s
2a3por example see: Scheina, p. 114; General T. E.
Milton, DSAF(Ret.)- "Too Many Missing Pieces," Air Force,
December 1982, p-49: and "British Cite Two Pnases~in
Falklands Conflict," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
December 13, 198 2, p. 78::
284^ complete listing of the British weapons performance
is found in: The Nott Report, Annexes B 5 C, pp. 45-46.
2 85Hastings and Jenkins, p. 194.
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C. IBPLEMENTING OBJECTIVES
Our attention now will turn to the conversion of the
established political objectives into military action
directed toward their fulfillment. In this area, we will
concentrate on analyzing the understanding between the
civilian and military authorities as to what the ultimate
goals of the conflict would be and how these would be
achieved. In the Falklands War the best way to approach
this guestion is to look at the Rules of Engagement (EOE)
,
within which the British operated in the South Atlantic, and
examine their connection with the objectives that we earlier
noted as underlying the decisioc to enter into armed hostil-
ities. EOEs in this intervention are inseparable from the
"exclusion zones" which the British declared around the
disputed islands. Thus, our analysis will be on the
reasoning behind their development and implementation.
The fact that the British felt that the Falklands
conflict would be a sea war has already been well estab-
lished. Such a war played into the strong suite of the
United Kingdom and was also dictated by the distance of the
disputed territory from the homeland. While the objectives
of the U.K. was to assure the return of the Falklands to its
administration and concurrently prove that aggression does
not pay, there was also the feeling that this should be
accomplished with a minimum loss of life. To operationalize
the goals of their intervention and properly reflect the
limitation that they were putting on themselves the British
established "exclusion zones" around the Falklands. At
first, the purpose was to exclude maritime assets only.
Later, both an air and sea quarantine were emplaced
surrounding the islands.
Defence Minister Nott explained the reason for these
zones in this way:
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"We engaged in intense and prclonged diplomatic activity
in pursuit of a peaceful solution. But we could not
depend upon it. We therefore took military steps
intended to put pressure on Argentina to withdraw and to
make possible our repossession of the Islands by force
if that should ultimately prove necessary. ... While
diplomatic efforts continued the net was gradually drawn
more tightly around the Argentine garrison on the
Falklands."286
The British had no desire to attack the Argentine mainland.
In fact Attorney General, Michael Havers, had declared that
an attack on Argentina proper would be outside the diplo-
matic framework within which Britain was justifying the
conflict. 287 Therefore, the zones can be seen as the ulti-
mate compromise between the political objectives/ limita-
tions of the war and the need fcr appropriate military
action through which it might be integrated and accom-
plished.
The initial zone to be put into effect was the Maritime
Exclusion Zone (MEZ) , announced on April 7th and activated on
the 12th. It was based on a circle with a 200-mile radius
centered on the Falklands and was designed to ward off ship-
ping that might either reinforce the Argentine garrison or
complicate the naval battle problem. 288 under its rules any
vessel trying to penetrate the MEZ could be fired upon
without warning by British units. The zone was justified by
the arrival of the first of the EN's nuclear powered attack
submarines, the HMS Spartan, on station in the South
Atlantic. Its rules were drawn up to give the Argentines
pause about sortying their naval forces too close to the
Falklands and was designed to give the British SSN»s room
2 86 The Nott Re£ort, p. 5.
?87This was ON Resolution 502 calling for Argentine
withdrawal and Article 59 of the ON charter giving nations
the right of self-defense. See: Hastings and Jenkins,
p. 162 .
288Norman Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned
and Mislearned," Orbis, Vol, 26, No. 4 (Winter 1983), p. 922.
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for maneuver, but in an area small enough to be credibly
patrolled.
The MEZ was transformed intc a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
on April 30th. This extended the blockade to both air and
sea units within the same 200-mine radius of the islands.
The announcement of the TEZ coincides with the arrival of
the naval task force, including the two aircraft carriers,
into the "war zone". It was really just an extension of the
defense area that had been declared around the task force on
April 23rd and was only a logical progression of the
British desires to both safeguard their growing naval forces
in the South Atlantic while increasing the pressure on the
Argentines.
Through the imposition of the first two "exclusion
zones" announcement from London had always proceeded imple-
mentation. This had given the conflict an almost unreal
systematic aura. Such was not to be the case in the final
expansion of the quarantined area.
By the end of April the efforts to end the Falklands
crisis peacefully were nearing the end of their rope. In
London, it was felt that the time for military action had
arrived. South Georgia was reoccupied on the 25th yet,
there was still no sign of the Argentines retreating from
their gains of their own volition. In this situation,
Buenos Aires certainly thought it could wait. Time was,
literally, on its side as the Antarctic winter approached.
Meanwhile, Britain craved action to maintain both their
tactical momentum and the military pressure on Argentina.
The chance for a real blow at Buenos Aires was provided
with the location of the the Argentine cruiser G ene ral
Belgrano by the nuclear attack sub HMS Conqueror on Hay 1st.
This aging vessel was considered by the British to be one of
the two most prestigious naval targets that their submarines
could engage, the other being the Argentine carrier
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Veinticijico de Maxo, Unfortunately, the ship was steaming
outside of the TEZ so permission to attack had to te gained
from lcndon.289
A left-wing British magazine later claimed that there
was a cover-up of the facts surrounding the sinking of the
Belqran o. According to the New Statesman permission to
attack this cruiser was part of an orchestrated attempt by
the Thatcher Government to not only derail any remaining
peace initiatives but, to push Britain toward total war for
the Palklands. 29 However, the attack on this cruiser is
more likely explained by the fact that the British wanted,
first to put Argentina's second largest naval unit out of
commission and second to send an unmistakable message about
its resolve to Buenos Aires. There is also ample evidence
that Thatcher and her advisors did not believe that the ship
would actually sink but, instead would be crippled with only
a small loss of life. 291 Hence, on May 2nd the Congueror
was ordered to engage the Belqrano even though she remained
outside the TEZ. This directive was carried out immediately
and resulted in the quick capsizing of the cruiser with the
loss of over 300 of her crew onboard.
This escalation of the war was greeted with much
consternation around the world, providing a real lesson for
those who would make rules limiting war and then disregard
them. Though London formally justified the sinking by its
earlier declaration of a "defense area" around the fleet
(April 23rd)
,
global reaction to the unexpected loss
produced almost universal bewilderment and some bitterness.
Argentina understandably attempted to exploit the British
289phil Williams, "Miscalculation, Crisis Management and
the Falklands Conflict," The World Today, April 1983,
pp. 148-149.
290MA11 Out War," New Statesman, August 24, 1984,
p.8-10,14.
29iHastings and Jenkins, p. 164.
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gaff. This effort prompted one of the more memorable quotes
of the conflict attributed to Jorge Herrera Vegas, an
Argentine spokesman at the United Nations: "Britain may not
rule the waves, but she certainly waives the rules. "292
The TEZ was extended to include all of the Atlantic west
of the Falklands to within 12 miles of the Argentine coast
on May 7th. This move was mandated by a combination of the
international shock over the Belqrano incident and the
sinking two days later of the British destroyer Sheffield by
an Exocet air-to-surface missile launched from a Super
Etendard aircraft. It was this zone that was to provide the
"free fire" area for the remainder of the conflict.
In summary the use of the "exclusion zones" was an
excellent integration of the capabilities of the Royal Navy
in the South Atlantic and the political objectives for which
the war was waged. ^ith the notable exception of the
sinking of the Belgrano it was used very systematically and
effectively. Even in that case it was the civilian leader-
ship that decided that the ship be engaged. Therefore, the
implementation of the goals of the intervention, within the
constraints of the limited war instrument, was well served
by this arrangement.
D. ALLIES: BECBOITMEHT AND RELATIONS AFTER ENTRY
In this section we will examine the relations between
the United Kingdom and its "allies" during the Conduct phase
of the war. This will include a look at the maintenance of
support within the international community of the coalition
that Britain had built prior to entry, as well as additions
and deletions from it- While Britain realized that the
prosecution of the war would always remain its own responsi-
bility it, nevertheless, avidly sought to retain the
292ibid, p. 166.
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foundation which justified its actions in the South Atlantic
and in some instances provided the indirect military help
needed to accomplish its objectives.
To note how important the survival of their blanket of
international support was to London, one need only look at
the British attitude toward the numerous "peace initiatives"
that were put forward during the period before their actual
reoccupation of the Falklands. In all of these situations
it was important for the J.K. to avoid the appearance of
intransigency, thereby retaining the role of an injured
party which was only seeking retribution for the crime
committed against it. An example of the paradox that this
sometimes entailed is shown by the British attitude toward
the plan developed by the ON Secretary General, Javier Perez
de Cuellar, in mid-May 1982.
Perez de Cuellar*s initiative was the last advanced
before the British assault at San Carlos Water and it was
extremely important to London that, on the verge of this
major operation, they keep the solid support of the interna-
tional community. It was becoming increasingly obvious that
the Argentines were locked into a military solution for the
islands, which Buenos Aires still apparently believed it
could win. Hence, taking a chance, Thatcher told the
Secretary General that she would agree to a United Nations
administration of the islands if the Argentine forces would
unilaterally withdraw. This was a significant retreat on
her promise to "return the islands to British administra-
tion" and certainly represented a cost-benefit analysis of
the issues involved. In this case, the risk of accepting a
peace plan probably unacceptable to Argentina, though it did
not correspond with Britain's primary objective of the
conflict, outweighed the risk of alienating its support on
the international front. Therefore, the British accepted
the plan in the hope that if, as a result, the conflict were
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to end any ON oversight would respect the right of self-
determination for the islanders and eventually return the
Falklands to some association with the Crown. 293 it was
probably somewhat to the relief of the Thatcher Cabinet that
Buenos Aires subsequently rejected the plan. However, this
course of action is indicative of the emphasis that Britain
put on the maintenance of international support.
In fact, British attempts to maintain their interna-
tional consensus throughout the war were well rewarded.
European support remained fairly solid with sanctions being
renewed by the EEC on May 17th, for an additional week, and
then extended indefinitely. This was accomplished with the
adherence of all but two of the membership of the "Ccmmon
Market", with Italy and Ireland refusing renewal. Such a
show of "community solidarity" was unusual for the Europeans
and certainly reflects the success of the diplomatic effort
which Whitehall made. 2^4
European help, at times, went beyond that of just an
economic boycott. The British were known to be understand-
ably upset when the Exocet missiles that France had sold the
Argentines sank the Sheffie ld on May 4th. 295 Yet, it was
later revealed that the French were very cooperative in
helping Britain to effectively counter the sea-skimming
missile. 296 overall, one must conclude that the help that
London received from its regional allies far outweighed that
accorded Argentina, which waited until May 29th before the
OAS even voted to condemn the "unwarranted and
293Hastings and Jenkins, p. 172-173.
294Daoudi and Dajani, p. 15 1-152.
295For example see: The Sunday Times Insight Team, "Did
the French Connection Sink the Sheffield?," The Sunday
Times, May 9, 1982, p.1.
296iiHelping Britain Cope With the Exocet," Newsweek,
July 5, 1982, p. 17.
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dispropcrtionate attack by the O.K. 297 one could well argue
that the difference between the "alliance" structures of
these two belligerents was a major determinant of both the
short duration and outcome of this war.
If Britain was encouraged by the success that it was
enjoying with its European allies it also found the U.S.
decision to retain a neutral position at the beginning of
the conflict disconcerting. The efforts of Secretary Haig
to arbitrate the crisis were received with a slight chill by
Thatcher's Government because it felt that its position
regarding the Falklands was bedded in untouchable moral
turf. Hastings and Jenkins state that "there remained one
large blot on the British diplomatic escutcheon as the task
force set sail. -.the United States. "298 Though London
decided to give the American Secretary a chance to resolve
the crisis, it was determined early on to, at least
initially, not back away from the formula set forth in UN
Resolution 502; Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands
followed by negotiations over the islands. Meanwhile, the
British hoped to woo the U.S. into overt support.
In fact, British fears about the "rock bottom" interests
of Washington were misplaced. The U.S. had already sided
with them in the UN on "502" and sympathy in America was,
though not unanimous, strongly tilted toward London. 299 j^
addition, the U.S. continued to "assist" Britain in areas
where there were "agreements". This included the supply of
jet fuel to U.K. aircraft stopping over at the Ascension
Island airbase, a facility owned by the British but, run by
2 97itj;xcerpts From OAS Resolution on the War," New York
Times, May 30, 1982, p. 16.
298Hasting and Jenkins, p. 103.
299For a good example of pro-British sentiment see:
Marvin Stone "Britain and Argentina: Equal Friends?," U.S.
News S World Report, April 25, 1982, p. 92.
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the Americans. 30 Thus, Washington was never as neutral as
either it or the British claimed.
During the month of April Haig traversed from London to
Buenos Aires several times hoping to achieve a diplomatic
coup that would avoid war. As his mission time and again
was broken between the rocks of belligerent intransigence
and indecisiveness the Secretary slowly began to realize
that the U.S. would soon be offered no choice but to side
with London against the aggressive actions of the Junta. 3oi
He even confided his doubts to London's ambassador to the
United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, noting the "irra-
tional and chaotic nature of the Argentine leadership. "^oz
By the end of the month, his negotiating attempt in a sham-
bles (though not from lack of effort) , Haig announced the
official U.S. tilt toward Britain, 303 This included the
imposition of economic sanctions and the pledge that the
United States would "respond positively to requests for
material support by for the British forces, "^o* -phe U.K.
would later use this blank check to acquire both hardware
and services that were of substantial use in the Falklands,
300MD.S. Said to Aid British Forces," New York Times,
April 13, 1982, p. 1.
30iHaig's story is best told by himself. See: Chapter 13
"The Falklands :* Do Not Urge Britain to Reward Aggression'"
ill Caveat, pp. 261-299.
302sir Nicholas Henderson, "America and the Falklands,"
Eco nomist, November 12, 1983, p. 34.
^osTiiis decision hurt U.S. relations with many of its
hemispheric neighbors. For exanple see: Warren Hage, "U.S.
Strategy Irks Latins." New York Times, May 5, 19 82, p. 19:
Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Hees Eef^^aclc To Its Latin Ties,"
New York Times, May 23, 1982, p.1; "OAS Without U.S.
Predicted as Result of Falkland^ War." Baltimore Sun. May
26, 1982, p. 4; and Louis Witnitzer, "FalJcIanas: Military,
Diplomatic Impact Beyond Islands," Christian Science
Monitor, May 28, 198 2, p. 7.
3o*nTranscript of Remarks By Haig on Falklands," New
York Times, May 1, 1982, p. 8.
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most notably, the AIM-9L missile and the utilization of
American communication and relay facilities. ^os
With the addition of the U.S., London now confronted the
Argentines with an almost solid support from the West. This
coalition now spelled doom for Buenos Aires* ambitions in
the PalXland Islands. The only questions remaining were:
How much time would it take for Britain to reoccupy the
archipelago? And, what would be the cost in lives and
material?
E. SDHHATION
This ends our treatment of the Conduct phase of the
Palklands conflict. We have traced the conversion of
British objectives in this war to their translation into
military action. This entailed both the mobilization of the
elements necessary to properly pursue London's goals in the
South Atlantic— the requisitioning of merchant ships— and
the development and implementation of a system that
correctly reflected those goals in a military reality— the
use of "exclusion zones". The utilization of the technique
of "selective intervention" has also been examined, in rela-
tion to the landing at San Carlos Water, and its effective-
ness noted. Finally, the relationship and recruitment of
"allies" has been analyzed during the conduct of the war.
We will now look at the British attempts to end this war on
terms favorable to its interests.
305For example see: "Sidewirder Deliveries," Aviation
Week S Space Technology^ Hay 31, 1982, p. 20 "U. S ."Supplying
Irms "Eo Bri'C:isE, STources Say," Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1982,
p. 2 and Hastings and Jenkins, pTT^2.
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IX. THE FALKLANDS SAfi: TERMINATION
In this final chapter on the Falklands War we will
consider the conclusion of this conflict. Onlike our
earlier case study on the Korear War^ this intervention in
the South Atlantic was ended by a complete military triumph
on the contested ground- In the lexicon of the Limited War
Model, its termination was "dictated". However, like all
such wars there were attempts tc both negotiate with and/or
pressure the enemy into capitulation before the conflict ran
its full course. It is an understanding of these attempts
and their relation to the established British objectives
that we will now analyze.
Our examination will be divided into four sections. In
the first, we will look at the indicator that was used to
signal the successful accomplishment of objectives by the
British. This will be followed by an analysis of some of
the initial attempts to end the war. The third section will
deal with military pressure and its relationship to conflict
termination. Both conventional and nuclear options will be
considered in this area. This chapter will then close with
the actual termination of hostilities and an assessment of
the United Kingdom's performance in the war in relation to
its original establishment of gcals.
A. MEASUBIMG OBJECTIVE ACCOMPIISHMENT
Our concern in this section will be with analyzing the
indicator (s) used by the British to signal the accomplish-
ment of the objectives in entering the conflict. This is of
obvious importance for the successful termination of a
conflict cannot be contemplated until one is certain that
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the goals for which it was fought have Leen accomplished.
The segregation of the indicators of objective accomplish-
ment from the goals to which they attest is often a problem
for both the political and military leadership. This
complication is, in itself, indicative of a weak under-
standing of what the intervention is meant to accomplish.
It is to the credit of the British hierarchy that they
avoided this pitfall.
The objectives of London from the day that Argentina
invaded the Falklands were to see the islands returned to
their administration and to assure that overt aggression was
shown to be an empty interna tiocal tool. Also, from this
first day the British demanded one condition before they
would consider any comprehensive negotiations on conflict
termination, the withdrawal of the Argentine military from
the archipelago. Therefore, it is the author*s contention
that Argentine withdrawal was the indicator that the
Thatcher Government was employirg in their analysis of the
progress of the intervention.
This was a valid signal because the abandonment of the
islands by the Argentines would, in almost every case, be a
precursor to some semblance of increased British control
over the Falklands due to the desires of the local populace.
Also, any retreat by Buenos Aires would accomplish the goal
of successfully resisting open aggression. Thus, this posi-
tion provided a simplistic and all encompassing signal of
goal accomplishment to which London could easily adhere.
That Prime Minister Thatcher stubbornly stuck to the
unequivocal demand that Argentina withdraw from the islands
was a source of strength to some and a signal of inflexi-
bility to others. 306 However, in light of her eventual
snccess, Mrs. Thatcher must be commended on her ability to
306For evidence of the consistency of her stand see:
Haig, pp, 271-272, 286, and 292.
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steadfastly steer the United KiLgdom through even the bleak
days when the Argentine air attacks were pounding the Royal
Navy near the San Carlos beachhead. In retrospect, one must
credit the Prime Minister with forthrightly directing the
United Kingdom during this crisis by refusing to muddle the
issues or related indicators for which the war was respec-
tively fought and judged. Even when she was forced to
gamble tc hold international sufport, by tentatively
accepting a negotiating position that endorsed some form of
third party administration for the Falklands, she firmly
stuck to her demand that the Argentine military must go.^or
Of course, her bets en both occasions were hedged on a
belief that eventually the self-determination of the islan-
ders would be respected and that the Argentine Junta would
continue to prove itself incapable of diplomatic flexi-
bility. However, one must agree with Alistair Home's
declaration soon after the war: "...Mrs. Thatcher's simple,
iron determination to act on principle has been both stead-
ying and infectious. "308
Britain was able to stick tc the demand for the with-
drawal of all of the Argentine forces on the Falklands
because of UN Security Council Eesolution 502 which also
called for the unilateral departure of Buenos Aires' troops.
Thus, the U.K. could hold its "bottom line" and concurrently
look to the accomplishment of its objectives while not
appearing overly intransigent. This is why "502" was such a
diplomatic coup for London. As the war progressed Mrs.
Thatcher could easily intone her conditions for the termina-
tion of hostilities. "All the Argentines have to do," she
307one example of this was the previously mentioned
Perez de Cuellar plan the other was the Peruvian peace plan
which was an issue in early May. For details see:
Henderson, p. 35.
308j^listair Home, "A British Historian's Meditations,"
National Review, July 23, 1982, p. 888-889.
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would say/ "is honor UN Security Council Resolution
502. "309 Yet, in the end, the Argentines saw fit to disre-
gard this edict. Britain was, therefore, compelled to take
action beyond the realm of diplomatic pressure to continue
the pursuit of its goals.
B- INITIATIHG TEfiMIHATION
One could argue that the Termination phase of this
conflict began not long after hostilities were actually
joined. The Haig mission and the proposals forwarded by
President Terry Belaunde of Peru and Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar of the United Nations were all attempts to end
the Falklands/Malvinas War before it could run its full
course. Unfortunately, these attempts failed, though
Britain expressed interest in varying degrees to all. It
was destined that negotiations would not end this struggle,
for it would be decided on the hattlefield.
The British dispatch of their carrier and amphibious
task force to the South Atlantic can also be interpreted as
a move toward conflict termination in the sense that it was
not merely deployed for combat tut, as a show of resolve.
It was initially hoped that this would be enough to send the
Argentines home. Thus, the original motivation for sending
the EN south could well have been more diplomatic than mili-
tary, ^lo However, like the attempts at negotiation,
diplomatic/political coercion was eventually to fail.
This left Britain with no alternative but to militarily
defeat Argentina in the contested theatre of operations
surrounding the Falklands, a process that was to take almost
two months. As one looks back, it now seems amazing that
the U.K. was able to reoccupy the islands without meeting a
309Hastings and Jenkins, p. 101.
3»oibid, p. 336.
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significant integrated attack from the Argentine military.
It fact, after their amphibious seizure and military consol-
idation of the "Malvinas" the South Americans conducted no
more sizable coordinated operations during the war. The
Argentine services were thus left to confront Britain indi-
vidually and with significantly reduced chances of success.
The initiation of the actual termination of this war can
therefore be tied to a pair of events. The first is the
defeat of the Argentine surface navy and the second is the
effective neutralization of its combined air force and naval
air arms.
The subdual of Buenos Aires' navy is traceable to a
single event, the sinking of the General Be lqra no on May
2, 1982. After this catastrophe the Argentine surface fleet
never dared to sortie from the relative safety of its
coastal waters- This limitation downgraded the ability of
Argentina to successfully defend their gains in the South
Atlantic, particularly when the battle was being waged in
excess of UOO miles from their mainland bases. The
inability of its aircraft carrier, diesel attack submarines,
and Exocet armed escorts to continually challenge the
British task force must be considered one of the more
significant tactical events of the war.
The psychological shock that the loss of the Belqrano
had on the Argentines is now well understood. Secretary
Nott matter of factly noted that after its sinking "major
Argentine units remined within 12 miles of the Argentine
coast and took no further part in the campaign. " ^ i i However,
Commander Robert J, Kelsey's analysis was more to the point.
He stated:
3 11 The Nott Report, p. 7.
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"<The> expansion of the exclusion zone to all but a
12-iDile strip... off the Argentine mainland was rein-
forced by the British torpedoing of the. .. cruiser
General Belgrano <and thus>, effectively decoupled
Irgen'Eina"^ naval power from the conflict- "^i 2
The date of the defeat of the combined Argentine air arm
is much harder to pin down. Certainly, one could say that
its high water mark was during the late May days following
the San Carlos landing when, over a period of less than a
week, four British ships were sunk (HMS Ardent-2 1st, HMS
Antelope-23rd, and HMS Coventry and SS Atlantic
Conve yor-25th) . In a later interview. Sea Harrier pilot
"Fred" Fredrickson intimated that the performance of the
Argentine aviators went down markedly after the first few
days of combat. ^ 13 This is attributable to the attrition of
experienced aircrews, the technologically superior British
anti-air weapons systems, and the increasingly difficult
mission which the Argentine fliers were facing.
Hastings and Jenkins argue that May 25th marked the
turning point of the air war.^i* up until this day, the
Argentines had been pounding the British shipping near San
Carlos Water. Yet, after the accomplishments of the Latin
airmen on the 25th, it would be two weeks before another
British ship was sunk through attack from the air. Though
it was not apparent at the time, the war in the Falklands
had progressed irretrievably into the Termination phase
after the successful defense of the San Carlos beachhead.
In fact, some experts outside of the United Kingdom were
already predicting the imminent end of the war. 3 is
3i2commander Robert J. Kelsey, "Maneuvering in the
Falklands," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol- 108, No.
9 (September" 1 98 2f7~pT377
3i3nBritish Cite Two Phases to the Falklands Conflict,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 13, 1982, p. 78.
3i*Hastings and Jenkins, p,228.
3i5por example see; "Q.K. Advances in the Falklands Are
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C- TEEMIMATIOH AND MILITARY PEESSOBE
In this section our purpose will be to look at the role
that military pressure played in ending this war. The use
of battlefield pressure has two purposes in this context.
The first is the obvious tactical advantage that is drawn
from successfully maintaining the momentum of one's own
offensive operations. The second is the psychological toll
that is forced on the enemy at both the political and mili-
tary levels when he is compelled to continually fend off
attacks.
The actual or threatened employment of two different
types of weapons—conventional cr nuclear-- can produce
pressure on one's adversary. The former is the more often
used (for obvious reasons) and achieves both the tactical
and psychological benefits previously mentioned. However,
nuclear weapons, in limited wars, must be categorized as
more often falling into the psychological realm. This fact
is particularly true in situations of nuclear monopoly, a
circumstance which the Falklands War exhibited guite well-
Here, one nuclear armed power, Britain, faced a non-nuclear
foe, Argentina. Thus, the British had the escalatory v
capacity to substantially outdistance their adversaries.
But, before we discuss the role that nuclear weapons played
in this conflict let us consider the arena where the war was
actually won, the conventional battlefield.
Conventional military pressure was used by the British
throughout the war. Although, it would ultimately be the
vehicle through whici the conflict would be terminated, in
the early stages of the confrontation, this typs of action
was utilized more for its effect on the psychological front.
Hurtina Argentine Morale, U.S. Officials State," Wall Street
Journal, Hay 26, 1982, p. 2.
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This is easily understandable in regard to the British
desire to avoid the necessity of having to completely recon-
quer the islands. Thus, the early uses of conventional
forces by London ties in with the previously mentioned
attempts to coerce Argentina into withdrawing from the
Falklands. By staging operations that did not necessarily
contribute to advancement toward their overall objectives
the British hoped to convince Buenos Aires' of their ability
and resolve to retake the contested territory.
We noted previously that the dispatch of the task force
from the O.K. could have been much more of a diplomatic
than military move. Another event that falls within this
classification is the reoccupation of South Georgia by
British forces on April 25th. There is little doubt that
this island, far to the east of the Falklands, could have
been bypassed by the British without serious strategic
repercussion. However, its recapture met two British needs.
First, it gave the U.K. a needed victory with which to start
their campaign. Secondly, it sent a distinct message to
Buenos Aires. In Nott's words: "The recapture of South
Georgia dealt a psychological blow to the Argentine
Government and provided clear evidence of the United
Kingdom's resolve and willingness to resort to military
action if other courses were closed. "3i6
Another example of conventional military pressure's use
in the psychological realm was the May 28th attack of 2 Para
on the Argentine positions at Darwin and Goose Green on East
Falkland. 31 7 Again the purposes and effects of this attack
were analogous to the earlier effort against South Georgia
in that it gave the British a much needed victory and had a
3i6The Nott Report, p. 5.
.
3172 Para was one of the two remaining battalions of the
British Parachute Regiment. Alcng with its sister unit, 3
Para- it had been attached to 3 Commando Brigade for the
Falklands operation.
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adverse effect on the South American forces morale. From a
tactical standpoint Argentine pcstions around Goose Green
only had to be screened from the primary British thrust to
the east toward the politically strategic capital at Port
Stanley. Instead, 2 Para was order to assault and occupy
the substantial Argentine postions near the community.
Hastings and Jenkins explain this decision as one that was
made in London, where the political need for a victory in
the wake of the naval losses at San Carlos became an over-
riding factor. 318
After a heated battle, lasting most of the day, 2 Para
achieved the victory. Defence Minister Nott later recalled
the dual significance of the battle:
"First it gave us a chance to asses the fighting quali-
ties of the enemy. Second, and more importantly, by
their outstanding performance against a numerically
superior enemy 2 Para established a psychological ascen-
dency over the Argentines which our forces never
lost. 3 19
We might also recall the psychological significance that the
May 2nd sinking of the General Belg rano had on the later
conduct of the naval war by the Argentines. This is a
unquestionable instance where military pressure led toward
the termination of hostilities. Hence, the use of conven-
tional military pressure served the British well during the
campaign- In the final section of this chapter we will look
at its ability to finalize London's victory. But, first we
must address the role of nuclear weapons in this conflict.
The evidence of the use of nuclear pressure during the
war is scant. In fact their is only one open source that
refers to their potential employment. This is the article
in the New Statesman that purports that the Thatcher
3i8Hastings and Jenkins, p. 231.
3i9The Nott Report, p. 10,
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Government had plans to push the escalation of hostilities
in the South Atlantic toward total war. ^20 According to its
sources, a Polaris submarine was sent as far south as
Ascension Island to provide the government with the option
to foment a nuclear holocaust on the Argentines should the
situation so warrant. The city of Cordoba in the northern
part of that South American courtry was supposedly selected
as the target for the first missile. 321 This was a prospect
that the New Statesman understandably found disturbing.
While one can sympathize with the concern that the
deployment of such weapons systems generate, it is not
surprising that a Polaris sub may have been sent south to
provide a possible augmentation for the conventional task
force- Besides the awesome destructive potential that is
inherent in a nuclear force deployment two other considera-
tions are relevant to this situation. The foremost is the
sheer coercive capability of such a deployment. However, a
second factor could be that its deployment was a hedge
against the surprise use of nuclear weapons by the
Argentines. Though the fact that Buenos Aires covertly had
the bomb was extremely unlikely, it was known to have long
coveted the weapon and Britain could have merely been
"covering its bets" with the dispatch of Polaris. ^22 it is
jzouj^ll Out War," New Statesman, August 24, 1984,
pp. 8-10, 14.
32ilbid, p. 9.
322^ potentially more interesting and still unaddressed
§uestion is whether the British task force sailed for the
outh Atlantic with nuclear ASW weapons on board and what
the ROE was for their potential use in the case of a
successful attack by an Argentine submarine on some high-
value naval unit. The sinking of the QE II. Canberra, or an
one of the British aircraft carriers would" nave Heen a hard
felt blow in London. The response to such an event is a
matter of conjecture. However, it can be assumed that
normal loadours for EN vessels jrobably include such
weapons.
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unlikely that the true movements of the U.K.'s SSENs during
this period will ever be known because the success of the
British on the ground made any debate over their use moot.
D. FIHALIZING AND JUDGING TERMINATION
The Termination phase of the Falklands War entered its
final period when the campaign to recapture Port Stanley
opened in earnest on may 30th. On this day, elements of 3
Commando Brigade secured both Mt. Kent and Mt. Challenger
guarding the western approaches to this small village that
served as the capital of the Falklands. This effectively
isolated what remained of the Argentine East Falkland occu-
pation force on the small peninsula leading to Port Stanley.
Ten days later, reinforced by the arrival of 5 Brigade,
an assault was made on the high ground dominating the
capital, less than a six miles away. Dislodging the
Argentine forces from their well-prepared defensive posi-
tions was a difficult task but, the ability of the British
to stage an integrated attack from the ground, air, and sea
had long ago disheartened the Argentines. When the Scots
Guards captured Tumbledown Mountain from an Argentine Marine
battalion, most further organized resistance ended. On June
14th, faced with an impossible tactical situation General
Menendez, Argentine Governor of the Malvinas, surrendered to
Major General Jeremy Moore, RM , commander of all British
ground forces. With this act the Argentine occupation of
the Falklands ended. Argentine prisoners of war were repa-
triated shortly thereafter.
When Mr. Rex Hunt was returned as Civil Commissioner of
the Falklands for the Crown on June 25th, the primary objec-
tive of Britain in its campaign for the Falklands was real-
ized. We can also say that the complete removal of all the
Argentine occupation forces set a precedent against the use
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of overt aggression. Thus, it can be safely stated that
Britain accomplished all of the goals which it had set for
itself before the war.
The cost of the war to the Onited Kingdom was not insig-
nificant, 255 British servicemen were killed and another 777
were wounded. 323 Furthermore, the cost of the operation
totaled 700 million British pounds while the replacement
price of all the lost and damaged equipment approached
another 900 million British pounds. However, in the wake of
the war, few in Britain questioned the price as much as they
savored the victory.
In conclusion, the Falklands War provides an excellent
example of the employment of limited war in our contemporary
era. Though its Entry, Conduct, and Termination phases were
not without mistakes, the final accounting must reflect a
job well-done by both the British political and military
authorities. Having now completed our examination of this
conflict we can address the sumaation of this study. It is
in the next and final chapter that this will be done.
323Hastings and Jenkins, p. 316. For purposes of compar-ison this was approximately one-third of total British casu-
alties in the Korean War.
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X. COHCLOSIONS
In this chapter our purpose will be to scrutinize both
the applicability and validity cf the Limited War Model
presented earlier in this work. It was in this context that
the two case studies undertaken were directed. Now, after
their completion, we can compare their relationship to our
theoretical paradigm.
In general, the finding of cur study is that the model
presented does offer some insight into the understanding of
the selected examples of limited war. Thus, it is antici-
pated that it would be of value in future policy making and
instrumentation. However, these results are not without
some qualification, a fact that will become clearer later in
this summation.
To organize the findings of this study for easy refer-
ence and systematic consideration we will readdress each of
the questions developed in Chapter 3 as the vehicle through
which the model could be tested- Each inquiry will be
presented and then discussed in turn. This will be followed
by a short summation offering seme overall thoughts on the
applicability of the model. We will then conclude with a
few ideas that, in the course of the study, were thought to
merit further consideration.
A. REVIEW OF QUESTIONS
1 . Entry
1. What were the principle considerations in the deci-




In this area the two cases showed both diveryencies
and similarities. While the United States was significantly
influenced by its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union
as it contemplated entry into the Korean conflict^ Britain
vas little affected by the ramifications of the East-West
struggle in its deliberations surrounding the Falklands.
Because of this, one gets the inpression that the perceived
stakes of the Korean 'Bar were higher than those played for
in the Falklands. This is evidenced by the participation of
a far larger number of nations in the Korean intervention
than in the later South Atlantic War.
These differences can be explained in part by the
fact that these wars existed in international contexts that
were significantly different from each other. It would seem
that wars fought with limited means for limited ends are not
so much a product of the issues at hand as of the interna-
tional environment in which they exist. This observation
lends support to the continuing need to prepare for the
possibility of limited war.
In the ledger of similarities we find that both our
actors felt that the defense of abstract principles, specif-
ically self-determination and the resistance of aggression,
were worth defending, though only with limited means. There
would seem to be a connection between the waging of war for
precedent and the devotion of political and material
resources in its furtherance. This is evidenced by the
commitment of both the actors studied to limit, at least
initially, its military response tD a carefully orchestrated
conventional intervention. He can also say that both had
real concerns about the impact that the war might have on
their national prestige and to some extent their position in
the world.
On the military side there was also both divergence
and similarity. The difference was primarily one of the
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relative size of each actor's military establishment.
Obviously, the U.S. had a much larger and somewhat more
flexible force and troop matrix than did Britain at their
time of crisis. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note
that each took a military machine to war that had been
significantly reduced in the preceding years in both
manpower and material- Perhaps a more intriguing fact is
that neither let this deter their taking action of a mili-
tary nature in an area perceived as being of vital interest.
2. Were these considerations translated into clearly
established objectives at the outset of the conflict?
The answer to this inquiry is a qualified yes. It
is evident that objectives were roughly established by the
political authorities early in their deliberations.
However, it would appear that they were not always clearly
understood by all with a role in their eventual pursuit.
This was noted specifically in the Korean case and will be
addressed in more depth in the review of the Conduct phase.
Overall one could say that the American and British
decision-makers were well aware of both the political and
military issues and .constraints as they considered their
possible entry into war. If there was a shortcoming it was
in the area of clarity. It has often been demonstrated that
political authorities will use a purposely muddled elucida-
tion of goals to leave room for later maneuver. Though this
hedging technique is sometimes useful, it can also chart the
decision-maker's course for unknown waters, a fact that was
demonstrated in this study.
3. Is there evidence that the actor assessed its
political/military will and capability to out perform
its opponent in a "competition in risk-taking before
entering into the conflict?
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Again, with some qualification, we can say that in
each of our cases some assessment of risk was made. A
further related observation is that the ability to
adet^uately assess risX is a function of time available. In
this regard, it was much easier for the British, who were
involved in a long process of escalation toward an actual
entry into large-scale hostilities than for the Americans
whose initial deliberations on intervention lasted less than
a week. The obvious lesson is that accurate long-range
intelligence is mandatory to avoid pitfalls in crisis
situations.
It would also be no exaggeration to say that in both
cases the early risk assessments of the decision-makers
lagged significantly behind events. Strategic preconception
and miscalculation had a substantial impact in this area.
However, one factor does seem to be very clear, that each
actor considered the risk of non-action much more dangerous
than the risk of the wrong action. This is the paradox of
the "lessons of Munich" crisis management parallel in
action. Both Britain and the United States ultimately
decided to enter a "competition in risk-taking" at the level
of farly large-scale conventional military action. This, in
their view, properly matched the interest involved with the
chance they were willing to take.
The allies of the prospective opponent were also
considered in the decision to enter into armed hostility.
This was much more of a factor in the Korean situation than
in the later Falklands crisis- The fact that the former was
seen as more of an ideological struggle than the latter
explains this difference.
4. Were allies sought before entry? Why and at what
price?
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Ill the Entry phase of both conflicts "allies" were
sought before military involvement. An interesting aspect
of this action is that neither cf our highlighted actors
expected or, indeed, wanted large amounts of material assis-
tance. This is due in part to the fact that each desired
the freedom to maneuver for its individual interests yet,
coveted the cloak of international justification.
Therefore, both made the effort to court international
public opinion. This was one area where, in both cases, the
results achieved by the respective diplomats were helpful
and of impressive longevity.
2 . Conduct
1. Were the objectives estahlished during the Entry
phase translated into the political/military action
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war?
In both of the cases studied our subjects quickly
diagnosed and reacted to the type of war that both the situ-
ation offered and that they wished to fight. In Korea this
was principally a conventional, ground oriented, battlefield
with supporting operations from both sea and air assets. In
the Falklands the war was projected to be initially a
struggle for sea control and eventually one in which the
ability of each belligerent to project its power across the
ocean and into the contested archipelago would be decisive.
Once the type of combat had been determined we saw
both our actors attempt to mobilize the resources necessary
for the successful prosecution cf their objectives- Though
an attempt was not made to tell the entire story of this
process in either war, we did note some specific examples of
the type of activity for which we were searching. For
instance, the concerted effort to tailor and/or improvise
the military forces available within the existing time
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constraints for action showed an understanding of the need
to promptly seek objectives through action. We also saw
attempts to maximize any inherent escalatory capability,
though this was always implemented within the framework of a
concern for the restraint on the use of force- Both the
U.S. and O.K. get fairly high marks in their initial mili-
tary reaction to the war although, the tactical results of
their early combat did not always reflect the earnestness of
their efforts.
2. Did one side posses technological superiority at the
beginning of the conflict? If so, how did it exploit
this advantage?
In both cases technological superiority was existent
and exploited. This was much mere apparent in the Korean
case where the enemy had only a small air force and navy.
In fact, as a Naval officer, it was interesting to note that
naval superiority was utilized with great benefit in both
conflicts. The advantages it generated in power projection
and mobility were helpful in Korea and decisive in the
Palklands. Air power and, in the latter conflict, missile
technology also were offered good examples of the use of
this type of advantage-
3. Was a form of "selective intervention" employed on
the actual battlefield? "Were joint service opera-
tions utilized?
It can easily be argued that the foremost battle-
field victories of each of the conflicts we studied stemmed
from an operation that used the fundamentals of "selective
intervention". Jeffrey Record correctly notes that both
these wars proved the continuing viability of amphibious
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assault. 324 It might also be added that the success of these
efforts was grounded in an almost complete naval superi-
ority, highlighting the advantages inherent and the flexi-
bility provided by a "balanced" sea service.
Specially trained and/or "elite" forces were also
much in evidence in these conflicts. The uses and the
impact of these types of troops are never so apparent as on
the limited battlefield were individual elements often have
an amplified impact on the strategic equation. Marine,
commando, and parachute forces combined with well-trained
airmen and seamen to give a significant lift to the prob-
ability of success in each of these wars and also to prove
the potential of carefully planned and implemented joint
service operations.
4. Were any of the original objectives changed during
the course of the war? Why?
Our conclusions must be somewhat mixed and tentative
on this question. In Korea there is substantial evidence
that the U.S. military leadership in the field misunderstood
the priorities of their political and military counterparts
in Washington. Thus, it seemed to some that the objectives
of the war were changed in midstream. However, it is the
author's contention that what changed was not so much the
goal as the indicator used to signal its accomplishment.
The classic case in this regard was the controversy
surrounding the crossing of the 38th parallel and the push
toward the Yalu in Korea. The relief of General Douglas
MacArthur was one result of this situation and will long be
remembered for the doubts it raised concerning the battle-
field strategy best suited to a limited war.
324jeffrey Record, "The Falklands War," The Washington
^uarterl^. Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1982), p. 487
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In contrast, Britain was able to stand firmly by its
objectives throughout the duration of its war. Of course,
it is hard to say if this would have been possible had the
Falklands conflict lasted for the three years experienced in
Korea- Nevertheless, the United Kingdom must be commended
on the consistency of its position. Credit for this ulti-
mately falls to the exhibition of personal resolve shown by
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
5. Were allies sought after entry into the conflict?
Why and under what pretext or arrangement?
Relations with "allies" were important to our actors
during the Conduct phase of each conflict. The most impor-
tant consideration was always the maintenance of interna-
tional justification that such support exemplified.
However, neither the U.S. or the U.K. was willing to
substantially alter its objectives in the conflict to retain
support, though both showed a willingness to, at times,
soften its rhetoric and public image to augment such
efforts.
3 • TerminatiojQ
1. Were measures or tactical goals developed to indicate
the achievement of objectives? What were they?
The concept of the segregation of goals and their
related indicators, in general, appears little understood
though it was evidenced at times our study. The problems of
the United States in Korea stemmed, in a real way, from its
changing of the indicators (e.g. reaching the 38th parallel,
crossing the 38th parallel, destroying the army of North
Korea, reaching the Kansas-Wyoming line, etc.) through whj-ch
it judged its success in the conflict. The United Kingdom,
which retained a single and simplistic indicator (the
227
withdrawal/removal of the Argentine occupation force on the
FalJclands) , had considerably less trouble.
Washington's failure to set forth an unmistakable
single or set of indicator (s) caused a great deal of
consternation both for their commanders in Korea and for the
public at home. While the Korean situation was much more
complex than that which surrounded the Falklands it did not
defy this type of systematic organization. The failure to
accomplish this led to repercussions that were most serious.
2- Was a periodic assessment made of the progress toward
objectives?
The answer to this inquiry is obviously much depen-
dent on the one preceding. For this reason, its answer in
the Korean case must be a somewhat qualified no. Because
the indicators seemingly changed on several occasions and no
attempt was made to provide a vehicle through which they
could be cross-referenced, such a periodic assessment became
impossible. Hence, "ad hoc" analysis was employed as the
only alternative until the stalemate of the late stages of
the war forced both sides to end the conflict, due in part
to sheer exhaustion.
In the British case the assessment of progress
toward objectives was distinctly tied to efforts to mili-
tarily terminate the conflict. Since the U.K. was faced
with a situation where they were forced to defeat the
Argentine services one by one, termination was gauged
through tactical progress. As Icng as the political support
which backing the intervention did not waver this was a
simple and effective formula.
3. When the initial objectives were reached was war
termination sought?
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Again we are faced with an inquiry that is dependent
on the answer to its predecessor and in the case of the U.S.
the answer must again be no. The success of the Inchon
landing with the strategic momentum it produced offered the
first opportunity for the U.S. to seriously consider termi-
nation on terms very favorable to their goals. It was a
change of indicators that prohibited this. In retrospect,
it can be safely assumed that, had the American decision-
makers realized that Communist China would enter the war,
this would have been the course they would have taken.
Unfortunately, a miscalculation cost the U.S. a chance for
an earlier and possibly more meaningful victory.
The British, faced with a situation where their
conflict could only be ended on the battlefield, could not
initiate termination until the Argentine garrison had been
either withdrawn or forced to leave. Thus, we can place the
initiation of the termination of the Falklands War at the
time when two of the three Argentine service arms had been
beaten and the garrison alone was left on the islands. The
author contends that this was en or shortly after May 25th.
4. Under what condition in relation to the original
stated objectives was the conflict ended?
Both our case studies can be judged as "successful"
in that they accomplished most of their originally stated
objectives. In Korea, the survival of the ROK was assured
and the line against Communism and overt aggression was
drawn and adequately defended. The only failure was the
ability to keep the war limited to its initial participants.
The entry of the PRC was thus somewhat of a setback, though
the fact that the war remained "limited" can be interpreted
positively.
Britain's success was ccmplete. The islands were
returned to British administration and the aggression of the
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Argentines was revenged. It was a conflict that, in the
view of the U.K., could not have turned out much better.
5. Was the employment of nuclear weapons ever consid-
ered? If so, under what circumstances?
We can definitively say that the use of nuclear
weapons was contemplated in Korea. This began with contin-
gency planning soon after the invasion by the North and went
as far as veiled nuclear coercion later in the conflict.
Many credit the latter action as being crucial to the final
Communist agreement to end hostilities on the peninsula.
The evidence of the role that the contemplation of
the use of nuclear weapons played in the Falklands War is
murky. It would not be surprising to find that they were
considered as some type of contingency. However, the rumor
published about the movement of a Polaris sub toward the
South Atlantic is the only evidence we have. The fact is
that the British conventional forces enjoyed such great
success that nuclear coercion was never even remotely
needed.
6. How was the conflict terminated?
Our two case studies exemplified different modes of
termination. The war in Korea was ended with a negotiated
settlement while the Falklands conflict was ended by
complete military victory. However, both employed the use
of military pressure in their closing stages.
We have already mentioned the role of nuclear
weapons in the termination of the Korean War. Also, conven-
tional pressure was also used to speed the end of this
conflict, the bombing of the irrigation dam complex north of
Pyongyang being a good case in point. In the Falklands
military pressure began on the psychological level, in the
hope of avoiding the necessity of having to invade and
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reconquer the islands. Yet, to bring the war to an end, a
military campaign against the capital at Port Stanley was
mandated to "dictate" the close of the conflict to the obst-
inate Argentines.
B. FIBAI THOaCHTS
In conclusion, we can say that the Limited War Model
provides an interesting insight into the decision- maXing
process surrounding the utilization of the limited war
instrument. Though far from perfect, it provides a possible
starting point for understanding this type of war. Before
we close, several other comments and suggestions for further
study merit mention.
First, it is not surprising to find that the step-by-
step progression of the model does not conform to the time
constraints that are often associated with crisis-
management. Hence, decisions made concerning entry into a
limited war may well be overlapped (e.g. objective or goal
formulation might have to be considered simultaneously with
the assessment of risk). However, in such situations the
model still offers a guide that is relevant to the decision-
maker. If nothing else, it provides a checklist for the
review formulation after initial deliberation. Concern
about overlap within the model in especially applicable to
the Conduct and Termination phases- Here the interaction
between events in the field and political maneuvering to end
a conflict becomes extremely complex. This is one area
where much more theoretical work could be done.
Second, after completing the two case studies a thought
advanced much earlier seemed to be confirmed. This is that
the Entry phase of a limited war is by far the most impor-
tant. The decisions made during this time period impact all
further considerations and actions in the conflict. Thus,
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one should be not only deliberately cautious but, fore-
sighted while acting in this phase. This is accomplished by
projecting the policy alternatives through a theoretical
assessment of their possible impact on later events prior to
implementation. In this endeavor consultation of this model
might be of some use. Without guestion, this is a inexact
science, yet an undertaking that should be made to the
greatest extent possible.
Finally, one other idea became apparent while working on
the case studies. This was that they are both ripe for
Allisonian analysis, a fact particularly true of the Korean
War where the declassification of many documents in the
mid-1970's makes the prospect of such a study appear
extremely interesting. The Falklands War also would offer
an intriguing, though probably much less source fertile,
ground for study because the Allisonian technique is less
often applied to non-American cases.
This ends our attempt to present and analyze the Limited
War Model. The problem of war, and in today's world
"limited war", promises to be ever present. One can only
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